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Modern society is increasingly dependent on computer networks, which are essential to delivering an 
increasing number of key services. With this increasing dependence, comes a corresponding increase 
in global traffic and users. One of the tools administrators are using to deal with this growth is Software 
Defined Networking (SDN). SDN changes the traditional distributed networking design to a more 
programmable centralised solution, based around the SDN controller. This allows administrators to 
respond more quickly to changing network conditions. However, this change in paradigm, along with 
the growing use of encryption can cause other issues.  
For many years, security administrators have used techniques such as deep packet inspection and 
signature analysis to detect malicious activity. These methods are becoming less common as artificial 
intelligence (AI) and deep learning technologies mature. AI and deep learning have advantages in being 
able to cope with 0-day attacks and being able to detect malicious activity despite the use of encryption 
and obfuscation techniques. However, SDN reduces the volume of data that is available for analysis 
with these machine learning techniques. Rather than packet information, SDN relies on flows, which 
are abstract representations of network activity.  
Security researchers have been slow to move to this new method of networking, in part because of this 
reduction in data, however doing so could have advantages in responding quickly to malicious activity. 
This research project seeks to provide a way to reconcile the contradiction apparent, by building a deep 
learning model that can achieve comparable results to other state-of-the-art models, while using 70% 
fewer features. This is achieved through the creation of new data from logs, as well as creation of a 
new risk-based sampling method to prioritise suspect flows for analysis, which can successfully 
prioritise over 90% of malicious flows from leading datasets. Additionally, provided is a mitigation 
method that can work with a SDN solution to automatically mitigate attacks after they are found, 




Modern society is heavily reliant on computer networks, which are key to delivering an ever-expanding 
array of critical services. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the volume of annual global IP traffic is 
forecast to grow to 4.8ZB by 2022, which is a 220% increase from 1.5ZB in 2017 [1]. Much of this growth 
will come from regions that currently have poor internet access, however, even in Western Europe, the 
number of users and devices is set to increase, along with internet speeds (353 million users in 2022, 
up from 331 million in 2017, and 4 billion networked devices in 2022, up from 2.3 billion in 2017) [1], [2]. 
As the volume of data continues to increase, so too does the need for new networking solutions to 
handle it. Software Defined Networks (SDNs) are rapidly becoming one of the main tools used to aid 
this growth. Traditional network infrastructure relies upon hardware routers, each maintaining a routing 
table for the potential paths for packets between devices, and the most efficient paths that can be taken. 
On a small scale, this is relatively easy to manage as changes can be made by reprogramming the 
routers as needed, and even small outages can be planned for and automatically corrected. However, 
at scale, the reprogramming of numerous individual devices becomes a complex and time-consuming 
task. This problem is negated in SDN environments as instead of each router maintaining its own route 
table, a central controller manages the route table. If a router has not previously encountered a route 
that a new packet requires, then it will ask the SDN controller for instructions on how to handle the 
packet and any future similar packets. In effect, instead of being distributed between all routers on the 
network, the routing table is now centralised on one device, which is separate from the devices that 
route the packets. This separation is what defines SDN, and it is described as “The physical separation 
of the network control plane from the forwarding plane, and where a control plane controls several 
devices” [3], [4]. 
However, security systems have been slow to respond to this new way of networking. Most existing 
IDSs still analyse data from packet headers directly, requiring additional hardware in all relevant 
locations, which runs counter to the SDN paradigm of having a centralised solution providing a holistic 
view of the network. Successfully integrating an IDS into the northbound interface of a SDN controller 
would bring all the same benefits to network security that SDN has brought to networking more 
generally. Upon finding a malicious flow, a SDN controller would be able to automatically send 
instructions to attempt to mitigate it. SDNs would provide an IDS with a more holistic view of a network 
and negate the need for individual devices in selected parts of the network. However, moving to such 
a model for IDSs does come with additional problems. 
One problem is a problem that current IDSs suffer from, data rates. Moving to a centralised solution 
would mean that the IDS must not only monitor all traffic in its local network segment, but all traffic from 
across the network. While SDN does aid with this somewhat, by providing an abstracted view of network 
activity in the form of network flows, a network will still produce many network flows creating a great 
deal of work. Additionally, these flows suffer from another problem. Most current IDS technologies are 
designed to work with traditional network packets (e.g. Flags), which provide a great deal of data useful 
for determining malicious intent. SDNs do not typically keep track of this kind of data since it is not 
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useful for determining overall network activity levels. In addition, some IDSs monitor data from inside 
packet bodies (known as deep packet inspection (DPI)), again a rich source of information that is lost 
when moving to an SDN-based solution. This means that when attempting to create an IDS that detects 
malicious activity based on SDN flows, there is both too much data (in terms of sheer volume of flows) 
and not enough (in terms of the features collected.) 
Another potential issue that could exacerbate this is the rise in popularity of machine learning. Recently, 
machine learning and in particular deep learning, has been seen as a potential boon to security-minded 
administrators. It has been shown that machine learning can detect attacks using various forms of data, 
the goal being to train an algorithm on various examples of data, which will then be able to detect new 
variants through generalisation [5]. This generalisation can aid in detecting novel and 0-day threats [6], 
threats for which a signature has not been produced or even seen before. However, machine learning 
models and in particular deep learning models, require large volumes of training data, with many 
different data points or features. As has been explained, SDNs goal is to abstract the features machine 
learning models need in order to get high accuracy rates. Additionally, deep learning models are 
particularly computationally expensive, which increases issues given the volumes of data that must be 
analysed.  
This work proposes a solution to these dilemmas. Proposed is a deep learning solution that uses only 
data that is readily available, without the use of techniques such as DPI, and can be integrated into the 
northbound interface of a SDN controller, to make use of the holistic view a SDN provides.  
1.1 Motivation 
One of the advents to aid with the increasing amounts of data has been SDN [4], which allows networks 
to respond more dynamically to changing network conditions. However, IDSs have been slow to 
embrace this new way of networking. As such, the motivational factors for this research are: 
1 To provide a solution to the issue of data rates overloading IDSs 
One of the issues facing traditional network infrastructure is that data rates are increasingly forcing 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) to either act in parallel to the network data (off-line), 
and potentially only detect attacks after the attack has succeeded, or use sampling which could 
increase the risk of attacks being missed due to packets not being sampled. SDN provides a high-
level representation of the network activity, meaning less data must be analysed and malicious 
activity should still be detectable. 
2 To provide a solution to the amount of time it takes to mitigate an attack 
It has been found that the time from first action in an event chain to initial compromise of an asset 
is most often measured in seconds or minutes [7]. While reducing the load on IDSs can aid with 
this (ensuring breaches are found in a timely manner) other solutions may be required to limit the 
damage of a successful breach. SDN provides one way to do this, through automated changing of 
the network conditions to hinder an attacker’s progress. 
3 To provide a solution to the contradiction between AI and SDN in an IDS setting 
3 
 
Machine learning provides a method to detect 0-day threats, being able to generalise well enough 
to determine if a flow is malicious even if it is “novel”, simply because many “novel” attacks are just 
slightly altered versions of existing attacks. However, machine learning requires large volumes of 
data, which SDN attempts to abstract 
4. To provide a solution to the issue of training time for AI based IDSs. 
While machine learning, and deep learning has potential to aid with intrusion detection, the 
amount of time it takes to train these systems is prohibitive, especially the large and deep models 
proposed in research. Machine learning models must be updated regularly to keep abreast of 
changing network conditions. This is a time-consuming process that must be repeated regularly, 
and reducing this time is a major issue. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
To address the research challenges outlined, the aim of this research is to develop an IDS solution that 
can be tightly integrated within a SDN-based network, capable of accurately identifying 0-day attacks 
and mitigating those threats that are detected. This broad aim can be separated into two primary goals: 
1 Investigation of the role of data sources and machine learning in mitigating 0-day attacks 
One of the issues identified is that SDN flows only provide a high-level representation of network 
data. This high-level representation typically comes in the form of a network “flow” that contains 
very few data points. This means there is less to analyse when attempting to make changes to a 
network and allows faster changes. However, machine learning typically requires large volumes of 
data points to be accurate. The effect of this will need to be investigated, and alternative data 
sources will need to be identified if (as is believed) accuracy will be affected. 
2 Development of a system that can utilise the advantages that SDN has to offer 
As has been stated, SDN has advantages when it comes to identifying and mitigating malicious 
activity. The smaller flows, while offering less raw data than packet data would, do allow for faster 
processing, meaning processing could potentially happen at line rate. Additionally, SDN allows for 
incredibly granular control of flows. This allows for the potential of mitigation that has been 
customised for the attack that is detected. For example, flows identified as botnet activity could 
lead to the infected machines being quarantined, while DoS attack flows could simply be dropped. 
In order to meet these aims, the following objectives have been established: 
1. Discover the effect of limited SDN flows on machine learning IDSs (Aim 1) 
Current literature will need to be examined on to what effect the limited data within SDN flows has 
on IDS detection rates, as well as what methods have been proposed to overcome the issues 
posed.  
2. Develop a method to mitigate the effects of the limited data. (Aim 1) 
A machine learning model will need to be built that can operate at similar levels to that in other state 
of the art research, but with significantly less data. This will additionally need investigation of 
overfitting causes and mitigations. 
3. Identify other potential data sources (Aim 1) 
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One potential method of mitigating the effects of the limited data on detection accuracy is to 
incorporate other accessible data sources into the detection system. These alternative sources will 
need to be identified, and methods of aggregating them into the SDN flows will need to be examined 
and tested.  
4. Determine how to run the model at near line speed (Aim 2) 
The aggregation of any alternative data as well as the analysis as to the maliciousness of any flows 
will need to happen at line speed. This is a consideration that will need to be incorporated into the 
earlier objectives, i.e. the speed of aggregating the data and how computationally expensive the 
detection system is, but a new sampling method for occasions where network load exceeds 
capacity to process flows will also need to be developed, especially since machine learning tends 
to be computationally expensive. 
5. Determine a method to mitigate even 0-day threats (Aim 2) 
One of the primary advantages of SDN is its ability to react to changing network conditions. A 
method should therefore be developed to make use of this ability to mitigate malicious activity once 
it has been detected in real time. Additionally, a primary advantage of machine learning in intrusion 
detection is the ability to handle 0-day attacks. These should also be mitigated, and so a method to 
identify a mitigation for previously unknown malicious activity needs to be devised. 
1.3 Novelties 
As a multi-disciplinary project, this project provides the following novel contributions: 
1 Use an alternative to network packet data 
SDN flows have less data available than reading packet data directly. This can result in reductions 
in accuracy for anomaly detection. As such, the flow data will be supplemented with network log 
data. Although Hybrid IDSs are not a novel idea, existing methods classify logs and network packet 
data in two separate processes. The outputs of both are used to determine if an attack has taken 
place. The contribution offered by this work is a novel technique that aggregates log and network 
flow data into a single data stream. Using logs like this should additionally allow for parallelisation 
of the flow creation process (network flows and log flows), which will aid in distributing 
computational load. 
2 Initial automated risk assessment mechanism 
A HDBScan-based mechanism has been devised that enables autonomous and near-wire speed 
grouping of similar network flows based on behavioural similarity and the assignation of a priority 
rating based on the percentage of flows that have been found to be malicious. HDBScan works 
significantly faster than other machine learning methods, enabling rapid grouping of each flow to 
be grouped at or near wire speed. This means that any flows that are potentially malicious (or high-
risk) will be analysed by the IDS, rather than potentially being missed by sampling methods. It is 
believed that this is the first-time unsupervised clustering will have been used to assign a risk score 
in this way. Being able to run in real time is a significant issue, as even traditional IDS methods 
struggle to deal with the volume of data, and the use of machine learning adds more complexity.  
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3 Custom classification model for combination log and network flows 
The initial classification of benign or malicious flows will be performed using a specifically 
developed classification model. The model is based upon a single convolutional neural network 
with customised layers and uses various techniques to reduce overfitting such as dropout and 
batch normalisation. In addition, techniques such as PCA, SMOTE or ADASYN will be employed, 
to attempt to ensure the training data is as useful as possible. As has been stated, ML, and 
convolutional, models in particular require many features to learn from, and this work shall use only 
27% of the features (11 out of 41) other works require. This is a significant issue, as has been 
stated the more data that is available the better the classification accuracy can be. Deep models 
are seen as requiring large volumes of data that is not available here. 
4 Adaptive mitigation framework 
The proposed mitigation framework is capable of identifying a diverse range of threats and 
implementing differing mitigations depending on the scenario. For example, if a botnet is detected, 
then quarantining infected systems may be an appropriate response, whereas if a probe is detected 
than an appropriate response may be to drop the flow. The framework leverages four sequential 
machine learning models in order to compare the flow to widely accepted attack taxonomies. It is 
believed this will be the first-time machine learning has been used to determine which leaf of a 
taxonomy an attack belongs to, and then use this information to devise an appropriate response to 
an attack. 
1.4 Research Scope 
This work is targeted at enterprise network infrastructure i.e. networks that are large enough to enjoy 
the benefits of SDN but not as large or complex as data centre networks or backbone internet structure. 
However, it is believed that this work could be expanded to other areas where SDN is proving useful, 
such as IoT and Fog. Specifying enterprise networks is still a broad scope. We specifically target 
networks that make use of their own (for example) webservers, email servers or file servers. Some (or 
even all) of these services may have been moved to the cloud in order to allow easier remote access, 
however it is still the case that many enterprises use local servers that are synced to the cloud to ensure 
on-site access, legal compliance, or security concerns.  
It is envisaged that the kind of company that could make use of this would likely have multiple sites 
(either nationally or locally), with custom connections linking those sites. Such a business would likely 
have custom Internet connections, and multiple connections for redundancy. Each site could potentially 
have hundreds of employees. For businesses of this scale, SDN is a very appealing technology as it 
simplifies what could otherwise be very complex network management. Similarly, companies of this 
size may want to use custom IDS services. It is worth noting that potentially office space providers may 
also find this technology useful, since they are typically responsible for Internet access for their 






In this chapter, will seek to provide additional context for some of the key areas of this work and discuss 
in more detail some of issues this work seeks to resolve through discussing previous works on the 
subjects. Data rates and malicious activity, SDN and how it operates, Deep Learning and intrusion 
detection methods shall be discussed. Finally, the state of current deep learning IDSs within SDN 
environments shall be explained, and briefly discuss current relevant datasets. 
2.1 Recent Data Rates and Malicious Activity 
From Chapter 1 is can be seen that data rates are increasing, and this is of concern for network 
administrators. However, the statistics need additional context to understand the extent of the issues 
that are arising. While fixed line internet speeds are expected to almost double between 2017 and 2022 
(increasing from an average of 37.9Mbps to 76Mbps for Western Europe) [1] most of that extra 
bandwidth is not being used on fixed devices. In 2017, roughly 48% of all IP traffic came from fixed 
devices, whereas in 2022 that is predicted to drop to 29% of all IP traffic. It will instead be replaced by 
wireless devices, mostly smartphones. In 2017, smartphones accounted for 18% of global IP traffic. 
This is a significant amount but dwarfed by the 41% of traffic accounted for by PCs alone. In 2022, PC 
traffic is expected to only account for 19% of all IP traffic, while smartphone traffic is expected to 
increase to 44%.  
This change in usage is important, as it shows some of the shifting demands that administrators are 
going to have to deal with. Generally, Wi-Fi access points are going to be in more demand as people 
grow more accustomed to working from their mobile devices. This is important as mobile traffic is more 
potentially more prone to temporal behavioural variations (e.g. an unexpected number connections, or 
traffic volume more generally), with high peaks and low troughs. In addition, those peaks may change 
location depending upon time, even within the same LAN. With fixed terminals, it was understood where 
most traffic within a business originated from, and when (where the largest number of terminals are 
located, and when they are scheduled to be in use). This predictability makes it comparatively easy to 
plan for. The administrator can determine a minimal acceptable service level, and plan to have enough 
bandwidth to accommodate it. With the move to wireless, this is no longer the case. While the number 
of people within LAN can still be estimated with some reliability, where those people wish to access 
local resources is constantly changing. For instance, an impromptu company meeting could see 
excessive surge in one room, which previously may have only housed a couple of fixed terminals. 
Offices with many terminals may see less use as workers move more freely to other locations to discuss 
matters with other staff not located in the same room. This kind of activity puts more pressure on 
wireless access points, some of which may only see those kind of data rates very infrequently.  
Along with this change in how networks are being used, there has been a change in what malicious 
activity is undertaken. Ransomware attacks have generally decreased since reaching a peak in 2017 
[8], however the number of ransomware attacks that specifically target businesses increased 12% 
between 2017 and 2018 [8][7]. Ransomware relies on being able to spread through a local network, in 
order to encrypt both active files and any backups (or the victim could just wipe the affected computer 
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and restore it). In addition, there have been instances of attacks that initially look like ransomware; 
however, the files are encrypted with a random key that cannot be recovered, meaning that the files are 
permanently lost. While using the same malicious software and tools, this means that the attacks are 
purely being used for disruption and destruction, with little intention of making large amounts of money 
directly. The reasons for these kinds of attacks vary, but again they are primarily targeted at businesses, 
not individuals. 
There has also been an increase in “Living off the land” attacks, which target commonly used 
applications and attempt to hide malicious activity as benign. Applications used like this include Remote 
Desktop Connection (RDP). Similarly, worms have seen a decrease in spreading via remote exploit 
vulnerabilities [7], [9]. Instead malware has moved to using simple techniques such as brute forcing 
passwords to laterally move across a network. Tied in with this has been an increase in “supply chain” 
attacks. These involve exploiting third party software or services in order to compromise a final target. 
A prominent example is the Petya/NotPetya [8][10] ransomware attack that was propagated through 
the misuse of a software update of MEDoc, a Ukrainian tax preparation program. Administrators 
generally have little control over the content of software updates and are frequently advised to install 
them without being able to gauge the security risks of the update. This kind of attack will allow an 
attacker to gain a foothold in many companies that use the software exploited, and can provide a 
foothold to launch further attacks using different methods if the attacker chooses (for example, NotPetya 
uses a version of Mimikatz to gain administrator passwords to spread across local networks). 
Finally, there has also been an increase in IoT-specific attacks [8] (an average of 5,200 per month 
against Symantec’s IoT honeypot), as these devices are often relatively poorly protected, but provide 
an excellent foothold for an attacker to launch more attacks. Many routers for instance provide all the 
tools needed to initiate a password attack against a server (using SSH for instance, or telnet), and are 
often themselves left with default or unsecure passwords. 
Moving away from attacks that specifically target businesses, there has been an increase in malware 
that targets mobile and other IoT devices within the last three years. This may be unexpected, 
considering the increasing prevalence these devices have in general society. This does pose an issue 
for business administrators however, as they need to be aware of the risks of the mobile malware and 
how to best prevent its spread. It is estimated that 1 in 36 mobile devices used within organisations 
could be classed as high risk [7]. This includes devices that had been routed or jailbroken, along with 
devices that had a high degree of certainty that malware had been installed on the device. Taken in 
conjunction with the fact that most data is going to come from mobile devices, this means that a large 
number of devices that are not under the administrator’s control, with a high risk of being compromised, 
are being taken into the heart of an organisations infrastructure and placed onto the same LAN as 
potentially sensitive documents or other servers. These devices seem to offer ideal opportunities as 
jumping off points, either to infect computers they are connected to or as ways to infect wireless routers 
they connect to. 
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In summary, just as the use of computer networks has changed, so has the malicious use of computer 
networks. IoT devices were once seen as secure and are now a potential major weakness. Updates 
from suppliers once only needed to be vetted enough to ensure they did not break existing processes, 
but now can be another point of weakness. Mobile device malware infections have grown steadily, and 
these devices are invited into the heart of company networks. Malicious activity can be started from any 
IP connected device and can target any IP connected device. To meet this threat, IDS’s need to be able 
to detect threats from all over a network, not just isolate particularly sensitive areas.  
2.2 SDN 
The volume of network traffic is increasing, however the volume itself is less of a concern than the 
complexities that come with managing it are. As data rates grow, the infrastructure required to deal with 
the growth becomes more complex, often requiring hundreds (if not thousands) of switches and paths. 
2.2.1 Traditional Networking 
Traditional networking works through devices having two planes, a control plane, and a data plane, 
which are vertically integrated into a single device (the network switch) [11]. The data plane is 
responsible for the movement of packets from one port to another, based upon a routing table. When a 
packet enters a port, packet header information is recorded and a match in the table is searched for in 
order to route the packet correctly. If no information for the packet exists within the routing table, the 
data plane forwards the packet meta-data to the control plane. The control plane is responsible for 
building a map of the network (or the network topology), and creating the routing tables for the data 
plane, dependant on that map. So, when it receives packet information from the data plane that doesn’t 
match any existing rules, it refers to the topology it has built (through the use of protocols such as the 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [12] or the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) [13]) to determine how to 
forward that packet, and updates the routing table accordingly.  
This is an effective system, which limits the impact of failures through not being centralised. If an 
individual switch fails, then neighbouring switches can learn of this failure and attempt to reroute traffic 
around the failed node. This was an important consideration of early IP networks that were supposed 
to work even in the event of catastrophic damage to infrastructure (given the military background). 
However, the same system leads to issues of scalability. Each individual switch needs to build its own 
topology map, and no switch will have a complete map of a sufficiently sized network. This will be due 
to limits in: 
 Memory: Even if you add more memory to a switch (which can be costly), that memory needs 
to be fast enough to allow the data plane to search the entire routing table to forward the packet 
at line speed. 
 Processing power: Building the network topologies is not a simple task computationally and 
each node added to a network increases that complexity. Larger networks require increasingly 
powerful processors to build and maintain the network map. 
 Available bandwidth: Network switches attempting to gather information about the network 
will need to use some network capacity. 
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None of these issues are insurmountable but the solutions are costly on an individual switch basis, and 
when you multiply the costs hundreds of times for multiple switches in a large network, they can easily 
spiral out of control. 
2.2.2 How SDN is Different 
SDN changes the traditional view of networks by separating the control and data planes. Switches 
continue to contain the data plane and are responsible for the forwarding of packets depending upon a 
routing table. However, that is all they do. The control plane is moved to a centralised device, the 
controller, which many switches can contact and ask for instructions. This does implement a single point 
of failure in networks (if the controller is compromised then the network could be), however it also 
centralises the costs into a single device. 
The model also provides other advantages. Traditionally, managed switches needed to be programmed 
individually before being placed into a network, as well as needing to be individually reprogrammed if 
the network structure changed. While tools to aid this process did exist, they were typically locked to a 
single provider through the use of proprietary protocols (causing issues if the vendor were to stop 
supporting that protocol) and were propagated through the network on a switch to switch basis (causing 
issues with a potential lack of clarity on when/if switches had received updated instructions). In contrast, 
SDN switches need minimal configuration before being placed in a network, and when a network 
structure changes, switches can receive the new instructions from the controller directly, simplifying and 
quickening the process. In effect, it allows what would normally be managed switches to become 
unmanaged. This advantage combined with the centralisation of cost allows for another advantage – 
dynamically programmable networks. 
Since the controller is a singular device, it gives the opportunity to add another plane above the control 
plane, the application plane. This application plane can receive information about the network state 
from the control plane (named the northbound interface), and issue instructions depending upon several 
factors and different programs (see Figure 2.2-1). For example, you could program an application to 
redirect traffic through certain paths at certain times of day for maintenance reasons or redirect traffic 
in response to malicious traffic being detected. These rules would be difficult to implement in the 
traditional networks, for two main reasons: 
1. The decentralised nature of networks means that getting multiple switches to act in a coordinated 
manner, even switches that are not directly connected or aware of each other, is a difficult task. 
2. The custom programs would require additional computational resources, multiplied by every switch 
in the network that needs to be able to run these programs. 
What this effectively means, is that while under the old, decentralised paradigm, traffic was routed 
depending upon IP or MAC address only, under SDN, traffic can be routed depending upon many other 




Figure 2.2-1 – How the layers of a SDN interact. 
1. Directly Programmable: As the network control is decoupled from the forwarding functions, 
network devices can be programmed directly. 
2. Agile: Abstracting the control plane from the data plane allows administrators to dynamically adjust 
network-wide traffic flow to meet the changing needs of dynamic network conditions. 
3. Centrally managed: The network intelligence is centralised in the controller, which maintains a 
near real-time global view of the network, which appears to applications as a single logical switch. 
2.2.3 The Effects of SDN on Intrusion Detection 
As established in Subsection 2.2.2, SDN is a technology that has been created in response to growing 
data rates and the resulting increase in network complexity. However, the benefits or drawbacks to 
network security as a result are less clear cut. Other academic works (discussed in Chapter 3) have 
indicated that SDN can have some security benefits, making some attacks more difficult, but also that 
the controller being a single point of failure, makes other attacks easier. For example, it may be possible 
to cause a DoS by flooding the controller with many new flows. While attacks like this may have been 
possible previously, they would target single switches, and the distributed nature of networks would 
significantly reduce the potential impact. Broadly, SDNs should be more resilient against DoS attacks. 
The purpose of SDNs is to increase the utilisation of network hardware, and to decrease the reaction 
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time in response to changing network conditions. A SDN should lessen the impact of DoS attacks since 
they should be able to automatically detect the increasing volumes of traffic or failure of network 
devices, and redirect traffic accordingly. Additionally, once the DoS attack has been detected, the SDN 
should make it easier to react to the attack, blocking or redirecting malicious flows. 
Generally, it is agreed that while SDNs do have associated risks that need to be accounted for when 
designing an SDN, they also bring benefits that should not be ignored. Another example is that SDNs 
allow for the redirection of traffic to middle boxes anywhere on the network for traffic to be analysed. 
Currently, middle boxes (IDSs, firewalls, load balancers etc.) need to be in specific parts of the network 
and only affect traffic within those parts. SDNs allow these devices to be separated, with traffic 
redirected to the devices if the SDN controller decides it is necessary. This offers some advantages, 
including separation of the security middle boxes from the main network, more selective analysis of 
traffic (only analysing traffic that SDN controller deems important) and centralisation of the middle boxes 
themselves (only a single device is able to analyse multiple areas of the network). Of course, these 
adaptions also have implications that need to be considered. If a NIDS is going to analyse all traffic 
across a network (rather than just a small section) then that NIDS needs to be computationally powerful 
enough to cope with the extra traffic. 
2.3 Deep Learning 
Representational learning is a technique that enables a system to automatically determine the 
representations for a given classification based upon the raw data. Machine learning is an example of 
representational learning, in that a machine learning algorithm determines the features that differentiate 
the classes automatically. Deep learning is a subset of machine learning that uses multiple levels of 
representation, with each level transforming the representation to a slightly more abstract model [5]. 
For example, rather than an input layer containing the pixels of an image and a shallow classifier 
determining the picture contains a face (something most shallow classifiers would not be able to do with 
sufficiently complex pictures), a deeper model may have the same pixel input, and then the first hidden 
layer detect edges. The second layer might detect the edges from an eye or mouth. The final layer may 
detect the image contains eyes, a mouth, a nose, and ears while the final classification determines the 
picture contains a face. 
In the same way, a deep model attempting to classify malicious traffic may have a first layer that detects 
“edges” of packets (e.g. a small packet size, a short Time To Live (TTL) or the use of a particular 
protocol). The second layer may add some context to these features, while abstracting the actually 
features (e.g. the packet is small or the protocol is unusual) and the final layer may be used as a final 
classifier (e.g. a DDoS is being attempted). This usage of multiple layers allows greater generalisation 
and can lead to better classification accuracy than shallow machine learning models are capable of, as 
each layer is building on the representations of previous layers [5]. 
Deep learning algorithms generally come with greater computational expense, which is something that 
initially held back their adoption since their conception in 1965 [14]. However, the advances in 
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processing capabilities, such as the introduction of General-Purpose Graphics Processing Units 
(GPGPUs), has reduced these barriers. 
 
Figure 2.3-1 – An example of a DNN structure 
Figure 2.3-1 shows an example of a Deep Neural Network (DNN) structure. The input layer contains 6 
features, which is expanded into the first hidden layer with 8 nodes, which maps to another hidden layer 
with 8 nodes, before resulting in classification layer with 4 nodes. In this case, the network would be 
detecting 4 discrete things. If applied to detecting network attacks there could be classifications for 
benign traffic, DoS traffic, Probe traffic and other malicious traffic.  
The first layer, termed the Input layer, is the raw data of the thing being classified. For example, in a 
grayscale image this would consist of individual pixels, typically ranging in values from 0-255 depicting 
the colour depth. For intrusion detection, this consists of packet data, including things like protocol type, 
TTL, size and source/destination addresses. The middle two layers are termed “hidden” layers as they 
are not directly observable from the system input and outputs. Each hidden layer transforms its own 
input data (i.e. the data from the layer before it) into a slightly more abstract version. With enough of 
these transformations, complex features can be learned [5]. This process is termed representational 
learning and higher levels of representation (i.e. further along the model) aspects of the input that are 
important for the classification task are amplified, and less important aspects are supressed. The key 
aspect is that these representational layers are not coded by an engineer but are learned from data. 
Finally, is the output layer (also known as the classification layer), which is commonly a more traditional 
shallow learning classifier, which receives its input from the final hidden layer. As opposed to being 
another layer of the same Multi-Layer Perceptron’s (MLP) node that make up the hidden layers. These 
are typically linear layers that compute a weighted sum for each of the potential classes. If this weighted 
sum is above a threshold then it determines that the input belongs to a particular category. The issue 
with these shallow classifiers has been that they are sensitive to irrelevant changes in the input, which 
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leads to misclassification when used alone. However, when paired with a suitable feature extractor (the 
hidden or deep model for example), they can perform well, being able to detect small changes in input. 
Previously, the feature extractors were designed by hand, specific to the kind of input that was being 
classified. This took great amounts of engineering skill and domain expertise, however the automatic 
feature extraction enabled by deep learning simplifies the process significantly.  
While all the nodes are connected to every other node on the next layer within Figure 2.3-1 (known as 
a fully connected network), this is not required, or even necessarily recommended. It has been found 
that limiting connections can aid in reducing overfitting. Overfitting is a phenomenon that can occur 
when a model is trained too much. A goal of machine learning is to identify not only samples it has been 
shown, but examples that are similar to what it has been shown but it has never seen before. The ability 
to adapt to new data is referred to as generalisation. When overfitting occurs, generalisation loses 
accuracy (typically on testing or evaluation datasets) as the models start to only associate the training 
data with the classifications. Overfitting can be avoided in three main ways: 
1. Using more data: Both increasing the number of samples you have, as well as increasing the 
number of features within the dataset can aid in overfitting. Increasing the amount of data forces 
the model to attempt to learn all new data and prevents it from fitting too closely to the original 
training data. 
2. Using less data: While this may seem to contradict the first point, often a lot of data within datasets 
can be “noisy” – i.e. data that does not help with the end classification. This can be features that 
heavily resemble other features within the dataset, or samples that are similar (or even identical) to 
other samples within the dataset. Both examples force the model to learn the same thing multiple 
times, increasing bias towards these values. 
3. Using regularisation: Regularisation techniques (e.g. dropout) ensure that all nodes are not 
always connected to every node in the next layer by randomly “dropping” a specified amount of 
these connections. This prevents the network from relying too heavily on a few strong features and 
forces it to use other features to learn as well. Other types of regularisation exist (to be discussed 
in later Chapters) but the principle is the same for them all. 
Broadly, machine learning can be separated into three different classes: Supervised, Unsupervised and 
Semi-supervised.  
Supervised learning is used when all the data used in the training process is labelled. It explicitly 
matches inputs to a list of outputs depending upon training examples that have been provided 
previously. This is achieved through generation of a function to match the training inputs to the labelled 
output and uses this function to infer the output for new samples [15]. Examples of this in practice 
include Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), decision trees, linear and logistic regression and Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) [16]. Generally, these methods have advantages in terms of accuracy and false 
positives over other forms of machine learning, but also tend to be slower to train. Additionally, as these 
require fully labelled data, they also have more issues with the difficulties of getting high quality pre-
labelled training data.  
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Semi-supervised [17] models use a mixture of labelled and unlabelled data. The goal is typically to 
lessen the burden of obtaining large, labelled datasets. The assumption is that if the dataset contains a 
few labelled examples of every class, then the unlabelled data can aid in forming decision boundaries. 
Similar to supervised learning, semi-supervised requires examples of every class within the training 
data, however, the use of unlabelled data allows larger training datasets, that can be constructed 
comparatively inexpensively (in terms of expertise and time required for labelling). Generally, semi-
supervised models achieve higher accuracy rates than unsupervised methods, and it can achieve 
higher accuracy rates than supervised learning on the same datasets if the extra unlabelled data does 
help form the decision boundary. However, in cases where all the training data is labelled, or the 
unlabelled training data is low quality or does not help form a decision boundary then semi-supervised 
learning will not hold any advantage over fully supervised methods.  
Unsupervised models use completely unlabelled data. They seek to detect shared attributes across the 
data and group records together, based upon the presence or absence of these shared attributes [18]. 
Clustering is one example of this, where records are plotted on an n-dimensional graph (where n is the 
number of features) and clustered depending upon their location. Autoencoders are another example, 
where an attempt is made to reduce the number of features of a record to a set amount while retaining 
as much information as possible (i.e. to learn a lower dimensional representation of the original data) 
[15], [19]. Unsupervised methods have advantages in being able to use unlabelled data and are 
frequently less computationally expensive than supervised methods but can have more issues relating 
to accuracy. Unsupervised methods are commonly used to reduce the dimensionality of a problem 
before a supervised algorithm is used to classify it. Most unsupervised algorithms will attempt to reduce 
the dimensionality of a problem in some way [15], making them effective feature selectors to decrease 




Figure 2.3-2 – A Figure to some example techniques used in the primary categories of Machine Learning – 
Asterisk is used to denote an algorithm that is frequently used in a deep manner 
Figure 2.3-2 shows some example techniques used in machine learning and whether they are primarily 
supervised or unsupervised. The * denotes an algorithm that is frequently used in a deep manner (i.e. 
multiple levels with hidden layers between the input and output). As can be seen, there are examples 
in both supervised and unsupervised models, meaning that deep models can be supervised or 
unsupervised depending upon the exact type of model chosen e.g. you can have a deep unsupervised 
autoencoder network, or a deep supervised neural network.  
Also of note in recent years is reinforcement learning, which differs from supervised and unsupervised 
learning in that it is active (i.e. it changes the input space it exists in), whereas supervised and 
unsupervised are passive (they classify the input space, and do not make changes to it). This makes it 
useful for applications where changing the input space is desirable, for example, game theory (e.g. 
AlphaGo [20]) or control theory (e.g. load balancing [21]). However, it is not a classifier in the same way 
as supervised or unsupervised learning can be. 
2.3.1 Data Preparation Techniques for Machine Learning 
The volume and quality of training data for machine learning models is particularly important and 
overfitting is a common problem for deep models. This subsection will discuss a few common methods 
for improving the quality of training data. 
Increasing the variety of data to ensure that all scenarios are represented is important. However, this 
can be challenging if your dataset is imbalanced or you only have access to limited volumes. One 
workaround for this problem is to use techniques to generate synthetic data points. Synthetic Minority 
Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) [22] is one such technique. Rather than undersample or 
oversample, SMOTE creates new data for the minority classes. This is performed using k-nearest 
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neighbours. A real point is taken, and a vector drawn from that point to one of its k neighbours. The 
vector is then multiplied by a random value between 0 and 1. Adding this to the original data point 
creates an entirely new data point. There is an assumption that k-Nearest Neighbour can accurately 
classify data which is not necessarily the case, however, the technique has worked well for intrusion 
detection [23]. 
ADASYN [24] works on a similar premise to SMOTE, in that it creates new minority samples using 
existing values. However, unlike SMOTE, it attempts to discover which minority samples are more 
difficult to learn through analysis of the data distribution. The goal is not only to reduce the bias caused 
by uneven data distribution but also to shift the decision boundary by creating more examples of the 
difficult to learn samples.  
2.4 Existing Intrusion Detection Systems 
It is commonplace for attacks that attempt to spread through an internal network after gaining a foothold 
in a poorly secured device. With the growth of supply chain attacks (which an administrator may have 
little initial control over) [8][10], the ability to monitor the internal network becomes more important than 
ever. Malicious activity needs to be detected and mitigated as soon as possible. Previously, detection 
of malicious activity was accomplished using a combination of signatures and statistical analysis.  
2.4.1 Signatures 
Signatures for network IDSs work on the same principal as common anti-virus or anti-malware software. 
As new forms of attacks are identified, a signature of the type of data the traffic creates is made, typically 
by companies specialising in IDS technologies. For example, the cmd.exe attack that was used by 
Nimda and Code Red uses a specific sequence of bytes that it can be identified with (bytes that correlate 
with copying the cmd.exe file to an accessible location). It is extremely unlikely there would be a 
legitimate reason for a remote user to perform that action, and so by monitoring all traffic for that 
sequence of bytes the attack can be identified. However, some potential issues do arise from this 
method of detection: 
 It is slow by nature 
For attacks to be classified in this manner, successful attacks must first have taken place and been 
identified through other methods. After being identified, then the process of creating a useful 
signature is undertaken (i.e. a signature that will reliably detect the attack, without being too broad 
to detect benign activity). 
 Encryption can interfere with the detection 
Going back to the example of the cmd.exe attack, if performed over an encrypted connection 
(HTTPS in this example, as it targets IIS servers), then applying the signature on a NIDS will not 
be of any use, as the sequence of bytes will have been encrypted. This means the signature instead 
needs to be run on the end point, as this will be the first instance where the unencrypted data will 
be analysable. 
 Small changes to the malicious activity can bypass the signature 
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Since signatures rely on finding common byte sequences in malicious activity, that signature can 
be bypassed by simply not including the specific byte sequences. It becomes obvious that malicious 
users are exploiting this when examining the volume of variants of some pre-existing malware. For 
example, Zeus has had hundreds of variants, some of which are even still in use today [25].  
2.4.2 Statistical Analysis 
This method of malicious activity detection acts as a complement to signatures. While signatures can 
find malware and worms (exploit type attacks) propagating across a network, statistical analysis is 
usually employed to identify DoS type attacks. For example, if general traffic towards a system exceeds 
a set amount, then the traffic may be classified as DDoS attack. This is often more useful in cases 
where traffic from a single source appears unusual. For example, a common statistical rule might run 
along the lines of ‘Classify as malicious any connection where the percentage of TCP SYN packets 
exceeds 50% of all packets, and there has been more than 50 packets sent.’ This kind of rule would 
attempt to classify TCP SYN flood attacks, by providing a firm barrier to the volume of TCP SYN packets 
the system would accept as benign. This detection method doesn’t suffer from the same kind of issues 
as signatures. However, attackers are aware that systems using such rules are in place and as a result, 
attempt to ensure attacks look as much like background traffic as possible. This is evident in the rise in 
the number of ransomware attacks that are used specifically as destruction and disruption attacks. 
Rather than pay for a DDoS attack to bring down systems for a short period before malicious traffic is 
identified and controlled, malicious users have started to employ ransomware attacks as pseudo DoS 
attacks [8]. Data on infected machines is encrypted and the encryption key is deleted, meaning there is 
little hope of recovering any data even if a ransom is paid [8]. These attacks have been targeted, and 
there appears to have been little effort in monetary reward, instead the goal appears to have been to 
be as disruptive as possible for as long as possible. This goal is what DoS attacks are typically used 
for.  
2.4.3 Reputation Based Analysis 
Reputation based IDSs have some similarities to statistical analysis in that the goal is to detect activity 
that is unusual, however, it goes further in that the potential malicious activity is marked and the 
reputation of the system is considered while deciding if the activity is malicious [26]. If the system 
producing the anomalous activity is highly trusted, then the anomalous activity can then be trusted as 
well. This can aid further detection attempts by also being a point of reference later. If a less trusted 
system starts to display the same anomalous activity, than the system can compare it to the early 
activity, see that it was listed benign and allow it to continue. The issue with reputation-based systems 
becomes one main question. How do you decide on the reputation of systems? Some solutions have 
involved using reputation scores that change based upon the proportion of anomalous activity that has 
been detected in the past or how accurate a node has been at detecting other malicious activity [26]. 
The issue with this method is that it takes time to determine how trustworthy a node should be, after all, 
how can you decide based on past actions if there have been no past actions? Other more traditional 
methods revolve around setting a score based upon how secure the node should be, with unknown 
sources being low trusted, and known, well secured nodes being highly trusted. 
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2.4.4 Types of IDS 
There are generally considered to be two main types of IDS: Host-based (HIDS) and Network-based 
(NIDS). HIDS reside on individual network devices and protect only those devices, whereas NIDS reside 
in strategic locations on the network and protect all devices within the corresponding network segment. 
Despite only monitoring singular devices, HIDSs do have some advantages over NIDSs, in that they 
have access to more detailed data. A NIDS might only have access to packet header data as well as 
data derived from that data (e.g. packets per second).  A HIDS that can monitor the network interface 
can compare what is being broadcast, to what is shown as running, and check if those programs have 
the authority to broadcast packets in that way. They also potentially can check packet body data, even 
if that data is encrypted on the network level. If a program is broadcasting data, then a HIDS might be 
given permissions to read any data before encryption on the network level to ensure it is not malicious. 
Alternatively, it could be given permission to read any received data after decryption. NIDSs do not 
have this luxury typically. The fact that they must analyse data coming from and to several sources, 
means that packets must be analysed even more quickly to keep at wire speed. 
NIDSs have advantages in terms of scope and protection as a single NIDS can protect several network 
devices and protect them earlier than a HIDS. For example, a NIDS could detect a DoS attack (many 
of which do not require complex processing to detect) and block that malicious activity from ever 
reaching the source. A HIDS may well be able to block the same activity, however by the time a HIDS 
is analysing the attack, the goal may have already been achieved (e.g. saturating the target’s 
bandwidth). NIDS are also able to detect distributed malicious activity. If a malicious user targets several 
different devices, it is possible that individual HIDSs could miss the attacks. It is only when combining 
the disparate flows that the pattern becomes noticeable. An example includes botnets that attempt to 
spread through password attacks. The goal of the malware is to remain undetected while spreading, 
however targeting a single device with many password attempts is noticeable. So rather than perform 
ten password attempts on a single device inside a minute, they perform the same amount of password 
attempts on different devices. From the attacker’s point of view, this may have the disadvantage of 
different devices having different passwords, and ultimately take longer to infect those different devices. 
However, in practice, passwords are frequently shared between devices to ease operational 
maintenance. Once the password for one device is found, it can be attempted on all the other devices. 
A NIDS may not be able to detect that all of these flows are password attempts (due to encryption or 
obfuscation techniques), however, it would likely recognise that the system has initiated an unusual 
number of flows (TCP SYN packets) to different devices in a short amount of time. 
In practice, HIDS and NIDS are used symbiotically, with NIDS designed to detect as many network 
attacks as possible as early as possible, and HIDS being used to detect attacks that either did not 
spread through the network or were missed. For instance, a NIDS is not going to be able to detect a 
malicious actor typing in different passwords to a physical console, and may not be able to detect 
multiple password attempts using something like SSH due to the encryption inherent in such protocols 
(without including other obfuscation techniques a malicious actor may employ). A HIDS however, should 
always be able to detect this activity through monitoring of system logs. 
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Both HIDS and NIDS often use a mixture of statistical and signature-based techniques. For instance, 
SNORT can be configured with rules to detect port scans dependent upon connection count per IP, 
ports connected per IP and connections per port (a statistical method), or can use signatures to detect 
malware through identifying the presence of specific byte code sequences in an executable (a 
signature).  
In order to detect a password attack like the one described above, a NIDS would generally need to 
analyse the packet body. The connections set up for these kinds of attacks can be completely legitimate, 
with nothing to indicate they are malicious within the packet header. This kind of analysis (termed Deep 
Packet Inspection) is more computationally expensive than examining packet header data. The extra 
expense limits the locations where it can be performed, and how many different signatures can be used 
before network traffic is slowed. 
While Figure 2.4-1 shows how an inline NIDS would be positioned, Figure 2.4-2 shows how an offline 
NIDS might be positioned. This kind of NIDS requires the switch copy and forward data to it (e.g. using 
a span or mirror port), while allowing the flow to continue. This kind of system is not designed to monitor 
data in real time, instead sacrificing speed of response for completeness. If a system is not waiting for 
benign data to be analysed, more time can be taken in that analysis to ensure any attacks are detected. 
Due to the delay, this is an area where DPI can be used, as the computational complexity does not 
matter as much. 
 
 




Figure 2.4-2 – An offline NIDS 
However, the continued use of DPI is coming into question for other reasons beyond its computational 
complexity. Increasing use of encryption is still rendering DPI less useful. While issues with network 
level encryption can be bypassed by placing the NIDS after the data has been decrypted (in the case 
of a Secure Socket Tunnelling Protocol (SSTP) for instance) it will not bypass application layer 
encryption. Often, packet body data is encrypted before it is separated into packets and transmitted, 
and the receiving application holds the decryption key (which is decided on a per-connection basis) 
[27]. 
Given the difficulties in increasing use of encryption as well as privacy concerns, ideally only packet 
header information should be used for intrusion detection at the network level. Packet headers contain 
a great wealth of information and many features are considered important by academics and industry. 
For example, if attempting to detect an ACK port scan, it could be considered good practice to set a 
rule that detects any packets that have a sequence number of 0 and have the ACK flag set. Both 
features sit within the packet header and would not be encrypted at an application level. However, 
detecting higher level threats does become more difficult without access to packet body data, meaning 
that if a NIDS is required to detect higher level threats than other measures start to become necessary. 
For example, if a user is connecting to several different servers (SYN or SYN/ACK messages) with 
those servers sending reset packets shortly after (RST messages) then this could be an indication that 
password attacks are taking place. The issue with this (statistical) analysis is a greater degree of 
uncertainty. While the activity could be potentially malicious, there are other benign reasons it could be 
happening. In conclusion, it is not feasible to continue to rely on statistical and signature-based 
approaches if all that is accessible, is the packet header. 
2.4.5 Deep Learning IDSs 
While it has more in common with statistical analysis (both ultimately being anomaly detection methods) 
deep learning as a tool for anomaly detection has several advantages. As it is an anomaly detection 
method, deep learning is more resilient to obfuscation techniques than signatures. This is because 
instead of matching a sequence of binary data or using set rules, anomaly detection methods simply 
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look for data that is unusual. It is also more resilient to 0-day threats as all that is needed for an attack 
to be detected is for the activity to be unusual.  
At first glance, this restriction for malicious activity to look different may seem to be the same as the 
kind of restriction on statistical methods. However, statistical models typically rely on broad rules that 
cannot capture nuanced activity, and which can be bypassed with little effort. For example, statistical 
methods may be used for detecting password attacks (e.g. if there are more than 5 password attempts 
in 1 minute, flag it as malicious). Frequently, malware and malicious users attempting password attacks 
will simply limit the number of attempts per minute that they make. Deep learning IDSs can bypass 
issues like this as the automated feature extraction allows it to detect patterns that broad rules cannot 
encompass. For example, a deep learning IDS could determine that all sent packets being fairly short, 
all responses being the same or a similar size (with a standard password not accepted response), and 
the number of interactions before a RST ACK are important features when detecting password attacks, 
and that flows that have more of these features are more likely to be password attacks. 
Most deep learning based IDSs use packet header data, and information derived from that data (number 
of packets per second, or number of SYN packets, etc.). Most research datasets also follow the example 
of using packet header data and data derived from it [28]–[30]. This makes sense considering that 
mostly this is the data that has been available to network administrators. Additionally, this aids with one 
of deep learning’s disadvantages. Deep Learning models typically require large amounts of both 
features and training data. Even without packet body data, packet headers can create the large volume 
of features required. For example, the UNSW-NB15 [31] dataset contains 47 features, of which 43 could 
be obtained from the packet header alone. When compared to other situations where hundreds or even 
thousands of features are used, this may not sound like a lot, however several of the features are 
categorical. This means that they could feasibly be split into features themselves through a process 
such as binarisation. Binarisation is the process of taking categorical data and turning it into binary data. 
So, if you have a categorical entries such as the protocol type e.g. TCP, UDP and ICMP, binarising this 
list would result in three columns where 1 is used for the presence of that protocol, and 0 used for its 
absence, as shown in Table 2.4-1 
Categorical Label Converted Binarised Labels 
Label TCP UDP ICMP 
TCP 1 0 0 
UDP 0 1 0 
ICMP 0 0 1 
TCP 1 0 0 
TCP 1 0 0 
Table 2.4-1 – Example Binarising of Protocol Types 
The volume of network data being generated could be considered a boon to these models. Deep 
learning models require large volumes of data to learn from, as such, one would imagine training data 
is plentiful for NIDS. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true, as the labelling of network data is 
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particularly difficult due to a combination of legal and technical issues. In terms of academic studies, 
the sharing of network datasets becomes difficult when considering the potential privacy issues 
involved. Data will need to be anonymised (potentially damaging useful features) at the very least, and 
permission may need to be sought from anyone using the network at the time of the recording in order 
to share the data as a dataset with other academics. Additionally, deciding which groups of network 
data are malicious is a difficult and time-consuming task. With potentially millions of rows of network 
data, it would be normal to use another program to detect any malicious activity that has been recorded. 
However, if that is done then any model that is generated as a result of the dataset is likely only going 
to be as good as the tool used to label it. This is not to say these issues cannot be overcome, but that 
getting high quality network datasets is difficult, and deep learning models are potentially more reliant 
on their training datasets than tools using signatures or statistical based approaches would be. 
Deep learning also has issues when it comes to accuracy and false positives. Simply because it is an 
anomaly-based approach, deep learning can label benign flows as malicious as they appear like other 
malicious activities. A common example from statistical analysis would be the account lockout function. 
Usually, if an account is locked due to too many password attempts, it is because the user has forgotten 
their password rather than a malicious actor attempting to gain access to the account. However, the 
statistical analysis rule (lock the account if there are x passwords attempts within y seconds) cannot tell 
the difference between a benign user forgetting their password and a malicious access attempt. It only 
detects that the access attempt is an anomaly and reacts accordingly. Deep learning has the same 
problem, except while an administrator could tweak the statistical analysis rule to attempt to 
accommodate forgetful users while still blocking malicious activity, the deep learning model is 
dependent on their being data that can distinguish the two types of activity. 
However, machine learning models are susceptible to a form of attack both signatures and statistical 
methods do not suffer from. Termed adversarial attacks, these are samples that are perceptually 
indistinguishable from one class, but are classified incorrectly [32]. Assuming C is a correctly classified 
sample by a machine learning system M, then M(C) = ytrue, however it is possible to create a sample 
such that M(C’) ≠ ytrue. Adversarial samples are classified according to the knowledge of the system 
that is being targeted by the malicious actor. These classes are white-box, grey-box and black-box. 
White-box adversarial attacks are when the attacker has detailed knowledge of the model they are 
attacking, including parameters and structure. In grey-box adversarial attacks, the knowledge of the 
attacker is limited to the structure of the model being attacked, and in black-box attacks the attacker 
has only the knowledge gained from query access [33]. However, it has been found  in many cases that 
attacks created for one model will transfer over to another model successfully [34], which means it is 
possible to create adversarial examples and perform a misclassification attack on a machine learning 
system with no knowledge of the model. It has been shown that adversarial attacks can still take place 
within machine learning IDSs [35], [36], even with the more constrained environment networks operate 
in where there is less scope to change values within packets without causing errors (for instance, 
changing the packet type from TCP to UDP would cause errors, since the packet structure is different).  
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Finally, deep learning has issues in terms of computational complexity. Signatures and statistical rules 
are very computationally inexpensive to operate. They typically amount to simple “if statements”, 
whereas deep learning requires much greater computational power to run. This is particularly important 
in NIDSs, since the goal is typically to analyse network data at line speed, so that malicious activity can 
be stopped before it has had chance to cause any damage, or even to reach the intended target. 
2.5 Deep Learning IDSs within SDN environments 
As noted in Section 2.2, the goal of a SDN is to separate the control plane from the data plane, which 
allows the control plane to become programmable. This is done through switches (on the data plane) 
sending information about the packet header to the controller, which then decides how to handle the 
packet. All packets are not forwarded to the controller however, just enough information to create an 
entry in a flow table. The flow table is what is used in order to decide how flows (collections of related 
packets) should be treated. This information is also what is provided to the application layer in order to 
do any other more complex calculations. For example, if a SDN controller was going to be used to load 
balance between two parts of a network, it would get the information on number of packets, the size of 
the flows and number of separate flow traversing each network segment. Using this information, it can 
determine which segment is least active and can assign new flows it. For load balancing, this is all the 
information that is needed. However, in Section 2.4 it was seen that IDSs typically use far more 
information than that, going as far as to read individual packet body data. In practice, flows can be 
thought of as abstract representations of data traversing the network. For instance, OpenFlow only 
requires enough information to identify what flow a packet belongs to, exclusively from the packet 
header (IP or MAC source and destination addresses, protocol type (TCP, UDP etc.) and port or service 
numbers). In addition, the controller will keep track of statistics about the flows, including priority, 
number of packets and number of bytes transmitted. 
When comparing the 10 features listed to the number of features available when training machine a 
learning based NIDS, the issue quickly becomes apparent. For instance, the NSL-KDD dataset (a 
research dataset commonly used in the networking community for testing machine learning based 
NIDS) contains 41 features. This is significantly more than the 9 required fields [37] provided by an 
OpenFlow SDN controller. Much of Section 2.2.3 showed that IDSs are more reliable when they have 
more data available. Encryption is reducing the amount of information (preventing reading of packet 
bodies) and the volume of data itself is reducing the amount of data that can be read (if you have more 
data to analyse, you have less time to analyse it). In Section 2.3 it was established that deep learning 
models require large volumes of high-quality data in order to train effectively. If the data quality is low, 
or if there is not enough of it, then overfitting can occur. In other words, the amount of data available for 
NIDSs is decreasing, and machine learning based NIDSs, and deep learning based NIDs, need even 
more data than even traditional signature or statistical analysis NIDSs. 
2.6 Datasets 
This brings us to datasets more generally. Datasets for intrusion detection have traditionally been 
focused on providing data for what can be obtained from network packet data, and not what SDN flows 
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provide. This started with the KDD’99 [38], which was produced before SDN was created. Prior to the 
KDD’99 the IDS research community lacked a highly detailed realistic dataset on which to conduct 
research. This led to researchers creating their own datasets which causes issues on reproducibility. 
Additionally, the dataset still contained several issues, such as redundant and repeated records, too 
many records and records that were too easy to classify. The NSL-KDD [28], [39] dataset sought to 
correct some of these issues, particularly the number of redundant records and the ease of 
classification. More recently the dataset has come under criticism for not being realistic, which is a by-
product of being more than a decade old, in an environment which changes quickly. Still, the NSL-KDD 
is one of the de facto datasets for intrusion detection of this kind. As has been stated, the NSL-KDD 
consists of 41 features, found in Table 2.6-1: 
Number Name Number Name 
1 Duration 22 Is_guest_login 
2 Protocol_type 23 Count 
3 Service 24 Srv_count 
4 Flag 25 Serror_rate 
5 Src_bytes 26 Srv_rerror_rate 
6 Dst_bytes 27 Rerror_rate 
7 Land 28 Srv_rerror_rate 
8 Wrong_fragment 29 Same_srv_rate 
9 Urgent 30 Diff_srv_rate 
10 Hot 31 Srv_diff_host_rate 
11 Num_failed_logins 32 Dst_host_count 
12 Logged_in 33 Dst_host_srv_count 
13 Num_compromised 34 Dst_home_same_srv_rate 
14 Root_shell 35 Dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
15 Su_attempted 36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate 
16 Num_root 37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 
17 Num_file_creations 38 dst_host_serror_rate 
18 Num_shells 39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate 
19 Num_access_files 40 dst_host_rerror_rate 
20 Num_outbound_cmds 41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 
21 Is_host_login   
Table 2.6-1 – The NSL-KDD features 
More recently, the UNSW-NB15 dataset has started to become popular. The dataset is designed to be 
a more modern replacement for the NSL-KDD, featuring more modern attacks with low footprints. This 
was built using the IXIA PerfectStorm and consists of 49 features that have been extracted from a 





Feature Name Feature 
Number 
Feature Name Feature 
Number 
Feature Name 
1 id 16 dloss 31 response_body_len 
2 dur 17 sinpkt 32 ct_srv_src 
3 proto 18 dinpkt 33 ct_state_ttl 
4 service 19 sjit 34 ct_dst_ltm 
5 state 20 djit 35 ct_src_dport_ltm 
6 spkts 21 swin 36 ct_dst_sport_ltm 
7 dpkts 22 stcpb 37 ct_dst_src_ltm 
8 sbytes 23 dtcpb 38 is_ftp_login 
9 dbytes 24 dwin 39 ct_ftp_cmd 
10 rate 25 tcprtt 40 ct_flw_http_mthd 
11 sttl 26 synack 41 ct_src_ltm 
12 dttl 27 ackdat 42 ct_srv_dst 
13 sload 28 smean 43 is_sm_ips_ports 
14 dload 29 dmean   
15 sloss 30 trans_depth   
Table 2.6-2 – The UNSW-NB15 features 
Many of these features are similar to those found in the NSL-KDD, including successful logins, and 
commands used, which are features that are only available from logs if the network packets are 
encrypted end-to-end.  
Specific to this work is the NetFlow/IPFIX SSH compromise detection dataset from the University of 
Twenté [40]. This dataset was originally designed to test a method of SSH compromise detection using 
the NetFlow/IPFIX SDN flows. Of interest to us is that it consists of both flows and logs from the servers, 
and that it consists of real-world data. The flows were collected from edge routers and contains all SSH 
traffic entering and leaving the campus network, while logs were collected from workstations and 
servers that have a publicly accessible daemon. The data comprise a period of one month, collected in 
January and February of 2014. The fact that the dataset specifically has log files that have been created 
as a direct result of flows is important for this work, since this allows us to monitor the impact of 
additional log data being added to the network flows in a real world environment. The data is not pre-
processed, which would make comparisons to other works more difficult since the data will inevitably 





Figure 2.6-1 – An extract of the raw flows from the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset 
 
 
Figure 2.6-2 – An extract of the logs from the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset 
 
 




3 Related Work 
In this chapter shall provide an overview of the cutting-edge and relevant existing pertinent to this 
project. 
3.1 Deep learning within Intrusion Detection 
This subsection will provide an overview of cutting-edge research related to deep learning within 
intrusion detection. This will come in three sub-sections, Datasets, the models being used, and data 
preparation. 
3.1.1 Datasets 
As outlined in Section 2.3, deep learning has many advantages when it comes to addressing the 
challenges within modern network security. Numerous works and datasets have been proposed over 
the years, starting with the KDD’99 dataset released in 1999. This dataset came into criticism for several 
issues, including [39]: 
 Redundant records, which can lead algorithms to bias more common data  
 An unrealistic attack variance and background noise, which does not match or emulate real 
network conditions 
 Too many records, which has led to researchers using different subsets of the data, meaning 
that works using the same data set cannot necessarily be directly compared 
 An attacker focused taxonomy of attacks, which is not how an IDS sitting on the edge of an 
attacked network would see data 
In response to these criticisms, an alternative dataset was created, the NSL-KDD+ dataset which was 
significantly more challenging. However, the realism of the dataset is still an issue, especially as 
networks have changed significantly since it was devised [28], [31]. 
The UNSW-NB15 dataset [30], [31] was developed to be a more modern alternative, with attacks that 
mimic more closely the low footprint attacks found today. This dataset contains 47 features, which have 
been extracted using a combination of Argus, Bro-IDS and twelve algorithms which cover 
characteristics of network packets. The dataset comes in two forms, a collection of four CSV files which 
contain all 2,540,044 records, and a partition of that dataset, separated into training and testing. The 
dataset contains 9 attack families, with Normal being a 10th classification. These are as follows: 
    • Fuzzers – Attempting to cause a program or network suspend by feeding randomly generated data 
    • Analysis – Different attack of port scan, spam and html file penetrations 
    • Backdoors – System security mechanisms are bypassed to stealthily access a computer or its data 
    • DoS – An attempt to make a server or resource unavailable to users by temporarily interrupting or 
suspending the services of a host 
    • Exploits – Targeting a known security problem within an operating system or piece of software 
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    • Generic – A technique that works against block-ciphers without consideration about the structure 
of the block-cipher 
    • Reconnaissance – Contains strikes that can simulate attacks that can be used to gather 
information 
    • Shellcode – A small piece of code used as a payload in exploiting a vulnerability 
    • Worms – A self-replicating program that uses a network to spread, relying on security failures to 
do so. 
The training/test split can be more difficult for several reasons. To start there is simply less data. As 
stated in Section 2.3, machine learning models gain better results when exposed to more data. This is 
for a few reasons. More data can aid in reducing overfitting and it allows the model to learn more 
examples of anomalous data. Importantly there are examples of attacks in the smaller testing data that 
do not appear in the training data. This can result in a difference of accuracies for different methods. 
For example, works such as [41], [42], [43], [44] achieve an average accuracy of 89.56%, precision of 
87.13, recall of 90.42 and F-Score of 88.58 while using the pre-prepared dataset. Compare this to works 
such as [45] (which used the full CSV files, and split the dataset into train/test sets separately), where 
accuracy is over 90% and it becomes clear that these factors do play a part. 
3.1.2 The Models Used 
Recently convolutional models have started to become popular within the research space for supervised 
deep learning. Originally designed as a method to extract complex features from an image [46], this 
has since been expanded to several different areas including speech recognition, sentiment analysis 
and medical diagnostics. Krizhevsky et al. [46] note that the main advantages of CNNs over standard 
feed forward networks (with similar sized models) are that they have fewer connections and parameters. 
This makes CNNs easier and quicker to train, while theoretically best classification performance will 
likely only be slightly worse. They create a model that achieves a winning top-5 test error rate of 15.3% 
in the ILSVRC-2012 competition, compared to 26.2% achieved by the second-best entry. 
Azizjon et al. show how the transformation to network datasets can work in [41]. Using a 1-dimensional 
CNN, they achieve accuracy of 91.2%, precision of 87.53%, recall of 95.15% and an F1 of 91.59% on 
the pre-prepared UNSW-NB15 test set after balancing the data using a random oversampling method. 
Their model consists of three convolutional layers in total, all with the same filters (32), stride (1) and 
kernel size (5). The data is passed through the first two convolutional layers before moving to a max 
pooling layer, and then the final convolutional layer. Batch normalization is performed, as is drop out 
and a final two fully connected layers. Min/max normalization is used on some features such as 
duration, sbytes and dbytes, where the values can proceed outside the range 0-1. They also test models 
with only a single convolutional layer, and two convolutional layers, as well as unbalanced data. They 
found that balancing the data increases accuracy and precision by more than 5% in all cases, whereas 
recall actually falls slightly (less than 3%). This results in an F-score topping 90% for all instances for 
the balanced data, while falling short of that with the unbalanced data. This shows the importance of 
balancing the dataset; however, the method of the balancing is also important. Through oversampling 
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the data, they effectively add more data to train on, which as discussed in Section 2.3 aids in reducing 
overfitting. As such, just from this work alone it cannot be ascertained whether it is the dataset balancing 
or additional data that helps increase accuracy and precision, or a combination of both. Increasing the 
number of layers has a similar effect, improving accuracy and precision (both for balanced and 
unbalanced data) whilst slightly decreasing recall. This results in a slight net increase in F1-score. This 
is not surprising, as other models have found similar advantages when increasing the number of layers 
or decreasing the kernel size [47]. As such, it is becoming increasing common to have models with 
kernel sizes of only 5, 3 or even 2. 
When comparing Azizjon’s work to Al-Zewairi et al. [45], then the issues explained in Section 3.1.1 
surrounding accuracy rates for different versions of the same datasets become more apparent. Using 
a DNN with five fully connected layers, each with ten neurons they achieve an accuracy of 98.99%, and 
a FAR of only 0.56%. However, they create their own training, test, and evaluate sets from the original 
four CSV files from the UNSW-NB15 dataset. As there is extra data to learn from, the model employed 
by Al-Zewairi can afford to be deeper than that of Azizjon, as overfitting is not as likely. Additionally, as 
the training, test and evaluation sets were randomly generated, it is likely that there were some 
representations of every attack within both the training and test sets. This is not true of the prepared 
datasets, which contain examples of attacks in the testing set that do not appear in the training set. The 
lack of some examples within the training set of the pre-prepared datasets is an attempt to replicate 0-
day threats, the expectation being that the models should be able to detect the attacks even though 
they have not previously been trained on them. This, along with the difference in dataset size, means 
care should be taken when comparing the pre-prepared dataset with the raw CSV files. 
Further questioning whether the dataset needs to be balanced (or whether simply adding more data is 
sufficient) is Kim et al [48]. Using the KDD’99 dataset, they show that increasing the proportion of attack 
packet data in the training set does not have a significant effect on accuracy, ranging from 98.95% 
accuracy with 30% attack packet data, to 99.08% accuracy at 50%, 70% and 80% attack packet data. 
However, the false alarm rate does change, peaking at 0.47% with 90% attack packet training data 
(from 0.01% at 10% attack packet data). The detection rate also mimicked this pattern of the FAR. The 
minimum recall achieved was 99.19% (with 30% attack data, not the 10% as might be assumed), and 
the maximum was 99.81% (with both 80% and 90% of attack data). This shows that balancing the 
dataset may not help accuracy, but it will affect precision and recall. 
An Autoencoder network’s desired output is the same as its input. So, for input i, and output o, the 
desired output would be i=o. However, intermediate layers of the network are smaller than the input 
and output, meaning that the network is forced to encode a representation of the original input with 
reduced dimensionality that compliments the layer size [19]. The goal is to reduce noise or unneeded 
features in an automatic manner. Traditionally, this is performed by creating a symmetrical model with 
output containing the same number of nodes as the input, and hidden layers decreasing and increasing 
in a symmetrical manner. So, for a model with 3 hidden layers with the size being decreased by 2 in 
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total, and an input size of x, the layer sizes would be x, x-1, x-2, x-1 and output of x. An example of this 
model is given in Figure 3.1-1. 
 
Figure 3.1-1 – An example of a small autoencoder structure 
This means that an Autoencoder network is effectively two separate networks, an encoder and a 
decoder network. The encoder network maps the inputs into a smaller representation. This can be 
represented with: 
 𝑁 = 𝑆1(𝑊𝑥 + 𝑏1) Equation 3.1-1 
Here, W is the weight, b is the bias vector, S is the activation function and N is the latent representation.  
The decoder network can likewise be represented as: 
 𝑂 = 𝑆𝑂−1(𝑊𝑥 + 𝑏𝑂−1) Equation 3.1-2 
Here, O is the output.  
Typically, a network like this is combined with a shallow classifier to get the final classification. For 
example, Al-Qatf et al. [49] utilise a sparse Autoencoder model with a SVM classifier in order to classify 
both the NSL-KDD and KDD’99 datasets. They use a sigmoid activation for the Autoencoder network. 
They achieve 80.48% accuracy on the NSL-KDD test set, as well as 93.96% on the full KDD ‘99 dataset. 
This again shows the effect of having more data available. As mentioned, the NSL-KDD dataset is a 
version that corrects some of the issues in the original KDD’99 dataset, and the difference in accuracy 
between the two datasets on the same model highlights how much of an effect this had. 
Alternatively, Andresini et al. [50] utilise a combination of 2 Autoencoder networks (one trained on 
normal data and one trained on attack data only), and then perform a final classification based upon a 
CNN and fully connected ANN. The Autoencoders have 3 layers of sizes 40, 10, 40 and use mean 
squared error as the loss function. ReLu is used as the activation function for the hidden layer and linear 
activation used for the output. The convolutional layer uses a 1x1 kernel size with 64 filters. CNNs with 
a 1x1 kernel size were first used like this by Szegedy et al. [34] in submission for the ImageNet Large-
Scale Visual Recognition Challenge 2014. From here, the data is flattened (to size 1280) and moves 
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through 3 fully connected layers of sizes 320, 160 and 2 for the final classification. ReLu is again used 
for all layer activation except for the final classification layer which is softmax. They obtain accuracy of 
92.49% on the KDD’99 dataset, and 93.40% on the UNSW-NB15 Test dataset. While the performance 
on the KDD’99 dataset could be improved, the accuracy on the UNSW-NB15 compares favourably to 
the other works listed, the next highest managing only 91.2% accuracy. 
3.1.3 Data Preparation 
Data preparation is clearly important as a model can only be as good as the data used to train it on. If 
poor quality training data is used that does not represent the end use of the model, then the model will 
not accurately predict the outputs. However, even beyond gaining the initial high-quality training data, 
there are additional tools and techniques that can be used to prepare the data so that accuracy can be 
increased.  
Balancing the data is often seen as being important. In Section 3.1.2, Kim et al. [48] was referred to, 
who used various proportions of attack and benign data and showed that recall and precision can be 
affected. The same kind of thinking was behind Andresini et al.’s paper when they used two 
Autoencoder networks, one trained solely on attack data. Kim et al. use oversampling to achieve the 
desired attack data proportions, however other methods of data balancing are available. For example, 
Phetlasy et al. [51] show SMOTE can increase accuracy, precision and recall when using a number of 
classifiers, including J48, Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and K-Nearest Neighbour. When using J48 
alone, recall increased from 68.16% to 84.6%, precision dropped slightly from 97.27% to 97.02%, while 
accuracy overall increased from 80.69% to 89.95% on the NSL-KDD testing set. Using a combination 
of both the MLP and J48 saw results improve further, with recall moving from 77.13% to 91.48% and 
precision from 92.13% to 96.57%. Finally, the combination of all 3 classifiers saw recall increase from 
81.36% to 92.01% and precision increase from 91.95% to 95.61%. Of note, is that in all instances apart 
from J48 being used by itself, both precision and recall increased. This is in contrast to Kim et al. who 
showed that just the proportion of attack data will negatively affect recall while positively affect precision, 
or vice versa.    
Alternatively, as part of their work Labonne et al. [52] compare a number of different balancing 
techniques, including SMOTE, ADASYN, SMOTEENN, SMOTE Tomek links, random undersampler 
and random oversampler. Results when comparing the Area Under Curve – Receiver Operating 
Characteristics curve (AUC-ROC) are in Table 3.1-1.  
Sampling Technique AUC-ROC 
No Sampling 94.53% 
SMOTE 95.33% 
SVM SMOTE 96.93% 
ADASYN 94.93% 
SMOTEENN 95.61% 
Tomek Links 96.02% 
Random Undersampler 96.24% 
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Random Oversampler 95.95% 
Table 3.1-1 – Results found in [52] when comparing different sampling methods 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.1-1 all methods of balancing increase the AUC-ROC score, with SMOTE 
based methods performing the best. It should be noted that the AUC-ROC score may not be the best 
metric to use for this kind of study. While it provides a method to determine how well a model can predict 
a class, it does not help us to see how the false positives or false negatives are being affected. 
An alternative to Kim et al. comes from Dong et al. [53]. Their work compares deep learning methods 
of classifying network data, to traditional methods. They do this by showing the precision results (rather 
than accuracy) for SVM-RBM, SVM, Naïve Bayes and C4.5. The deep SVM-RBM model outperforms 
all the other models on the KDD’99 data set and the paper highlights the difficulty of detecting U2R and 
R2L attacks within the dataset due to the small volume of attacks within the dataset. Precision for all 
results peaks at around 0.85, whereas for U2R attacks precision peaks at around 0.4, with the SVM-
RBM still achieving the highest precision results. The authors also used SMOTE to solve some of the 
issues with imbalance in the data set. Showing results for precision both with and without using SMOTE 
on U2R attacks, accuracy peaked at 0.56 with SMOTE and 0.45 without. 
Feature selection itself is also important, as explained by Akashdeep, et al. [54]. They observe that 
removing features that do not contribute (or have a very low contribution) to detecting attacks can aid 
in increasing accuracy and decreasing computation time. The authors use the KDD`99 data set and 
rank the features into two tables, one table based upon information gain (IG) and the other correlation 
(CR). After this ranking, the tables are merged (a Union Join) and the top 25 features are selected. 
There is a direct (and deliberate) contradiction between IG and CR, as the higher the IG, the lower the 
CR. The method does show an improvement in accuracy and FPR over other methods of feature 
selection mentioned in the paper. 
Praneeth et al. [55] specifically look at Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as a method of feature 
reduction for the KDD’99 dataset. They compare accuracy against the number of components using a 
SVM classifier (including RBF, Linear and Polynomial kernels). They find that accuracy is matched with 
and without PCA at 25 components (or features) for the linear kernel, 20 for the RBF kernel, and that 
accuracy is consistently higher using PCA for the polynomial kernel. The main advantage of PCA comes 
with the amount of time to process, which is smaller for all kernels with PCA, and follows the pattern 
you would expect (more components taking longer to process). At worst they find use of PCA allows 
for accuracy matching that without using it, but allows for quicker processing, something that becomes 
important in a networked environment. 
Bahrololum et al. [56] compare decision tree, particle swarm optimisation (PSO) and Flexible Neural 
Tree (FNT) as methods to select features. Through analysis of the KDD’99 dataset, they determine that 
there are several features that do not participate in the final decision, and therefore can be removed 
with no loss of accuracy. However, different classifiers do prioritise different features. For example, 
decision tree finds that src_bytes are important for all classification tasks, whereas it doesn’t feature as 
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important for any class with FNT. It can be concluded that there is no one “best” feature reduction 
technique, and which method is used will need to be evaluated on a case by case basis. However, 
feature reduction should be considered in any work where processing time is important. 
More recently, Liu and Chung [57] compare a number of feature reduction techniques, including stacked 
Autoencoders, decision trees, neural networks and SVM. The process is to train on the dataset and 
obtain a baseline accuracy. Then to remove features and check the extent of the accuracy change. This 
process is automated using grid search and 10-fold validation. They come to a number of conclusions, 
including highly correlated features may lead to overfitting, the feature extraction step is important since 
it re-represents the original feature set in a way that is more sensitive to later classification steps and 
that weaker separate features can become stronger when combined with other weaker features 
3.2 SDN as a security solution 
Shin et al. [58] identify four characteristics that could aid SDN in improving network security. These 
areas include: 
 Dynamic flow control 
 Network-Wide Visibility with Centralised Control 
 Network Programmability 
 Simplified Data Plane 
They give firewalls as an example of the advantage of dynamic flow control. Upon receiving a new 
packet, an SDN-enabled switch forwards the information about the packet to the controller. The 
controller can forward the data to a firewall application, which can determine if the packet passes the 
security policies. Upon receiving the pass or fail response, the controller can forward instructions on 
how to manage the packet to the switch, which will add the instructions to its flow table. The advantages 
of this beyond a regular firewall are that any SDN-enabled switch can become a firewall, reducing the 
need for specialist hardware, and increasing the resilience of the network. An example given for 
network-wide visibility advantages, is the detection of particular DDoS attacks initiated by bots, where 
the ability to monitor traffic from multiple unrelated devices, allows for the detection of malicious activity 
that may otherwise have remained undetected. For example, DDoS and flood attacks frequently 
transmit small volumes of data towards the target, none of which individually would be dangerous, and 
so not detected. The benefit of the network programmability revolves around middle boxes. It is 
commonly not easy to change or modify a middle box’s security functions, but it is also difficult to predict 
exactly which security functions are required. The programmable nature of SDNs allows an 
administrator to create their own security functions as a supplement to the middle boxes, using scripting 
languages such as FRESCO [59]. They offer the now comparative simplicity of the data plane as an 
advantage to security since more security functions can now be implemented in an easier manner. 
Yoon et al. [60] show the feasibility of implementing some of these security functions to the control layer 
of a SDN. They implement a firewall, NIDS, NIPS, an anomaly detector, stateful firewalls and a reflector 
network. Among the advantages of the NIDS and NIPS they implement, they state the lack of need for 
middle boxes and the lack of need to carefully place the devices.  These advantages pass over to other 
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security functions that were implemented as well. The example given being a distributed firewall, 
capable of managing traffic network wide. They also state the primary disadvantage as being 
performance. In-line security functions such as NIDS and NIPS need to analyse traffic in real time, so 
as to not slow all other network traffic, and this becomes more difficult as you add more data. Specifically 
for anomaly detection, the authors state the advantages being the comparative ease of collecting 
information, however the disadvantage being one that has been mentioned in Section 2.5, the loss of 
other information that is frequently used (e.g. TCP session information). 
Despite these advantages, SDN does come with additional security issues. Scott-Hayward et al. [61] 
discuss some of these issues, which they split into six areas: 
 Unauthorised access to either the controller or unauthenticated applications. 
 Data leakage in terms of flow rule discovery or forwarding policy discovery  
 Data modification through flow rule modification to modify packets 
 Malicious applications creating fraudulent rules or controller hijacking 
 DoS – through switch-controller flooding or switch flow table flooding 
 Configuration issues such as lack of authentication techniques or policy enforcement. 
 
However, they also find potential advantages, such as a “moving target defence” where the actual IP 
of machines is hidden and replaced with a virtual IP. While conceptually similar to a NAT, the idea is a 
SDN controller would hold a list of randomly changing virtual IP addresses that are mapped to a specific 
physical IP address. Named hosts are available via the virtual IP, but the real IP is only accessible by 
authorised entities [62]. It is found this solution can help invalidate the results of information scanners. 
More recently, Scott-Hayward et al. have expanded on the initial paper, with research examples given 
to address some of the security issues that have been presented. However, they note that although 
SDN has matured since the initial paper, there is still much work to be done. Strong themes they identify 
include projection of potential security issues and automated response for quick reaction to network 
threats. 
One example of the potential security issues is given by Sin and Gu [63] who propose a SDN scanner 
and DoS method. They successfully fingerprint a SDN using specially crafted IP packets and measure 
the response times. The theory is that the first packet to traverse a SDN will take longer than the second. 
This is because the first packet will need to be referred to the controller, and rule generated and 
transmitted back to the switch. Alternatively, the second packet will still have the new rule in place. 
Upon identifying an SDN, the attacker could then proceed to disrupt the network through sending 
multiple new crafted packets through the target network, using up network resources. This would 
essentially be a DoS that targets a SDN controller and is unique to SDN environments. 
An example of how a SDN can improve network security comes from Shin et al. [64][58], who through 
the use of actuating triggers determine a method of responding more quickly to standard DoS attacks 
within SDN environments. They also propose an extension of the OpenFlow data plane called 
connection migration, which reduces the amount of data needing to be passed to the controller, thus 
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reducing the risk of the Southbound interface becoming saturated. They claim these two measures 
would likely be enough to mitigate or prevent the malicious activity proposed by [63]. 
3.3 SDN and Deep Learning within Intrusion Detection 
Other authors can be found highlighting the contradiction between SDN and deep learning made in 
Section 2.5 
For example, Tang et al. [65] propose a fully-connected DNN using an six-dimensional input layer 
comprised of common features found within both the NSL-KDD dataset and OpenFlow. The authors 
attempt binary classification and achieve an accuracy of 75.75%, precision of 83%, recall of 76% and 
an overall F-score of 75% on the NSL-KDD test set. This should be contrasted with the works noted in 
Section 3.1.2, for example, Al-Qatf et al. [49] utilise a sparse Autoencoder model (unsupervised) to 
achieve 80.48% accuracy on the NSL-KDD test set, or Azizjon et al. [2] using a 1-dimensional CNN 
achieve an accuracy of 91.2%, precision of 87.53%, recall of 95.15% and an F1 of 91.59%. Considering 
only six features are used, and that these are not even the most useful features (according to 
Akashdeep, et al, Praneeth et al or Bahrololum et al, in Section 3.1.3), and that the DNN does achieve 
higher accuracy then other tested shallow methods (Naïve Bayes at 45%, SVM at 70.9% and decision 
tree at 74%), the result could be considered good. However, the authors acknowledge that it would still 
not be good enough to be adopted into a commercial solution, or to be used as an alternative to 
signature based IDSs. It should be noted that the default OpenFlow specification does call for a larger 
flow table than the six common features included in this work. This means while the work is useful in 
highlighting the issue, further work with more realistic datasets is needed. 
More evidence of the contradiction between SDN and deep learning is provided by Janarthanan and 
Zargari [30]. Using several attribute selectors, including the CfsSubsetEval, InfoGainAttibuteEval and 
Ranker methods in Weka, they use several machine learning algorithms to evaluate binary classification 
performance. The goal is to determine which features within the UNSW-NB15 dataset are irrelevant or 
redundant, so that these can be omitted, and the curse of dimensionality reduced, resulting in less 
training and testing time. They find that the most important features included service (e.g. http, ftp etc), 
sbytes (number of bytes sent from source), sttl (source to destination time to live), smean (mean of 
packet size transmitted by the source) and ct_dst_sport_ltm (No. of rows of the same destination IP 
and source port in 100 rows). Of these, none is a required feature within the OpenFlow specification 
[37]. Service could be inferred from a combination of protocol type (TCP, UDP etc.) and port number, 
though port number itself is not a required feature. Sbytes is an optional field within the specification, 
which would likely be used by many administrators, and smean could likely be inferred as it can be 
determined through a combination of the optional fields received bytes and packet count (both of which 
again, an administrator is likely to use). However, sttl would not be configurable at all since time to live 
only really has a purpose on the data layer. ct_dst_sport_ltm exists within the derived category of 
features within the UNSW-NB15, which means it is a feature that has been added after the dataset has 
been generated. This kind of feature could exist, but would require more processing in general, since it 
will change multiple records with the addition of a single new flow. In practice, it may be better to use a 
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feature that compares the number of connections to the same destination address and port within the 
last n minutes. This would be simpler to compute, as it would only be updated once (when the flow is 
generated), however, this is not a feature that exists within the UNSW-NB15 dataset. 
Niyaz et al. [66] take a different approach, instead of limiting themselves to a few common features like 
Tang et al. [65], they create their own dataset. This is achieved through creating their own network and 
performing various DDoS attacks from ten different attackers towards 5 different hosts. To collect 
benign data, they use a home wireless network with up to 12 devices connected, though not 
concurrently. After collecting data from both networks, they create their SDN and replay the data 
collected over it using TCPReplay. Using a deep sparse autoencoder model, they achieve 95.65% 
accuracy for binary classification. It should be noted that whilst the authors do use a SDN 
implementation based on OpenFlow, it is still a custom design, with data being recorded that would not 
typically be recorded by an SDN. For instance, the authors use the flags that are set in TCP flows as 
features, which is not an optional or required table entry within the OpenFlow framework [37]. This could 
lead to scalability issues on larger networks (more data being collected and analysed), though the 
authors suggest this could be overcome using a hybrid approach with tools such as sFlow or individual 
packet capture. The details of such a system are not provided. It should also be noted that the focus 
was on DDoS attacks, and not the broad range of attacks that can be found within a dataset such as 
the NSL-KDD or UNSW-NB15. 
This is an issue Yoon et al. [60] also mentioned in their work integrating IDS and IPS into SDN. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3.2, they do find advantages for IDS and IPS within SDN, namely that being that 
the middle boxes no longer need to be placed in-line. Upon receiving a flow table miss, the controller 
can order the packet to be redirected to IDS component for analysis, and then future benign packets 
can be forwarded onto their final location. This has the advantage of reducing the processing overhead 
of the network. Packets will only be analysed when it is unknown if they are benign or malicious, and 
the IDS will not be a bottleneck for the network. However, one of the disadvantages they mention is the 
limited access to packet data that comes from a network controller. Ideally, the IDS/IPS would just be 
using controller data to perform this analysis, as redirecting packets to the IDS introduces additional 
overheads. However, the comparative lack of data within the controller, means that the authors’ (non-
machine learning-based) solution would be hampered.  
3.4 Taxonomies 
After identifying a flow is malicious, a suitable mitigation measure needs to be determined. It has been 
stated that SDN is suited to carrying out automated mitigations of attacks, however what kind of 
mitigation needs to be discussed. Typically, a system will identify an attack by name, and list possible 
counter measures, allowing the administrator to choose something suitable, or it will just block the flow. 
This is not appropriate for the proposed system since part of the goal is to mitigate even 0-day attacks 
which do not have prepared counter measures. This subsection therefore examines taxonomies which 
are designed to identify a mitigation (unlike most which are designed to identify an attack).  
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Souissi [67] shows that the system being proposed could theoretically work with “A novel response-
oriented attack classification”. Souissi proposes a taxonomy consisting of the classes source, attack 
vector, target, and impact. Additionally, a matching defence mechanism is proposed that varies 
depending upon the parameters found in the taxonomy. While the system seems logical, it is tested on 
only two test cases, and so more study should be performed to ensure the system operates well in 
practice. 
A similar paper from Fu et al. [68], this time using the dimensions of Attack plane, Vector, Target and 
Effect. Effect is functionally equivalent to Impact from Souissi’s [67] paper, however only uses system 
damaging or resource occupying (verses the use of DoS, Access privilege, Harm implementation, 
information disclosure or no result from Souissi). Fu et al. do not include an access privilege option, as 
it is believed this can fall within the remit of system damage. It should be noted that the focus is on 
routing hardware, not a full network. We do not share this belief, as routers and basic switches can still 
be susceptible to access privilege attacks that do not perform harm to the switch or router themselves. 
For instance, the Mirai botnet was formed using primarily access privilege attacks, and most users of 
an infected router did not realise there was an issue until the botnet was leveraged. The attack plane, 
vector and target also have differences; however, these are explained by differences in the goals of the 
taxonomy. For instance, while Souissi has local or distant for attack source, Fu et al. have data plane, 
control plane or management plane, mimicking the three layers of a SDN network. 
Wu et al. [69] feel that only three dimensions are needed, source, technique and response. Like Souissi, 
Wu et al. propose a taxonomy based on responding to a network event, however, they do not address 
vector at all. For a response-orientated taxonomy, vector should be crucial, as without it, the 
countermeasures that involve restricting access to the attacker become more difficult. Apart from this, 
the solution is flexible and able to identify attacks and formulate responses.  
Simmons et al. [70] show a different approach in AVOIDIT: A Cyber Attack Taxonomy. In it, they state 
that to be a complete and useful taxonomy then several aspects must be met. These include that it 
must be built on previous works, that an attack must only be classified into one class, it must be clear 
and concise, it must be exhaustive, it must be unambiguous, it must be repeatable (i.e. the same attacks 
should be classified the same way each time), the terms should be well defined and that it should be 
useful. Some of these are related, for example, unambiguous and repeatable. If a term is ambiguous 
then there is a higher probability of some attacks not being classified the same way multiple times (as 
the class is open to interpretation). Applying these requirements, they devised AVOIDIT, which contains 
5 classes consisting of Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defence, Informational Impact and Target. 
Most of the classes are again broadly like others, but the inclusion of defence is an interesting choice. 
This consists of both Mitigation and Remediation and is designed to give a defender an appropriate 
starting point to defend against the attack. However, the authors state that this area could potentially 




3.5 Summary and Discussion 
It has been determined that there are a number of challenges facing this project, including: 
 A lack of suitable datasets 
 Uncertainty about the need or best way to balance data 
 Potential security issues around SDN itself 
 A significant reduction in accuracy when models are being trained only on the features available 
within SDN flows 
While the UNSW-NB15 is a more modern dataset and includes more modern attacks, it still includes a 
lot of data that is not readily available to SDN networks. Another dataset must be found in order to 
confirm any results. Additionally, the prepared dataset should be used, as using the raw dataset could 
lead to issues like those found in the earlier versions of the KDD’99 dataset. Those being that manually 
separating training, testing and evaluation sets can change the distribution of attacks making it easier 
or harder. The prepared dataset avoids these issues and allows us to compare any results directly 
(though with the knowledge other authors were using all features available). Some experimentation will 
also need to be done into balancing the data. It becomes obvious there is no “one size fits all” solution 
to data balancing, and that perhaps data does not need to be completely balanced at all. Instead, there 
may only need to be enough examples of all attacks for generalisations about other attacks to be made. 
The major issue surrounding the project is the lack of data available to teach deep models. Section 3.3 
outlined multiple papers which did not achieve results comparable to those of state-of-the-art papers 
using the whole dataset, or only did so by adding excess data back in and causing potential issues with 
scalability.  
Section 2.5 highlighted the contradiction that is apparent between SDN and deep learning for the 
purposes of intrusion detection. SDNs operate using extremely limited datasets, deep learning models, 
by contrast require large volumes of data with many features. Past works have achieved high accuracy 
rates using creating a custom SDN solution and generating more data points (Section 3.3, notably [66]). 
This solution could however lead to issues of scalability and is not a solution that would be compatible 
with pre-existing SDN installations. However, they do show that there is a benefit to more data being 
added to standard SDN flows.  
Additional data could come from several sources. Past papers have shown the benefit of using features 
that are effectively just basic features applied over time, or some other measure, such as the count in 
the NSL-KDD dataset (Number of connections to the same host as the current connection in the past 
two seconds). Indeed, some of these features are the most useful [54], and often also have the 
advantage of being easy to calculate using SDN flow characteristics. For the count, no packet body 
data is required, or even any header data beyond the destination of the flow. Every two seconds the 
flow table can be examined, and the number of connections can be counted. Additionally, there are 
sources of data outside of network data alone. Log data is a valuable source of information, and often 
a resource companies already manage using automated log servers. Again, some of the most valuable 
features are ones that are available through this resource [29], [71]. Going back to the NSL-KDD 
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dataset, the root_shell (whether root was obtained), su_attempted (count of number of attempts), 
num_shells (number of shells opened) and num_access_files (number of files accessed) are all found 
to be valuable, and are all features that would be readily available within logs. This is not surprising, the 
combination of root_shell and su_attempted gives a clear indication of whether a service may be under 
a password attack. If root is being requested many times, with few (or no) successes, it is a clear sign 
that the service may be under attack, as a forgetful administrator would likely move to regain access to 
the service through a more legitimate route then guessing many times. 
There have been attempts to merge logs with network data for the purposes of intrusion detection. 
Typically referred to as Hybrid NIDS [72][73], these systems generally attempted to use different 
methods to detect anomalous activity in logs or the network data separately, and registered it as an 
intrusion attempt depending upon a ruleset (e.g. If either system detects anomalous activity, register an 
intrusion, or If the network system registers an intrusion but the logging system doesn’t, register it as 
benign, which may help with false positives). Few researchers have attempted to incorporate logs into 
a NIDS to improve network anomaly detection specifically. This is likely because traditionally this kind 
of merging has been difficult to achieve. For more traditional systems, it would require rewriting all of 
the signatures that have been generated over the years (for both network-based as well as host-based 
intrusions), whereas statistical measures would gain little from such a merger and the added information 
it provides. For self-learning systems there was also the difficulty of how you incorporate both log and 
network data. Often, network data is only kept for a short amount of time (the time needed to manage 
it), and so you would need to either copy all the network data to another location in order to have it 
analysed (a system for which there wasn’t a simple or standard solution) or attempt to do the analysis 
on the routers handling the data (which would lead to issues with computational resources). SDN can 
solve this problem for us. 
A common feature of all SDN designs is the use of a northbound interface, which can be used to receive 
information from the controller and issue instructions back. Without a northbound interface, a system 
cannot be considered an SDN, as there is no way to issue the commands that define the idea. Typically, 
the northbound interface can also be accessed through software, allowing automation of network 
resources dependent upon network load. As such, it is possible that an intrusion system could sit on 
this northbound interface, getting information from the SDN controller about the currently active network 
flows. In addition, if this were to sit on separate hardware from the main controller, it is entirely possible 
it could also receive data from log servers in a similar manner. A large database of flows, both past and 
present, could be built, which includes log data as well as flow data and is regularly analysed for signs 
of anomalous activity.   
This configuration process comes with an additional advantage. Since the IDS is sitting on the 
northbound interface, it would be possible to alter flows based upon network conditions or anomalous 
activity. This is the purpose of the northbound interface after all. Once the IDS has found malicious 
activity, then a system could be put in place to mitigate the risk posed through manipulation of network 
traffic. This could be similar to a Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS), however there would be 
some important differences. 
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Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPSs) are typically hardware-based devices that seek to 
prevent attacks by blocking traffic (possibly through the use of reconfiguring firewalls), resetting 
connections or simply dropping packets. They typically work inline and are placed just before important 
infrastructure that needs to be protected. The process of manipulating SDN flows to attempt to stop 
malicious activity does not fit directly into this paradigm, particularly as the device will not be sitting 
inline (Section 3.3, notably [60]). As such, proposed is that an intrusion detection and mitigation system 
that sits on the northbound interface of a SDN be called a Network Intrusion Mitigation System (NIMS). 
A NIPS will prevent attacks through blocking or dropping traffic, the NIMS does not have this restriction. 
Through manipulating flows, a NIMS could redirect an attack to a honeypot, for example, with the 
attacker still believing they are targeting the original target. This could allow for gaining potentially 
important intelligence on the attacker (what the motivation or end goal is for example). If the attack is 
of a low threat, then it could be highlighted to the administrator, but no further action be taken, or if 
mitigating the attack could potentially produce undesirable results, then the same action could be taken. 
While dropping or blocking certain flows is still something that a NIMS could perform, the goal would be 
focussed more on mitigating the effects rather than preventing the attack entirely. 
The advantages for this approach become clearer when you examine some of the most common threats 
facing businesses (Section 1 [8][7]). Living off the land attacks, malware propagation using exploits, 
password attacks, and supply chain attacks all have one thing in common. They use software and tools 
that are already commonplace within business networked environments to propagate and are therefore 
more difficult to detect and stop. Deep learning can provide the means to spot the attacks, but the 
means to stop them requires both more finesse, and a more holistic view of the network, than is possible 
with traditional NIPS. At best, a NIPS would only ever be able to protect the service it has been placed 
immediately in front of. Even then, without SDN to aid in the identification of exactly which flows are 
malicious, the options would be to either perform a DoS attack against any compromised machines 
(through blocking all traffic from them) or allow the attack to continue. With SDN, flows can be blocked 
or redirected, instead of the agents creating the flows. Additionally, the NIMS would be able to monitor 
the entire network and block or redirect malicious flows, not just those directed at the equipment being 
protected by a NIPS. This is noteworthy as while access to these protected machines is desirable by 
attackers, this is not the goal. With automated botnets and worms, the goal is simply to spread as far 
as possible and turn those infected machines into resources to spread further. Later, instructions can 
be sent to utilise this network (as was seen with Mirai and Petya/NotPetya [74]).  
A NIDS may help to detect the malware and alert an administrator to its existence, and a NIPS may 
help stop the spread to essential network components, however, without some sort of automated 
response system the attack may have compromised the entirety of the rest of the network. Removing 
such an infection could feasibly take months, as frequently the best course of action is to replace the 




4 Overview of Assumptions 
Previous chapters, have discussed the apparent conflict between the SDN paradigm (a centralised and 
programmable network, based upon a high level representation of the state of the network) and deep 
learning based IDSs or IPSs (requiring direct packet analysis and in the case of IPSs changing the 
network state without utilising the SDN). Also discussed (at a high level) have been solutions to this 
issue, and how other researchers have approached it. This chapter, shall provide an overview of the 
assumptions that have been made whilst developing the solution, and provide the environmental 
context the solution is designed to work in. 
4.1 Overview of Hardware Assumptions 
Figure 4.1-1 illustrates an example of how a network may look with the proposed solution deployed. 
This can be separated into three sections, mimicking a SDN layout. In this section will discuss what 
these areas are and what components fit into them.  
 
Figure 4.1-1 – Architectural view of an example network it is believed the solution could be placed into 
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The three core areas are highlighted with the use of the different coloured lines indicating network 
connections. These consist of the Data Plane (blue lines), the Control Plane (green lines) and the 
Mitigation Plane (red lines). 
It should be noted that with this setup, both the IMS and the SDN controllers are single point of failures. 
This holds true for SDN controllers in general (one of the disadvantages of the SDN paradigm is that 
the controller becomes a point of weakness and could be a target of attack). However, the same benefits 
that have led to SDN becoming more widespread can aid security. There is reduced operational cost 
(one device protecting the network vs several protecting different locations), and easier management 
as a result. Additionally, it offers advantages in terms of reaction to threats. If an internal attack has 
been detected in one area of the network, then the whole network can be configured to block or redirect 
that threat, should the same symptoms be detected elsewhere. More to the point, this can be done 
automatically, leveraging the power of SDN.  
Within the diagram, the logging controller and IMS have been shown as two separate devices, however 
it may be beneficial to have them run on the same device, or at least have access to the same storage 
(in the case of Storage Area Networks or Fibre Channel Storage). The IMS will want to check logs 
frequently to see if there are any updates for matching flows and having them connected would 
decrease the overhead. However, it should also be considered that running the IMS is likely to be 
computationally expensive (in terms of CPU and memory specifically) and having it reside on the same 
device as the log server could lead to bottlenecks. This is slightly outside the scope of this work and is 
something that would need to be explored further for a future system. In the same vein, the mitigation 
component and detection component are shown as being on the same device (the IMS). In practice, 
they could be on separate devices, and the benefits of separating them would need to be weighed 
against the costs. 
4.1.1 Data Plane 
In this plane, the data that will eventually be analysed is created. As such, this consists of the SDN-
enabled switches, additional servers, and general PCs.  
 Servers 
Shown in Figure 4.1-1 are additional servers that represent the kind of servers that may be 
seen in a business (such as a web server, FTP server, SSH server and a mail server).  Logs 
from these servers are transferred to the logging server, a common component of business 
networks which aggregates and sort logs for easier processing later. In the proposed system, 
this is called the log controller, as this title better fits the intended role. Log levels for these 
services are set to notice (or the equivalent, i.e. usually the level before warning) and be 
transferred with existing log management software (such as syslog). It should be noted that the 
analysis of logs is done later on the log controller. 
 SDN Enabled Switches 
These provide the network flows, which are the base of the detection system. Upon registering 
a flow, they were not previously aware of, a message is sent to the SDN controller with details 
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of the new flow, including source and destination addresses, protocols involved (UDP, TCP 
etc.) and start time. It is also updated regularly with number of packets, and size of flow. 
 General PCs 
While general use PCs rarely have extensive logging turned on by default (as the scope for 
damage is typically less), DNS lookups can be logged, along with other general activity 
information. This is often used to diagnose malware. Activity at unusual times (for example 
when the office is closed) can be a sign of malicious use, as can requests for unusual 
addresses. Tracking of activity usually requires an agent/server relationship, in which an agent 
is set to start-up automatically on the user PC and sends an aggregated view of activity for a 
defined time period, to the server. The server can then provide an overall view of general 
activity, which can then be focused on specific computers if needed. Unlike the specific servers 
above, the user PCs typically do the initial data aggregation, rather than a log server, which 
naturally means the data is less granular. 
4.1.2 Control Plane 
The control plane consists of two main devices, the SDN controller (as with SDNs) and the log controller. 
The purpose of the control plane is to aggregate and format the data so that it can be used later by the 
mitigation plane. 
 SDN Controller 
The SDN controller is configured as it would normally be, keeping a list of current and past 
network flows. While the switches provide the controller with source, destination, size of 
instances of flows and number of packets, the flow controller aggregates this data to create a 
larger view. For example, a switch may provide the controller with an update saying “A flow that 
has been matched to one in my database with this source and destination, lasted x seconds, 
with y number of packets and a size of z bytes.” The controller would take this information and 
add the number of packets, bytes and duration to the flow data already compiled. In addition, 
controllers typically keep note of the length of time the flow has been idle (which will be reset). 
 Log Controller 
The log controller receives logs as it would if it were a normal log server, from servers and 
devices on the data plane. These are then integrated into a database from which additional 
features are obtained. Required features would include things like date and time of creation (to 
match against flows that may have created it), as well as source of the log (which server or host 
the log was generated on) and the log text itself. Ideally, the remote IP address would also be 
accessible. Derivable features include examples such as login attempted (was the log created 
because a user attempted a login), login successful (was the log generated because a user 
successfully logged in), a sentiment score of the log text (how positive or negative the log text 
sounds), and log number (how many logs have been generated matching certain criteria (such 
as from the same IP within n minutes)). 
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4.1.3 Mitigation Plane 
The mitigation plane consists of two main components, the detection component and the mitigation 
component, both of which could run on the same device (The IMS in Figure 4.1-1) due to the close 
integration these two components would need. As stated in 4.1 they could be separated onto two 
devices, however much of the work they will do is very similar, and they will need access to the same 
data sources, so it is assumed that they would be on the same device. 
 Detection Component 
This component is responsible for combining the separate log and network flow data, detecting 
useful features, and making an initial classification. Logs are combined with flows through 
matching the source and destination addresses, as well as ensuring the log has been created 
within n minutes of the flow. A delay is allowed as flows will be created before the logs they 
generate, and so cannot be matched perfectly. In addition, the time period allows us to spot 
instances where a user has started a short flow, stopped it, and then restarted it again a few 
minutes later. Depending upon load and configuration this activity may appear to be new flows 
to the SDN controller, especially if a FIN message is sent in the case of a TCP flow. For 
instance, this can happen in the case of a password attack. The attacker will attempt two or 
three passwords, and then pause. This can aid in bypassing a lockout limit (for number of 
attempts within a set time period). 
 Mitigation Component 
The component is responsible for determining what kind of attack the network is under and 
determining a mitigation method for it. This is done not through the traditional method of 
comparing a flow to previous examples of attacks, but by comparing the flow to several different 
attack characteristics within an attack taxonomy (examples of which have been discussed in 
Section 3.4). Through comparing the flow to different leaves of the taxonomy it is possible to 
determine a mitigation that is custom to the attack that is being experienced. This is done as 
some attacks that may be considered quite different may have similar mitigations. For example, 
a SQL injection attack designed to leak data, and a brute force password attack designed to 
gain access to a system, where the mitigation for both could consist of blocking the offending 
IP. The reverse is also true, where similar attacks may have different mitigations. For example, 
a SYN flood mitigation may be to block the flow, whereas a DDoS attack mitigation might be to 
redirect traffic. However, in both cases the attack being made is a DoS attack. 
4.2 Overview of Process Assumptions 
This section shall provide an overview of the assumptions that are made about how both server logs 
and network flows are created and interact. These are based on the hardware assumptions made in 
Section 4.1, and seek to clarify exactly where and how the data being used in the rest of this thesis 
would come from in a real-world application. To do this, process diagrams that outline the individual 
steps taken will be shown. All these steps are taken within the Data Plane explained in Section 4.1.1, 
and these processes are termed initialisation processes later in the thesis. An initialisation is considered 
an event that results in the creation of a network flow. These events are outside the ability of a network 
45 
 
administrator to control, however there are several ways this could be achieved, and administrators 
need to be mindful of these. These are discussed below, as is their impact on this work. 
It should be noted that these processes could happen in sequence, or in parallel, or in any other 
combination. The goal is to show the types of communication, and what outputs might be available to 
analyse, as well as where in the system this analysis might take place. To aid with this, sections of the 
flows have been highlighted red, green, or blue, and this will correspond to the colour segments of the 
network diagram Figure 4.1-1.Figure 4.1-1 – Architectural view of an example network it is believed the 
solution could be placed into 
External Client to Server Communication 
This is the bulk of what would be considered typical communication and is what most datasets attempt 
to represent. Communication is initiated by an external actor, typically using the internet. The first notice 
of this communication received is from the firewall, and flow is created at the first switch it meets after 
passing through the firewall. The outline of the flows’ path is shown in Figure 4.2-1. This shows the 
process of the flow lifecycle and is generally like that found in most SDNs. Three components can be 
identified clearly, the SDN-enabled switch (green), the SDN controller (blue) and the server, which could 
be a SSH server, or an FTP server etc. (red). Note that a flow is always created or updated within this 
process, while a log is not. It is possible that flows could be created that do not require the creation of 
a log. For example, it is unlikely a web server would log every page request it receives, as this would 
quickly lead to unmanageable log sizes.  
It should also be noted that the firewall will be dropping packets before they meet the SDN-enabled 
switch, meaning that no flows are ever created, and the data is not analysed by the system. While SDN-
based firewalls have been researched, it is likely that exposing a controller to the level of traffic 
experienced by an external firewall would lead the controller to be become overloaded, and for little 
benefit. 
 
Figure 4.2-1 – External Client to Server Flow 
Internal Client to Server Communication 
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Figure 4.1-1 shows a secondary firewall that monitors all data directed to the servers regardless of the 
location. This leads to a process flow similar to the external client to server, with the exception that all 
communication produced by the internal computers will produce a flow to analyse. Additionally, the 
second firewall leads to a situation in which flows may be created, but logs are not. For instance, if 
somebody mistakenly attempted to start an FTP connection to the webserver (through typing the wrong 
URL), it is likely the firewall would drop that connection. This is shown in Figure 4.2-2. 
 
Figure 4.2-2 – Internal Client to Server Communication flow 
The primary difference in the flows between Figure 4.2-1 and Figure 4.2-2 is the location of the firewall. 
With external communication, the firewall is going to be the first thing the flow comes against, and not 
passing the firewall means that the flow never enters the network. With internal communication the 
firewall is only accessed after the flow has entered the network, and so will be analysed regardless of 
whether it can pass the firewall or not. 
Internal Client to Client Communication 
While comparatively rare, this kind of communication is becoming more common as applications have 
moved away from client-server relationships to peer-to-peer relationships. For example, the file sharing 
tool Dropbox enables peer-to-peer file sharing for shared folders on the same network, in order to speed 
up synchronisation speed versus that of syncing over the internet. It is also this kind of communication 
that would result from a botnet infection, as the bot attempts to infect other computers on the same 
network. This is important as ransomware infections spread by botnets are increasing within business 
environments [8], and this is seen as an inexpensive way of disrupting a network. The flow for this kind 




Figure 4.2-3 – Client to client communication flow 
There is no firewall involved in this system, as typically client computers are not specifically protected 
before they access a switch. This makes for a simpler flow diagram but is still communication that needs 
to be analysed. It should also be noted this kind of communication typically will not produce server logs, 
as the flow is not directed at a server.  
Internal Server to Server Communication 
While similar to the internal client to server model, this kind of communication would rarely feature any 
significant defences. The reasoning is simple, this kind of communication typically comes as a result of 
servers requiring data from each other in pursuit of a request from another client or process. Time to 
reply is often critical in this kind of situation, and many networks cannot afford the computational 
complexity of having another comparatively slow firewall protecting servers from each other, especially 
when this should be the most secure area of the network, with no malicious activity. 
 
Figure 4.2-4 – Server to server communication 
Figure 4.2-4 shows this, with no firewall included in the diagram, but still containing the log creation. 
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External Client to Internal Client Communication 
While traditionally rare, this communication type is becoming more common as remote working 
becomes common place, and applications such as TeamViewer make the experience easier. Although 
cloud computing and remote software can aid in remote working, often users want to use the same 
computer they would be working on inside the office, or need specialist tools or hardware that are only 
available through logging into their office computer remotely. This type of communication has the same 
issue as remote client to server communication, in that if the connection is stopped at the firewall, no 
flows or logs of the event will enter the system. However, it is unlikely that a traditional firewall would 
stop this, as typically these services (while peer to peer) utilise outbound connections to bypass stateful 
firewall checks. Figure 4.2-5 shows the process for this, again showing that if the incoming flow does 
not meet the requirements to pass the firewall, then the process will never begin. Again, as the flow 
never interacts with a server, logs are not recorded. 
 






This chapter shall discuss the methodology and reasoning behind the system being created, linking 
decisions to the previous assumptions that have been made, and showing the reasoning behind them. 
To achieve this, process diagrams detailing the individual steps being taken will be presented, including 
code extracts where applicable. A process flow diagram will be followed (to be shown in the next 
subsection), while mentioning where on the hardware diagram the process is taking place. 
5.1 The process being followed 
In Figure 5.1-1 the overall process laid out. As presented, it consists of four main stages. These stages 
are organised according to the state of the data and the kind of analysis or transformation being done 
to it. This is in contrast to the hardware overview, which is organised according to what the goal of the 
hardware is within the system (creation of data, control and organisation of the data, and manipulation 
of the data). The process stages are Initialisation and Creation, Extraction, Analysis and Mitigation. 
 
Figure 5.1-1 – Flow diagram to show the flow of data within the system 
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Of note is the new orange box. This is the activity that is envisioned would happen on the IMS. As 
mentioned in Section 4.1.3, this could be the same physical device as the SDN controller, or a separate 
physical box that uses the SDN controllers’ northbound interface to collect relevant data. 
It should be noted that the logs are processed in parallel to the network flows until they are finally 
grouped. This is done to attempt to ensure the system will scale, as processing both logs and flows in 
series could affect scalability. Additionally, as has been mentioned in Section 4.2 there is an assumption 
that while flows will always be created, logs may not be, and this design aids that assumption by allowing 
logs to be matched to flows when they are created but doesn’t wait for them or require them. This is 
also tested with the SSH Compromise Detection Using Netflow/IPFIX Dataset, which did not have 
corresponding logs for every flow. The log data is supplementary data to aid classification, and not 
essential. 
5.2 Initialisation and Creation 
The initialisation process includes all actions required to create a network flow. This is significant as it 
is possible to create a flow without creating any logs. For example, with the network hardware given 
above, an internal HTTP request for an external website would likely not generate any logs, but would 
generate multiple network flows (DNS query, HTTP flow itself, etc.). A request like this would still need 
to be analysed, especially as these requests can be used to track botnet activity. It should also be noted 
that logs that are created without flows are not being considered, as this would fall within the scope of 
HIDSs. As stated in Section 4.1.1, creation of the data is handled by devices in the Data plane. This 
includes logs from servers, as well as network flows from switches. More specifically, switches provide 
flow data to the SDN controller, and the servers create logs that are provided or accessed by the log 
server. As such in the rest of this section shall discuss the creation of the logs and flows. 
5.2.1 Flows 
Flows are the first kind of data to be created and are the primary source of data for the IMS. A network 
flow is created whenever data arrives at an SDN-enabled switch and does not match any previously 
encountered data. When comparing a packet to previously encountered data to determine which flow 
entry a packet belong to, OpenFlow specifies 12 fields a packet can be compared against: 
1. Switch Input Port 
2. VLAN ID 
3. VLAN Priority 
4. Ethernet Source Address 
5. Ethernet Destination Address 
6. Ethernet Frame Type 
7. IP Source Address 
8. IP Destination Address 
9. IP Protocol 
10. IP Type of Service bits 
11. Source Port (For TCP or UDP) 
51 
 
12.  Destination Port (For TCP or UDP) 
 
Not all the fields are required, and there are three types of compliance: 
 Full compliance: where all fields are supported. 
 Layer 2 conformance: where the layer 2 headers are supported (fields 2-6) 
 Layer 3 conformance: where the layer 3 headers are supported (fields 7-12) 
 
It is noteworthy that packets can be matched to multiple flow entries (effectively belonging to multiple 
flow entries), and in order to manage this the OpenFlow specification states that the packet will be 
assigned to the flow entry with the highest priority, and no more searches for other matches will be 
made.  
Typically, NIDS datasets (such as the UNSW-NB15, and University of Twenté dataset outlined in 
Section 2.6) do not contain fields 1-6, but only IP addresses and ports. This work assumes an 
organisation will be using a layer 3 compliant switch in order to gather the data, thus providing the 
following 6 fields for us to use: 
1. IP Source Address 
2. IP Destination Address 
3. IP Protocol (TCP/UDP etc) 
4. IP Type of Service Bits 
5. Source Port 
6. Destination Port 
However, an OpenFlow table also contains counters and timeouts. The specification [37] requires a 
counter to be used for active entries, duration, received packets and received bytes. This increases the 
features used to 9. There are other counters available, but these are not required by the OpenFlow 
specification and so are not assumed to be available for the purposes of this work. Other SDN solutions 
may provide more data, however this is on a case by case basis, and the project seeks to create a 
solution that should be applicable to as many SDN based solutions as possible. OpenFlow has been 
chosen as it forms the basis of other commercial SDN solutions [4], and so even if a company is not 
using an OpenFlow product specifically, it is likely the same assumptions about available data can be 
made. 
5.2.2 Server Logs 
Logging is enabled on most server-based systems by default, and is generally required for legal and 
compliance reasons, as well as security and monitoring.  Figure 5.2-1 shows a log from the 




Figure 5.2-1 – Extract from the logs of the Netflow/IPFix Dataset 
The logs in this dataset come from Kippo and OpenSSH servers, and contain date, time, service, source 
IP address or hostname as well as log text. This is broadly in line with syslog (RFC 5424), which 
specifies a log should contain Hostname or IP address, Timestamp, Facility, Severity, and the message 
itself. Windows system logs contain Date, Time, Computer, Source, Event ID, Level and Category, as 
well as log text. While logs are not standardised, there are some similarities between different log 
formats, and data that can be gleamed almost universally, that being the date and time of creation of 
the log, hostname or IP address of the system, log text and service that resulted in the log creation. It 
is logical that these attributes would be included in most log systems, simply because for a log to be 
useful these are the minimum attributes required. If a log does not have a time or date, an administrator 
cannot tell when the log was created or attempt to discern what events may have been happening at 
the same time to cause its creation. Similarly, while IP address or hostname may not be required when 
dealing with a single machine, if transferred to a central log server (a common practice in business 
environments) an administrator will need to know where a log originated, and the service it relates to. 
As such, it can be assumed that logs within a business environment contain: 
1 Date 
2 Time 
3 Hostname or IP Address 
4 Service 
5 Log text 
However, the only feature this easily adds to the proposed system is Service, since port number is not 
necessarily a reliable representation of the service being used on a network level. Date, time, and IP 
are already provided by the network flow, and log text can vary enough within a single service that 
without further processing it simply cannot be used. It may also be possible to add severity to the list, 
however, different log formats use different ratings for severity. This comes in the form both rating 
number and scale itself. For example, syslog uses a rating of 0-7 to represent Emergency, Alert, Critical, 
Error, Warning, Notice, Informational and Debug, whereas windows uses a rating of 1-5, representing 
Critical, Error, Warning, Information and verbose. If using this measure to determine the severity of the 
event, the question becomes how should these separate ratings be compared? For example, should a 
critical error in syslog (level 2) be comparable to a critical error on windows (level 1), or an Error on 
windows (level 2). Given the range of different log services, and the variety of potential different levels, 




The base level features that can be extracted have been identified in Section 5.2. However, this base 
level data is not suitable for intrusion detection alone. Additionally, it was stated that log text needs 
more processing in order to be useful. The SDN flows do not require the same kind of processing as 
the logs do, and features derived from network flows are features the SDN controllers keep track of 
anyway. For example, one such feature includes total size of flow (both in terms of packet number and 
bytes). Switches send the size of individual flow instances to the controller, and the controller updates 
the flow table with the cumulative sum of the flow instances to get the size of the flow in total. While 
more data can be derived (such as an average flow instance size) the goal is to create a system that 
will work with the data provided by a SDN controller.  
5.3.1 Flow Features are Extracted 
The first step is to load flows into the database since the network flows are always generated and are 
used as a comparison to the logs. Flows are received in a textual form, an example of which can be 
seen in Figure 5.3-1: 
 
Figure 5.3-1 – An example of an OpenFlow flow 
This can effectively be read as a CSV, with cookie=0x0 being the first column, duration=6.402s being 
the second, etc. This can be performed with pseudocode like: 
1. import csv 
2. string = getFlow() 
3. x = csv.reader(string) 
4. for row in x: 
5.     #Process the row 
Pseudocode 5.3-1 – Pseudocode for reading a flow 
In Pseudocode 5.3-1, the getFlow() function runs an appropriate command on the SDN controller to 
view flows (for OpenFlow this would be the ovs-ofctl dump-flow command), and returns the contents. 
From here, the contents of various fields can be accessed through row[x] where x is the number of the 
field you wish to access. For features that consist of just a number, a regular expression filter such as 
re.sub("[^0123456789\.\:]","",row[x]) can be applied, which will remove any characters except numbers, 
decimal points or colons (for IPv6 addresses). So, for the string in Figure 5.3-1, Table 5.3-1 shows the 
features obtained, and where they were obtained within the string: 
Feature Was Filter Used? Row Number Result 
IP Source Address Yes Row[13] 10.0.0.2 
IP Destination Address Yes Row[14] 10.0.0.1 
IP Protocol No Row[8] arp 
IP Type of Service Bits Yes Row[7] 65535 
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Source Port Yes Row[15] 2 
Destination Port Yes Not applicable for ARP, 
same as Source Port 
2 
Duration Yes Row[1] 6.402 
Received Packets Yes Row[3] 1 
Received Bytes Yes Row[4] 42 
Table 5.3-1 – Table to show features gained from an Example ARP flow, including location they were taken from 
For the TCP flow shown in Figure 5.3-2, the corresponding table is shown in Table 5.3-2. 
 
Figure 5.3-2 – An example of a TCP OpenFlow flow 
Feature Was Filter Used? Row Number Result 
IP Source Address Yes Row[13] 10.0.0.1 
IP Destination Address Yes Row[14] 10.0.0.2 
IP Protocol No Row[8] tcp 
IP Type of Service Bits Yes Row[7] 65535 
Source Port Yes Row[16] 80 
Destination Port Yes Row[17] 52930 
Duration Yes Row[1] 16.012 
Received Packets Yes Row[3] 12 
Received Bytes Yes Row[4] 2945 
Table 5.3-2 – Table for an example TCP flow 
This data can now be used to compare the flow received to flows within the main IMS database. This 
database, similar to a SDN flow table, keeps a list of flows that are traversing the network, and its 
corresponding data aggregated data. The term Network Health Flow (NHF) is proposed to describe the 
aggregated data being kept on the IMS. An SDN flow can be matched to a NHF using IP Source and 
Destination, IP Protocol, and Source and Destination ports collectively. If a match is found, then 
Duration, Received Packets and Received Bytes can be updated with the new information, otherwise a 
new NHF can be entered into the IMS database. This is shown in Pseudocode 5.3-2. 
1. import mysql.connector 
2.   






9. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
10.   
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11. query=”SELECT count(*) FROM flowTable WHERE ip_src = ip_src AND 
ip_dst = ip_dst AND port_src = port_src AND port_dst = port_dst AND 
protocol = protocol;” 
12.   
13. mycursor.execute(query) 
14. result = mycursor.fetchone() 
15.   
16. if result[0] > 0: 
Pseudocode 5.3-2 – Pseudocode for creating a new flow entry to updating an existing entry 
After the flows have been updated and new flows added, any logs that have been generated can be 
matched to the flow data. The first stage in this is adding data to a temporary log database, to make the 
processing quicker. This is performed using a query that is very similar to that used to match the network 
flows, but the match is made on the host IP address (after being converted if necessary), as well as the 
service and the time created. Pseudocode for this is provided in Pseudocode 5.3-3. This simultaneously 
gives us the first feature derived directly from the logs, the number of instances of duplicate logs being 
generated. 
1. import mysql.connector 
2.   
3. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
4.   host=host, 
5.   user=user, 
6.   passwd=password, 
7.   database="logDB" 
8. ) 
9.   
10. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
11. query=”SELECT count(*) FROM logTable WHERE hostIP = hostIP AND 
service = service AND time>= time AND logText = logText 
12.   
13. mycursor.execute(query) 
14. result = mycursor.fetchone() 
15.   
16. if result[0] > 0: 
17.  query = “UPDATE logTable SET instances = instances + 1, 
time = time, date = date  
18.  WHERE hostIP = hostIP AND service = service AND time>= 
time;” 
19. Else: 
20.  query = “INSERT INTO logTable hostIP, service, date, time, 
logText, instances 
21.  VALUES hostIP, service, date, time, logText, 1;” 
22.   
23. mycursor.execute(query) 
Pseudocode 5.3-3 – Code to match log entries to flow entries 
5.3.2 Log Features are Extracted 
More features can be extracted from the logs; the first aspect considered is whether there is a successful 
login. The only way to get this data without the use of decryption techniques and deep packet inspection 
is to analyse the log text. Because logs are generally highly structured, and the text does not deviate 
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significantly between different instances of the same log it is possible to use source code similar to 
Pseudocode 5.3-4: 
1. log = getLogFromDataServer() 
2. x = log.split() 
3. for word in x: 
4.  if (word == “Accepted”): 
5.    accepted = 1 
6.  elif (word == “password”): 
7.    password = 1 
8.   
9. if (password == 1) && (accepted == 1): 
10.   loginAttempt = 1 
11. else: 
12.   loginAttempt = 0 
Pseudocode 5.3-4 – Entry to show whether a login attempt has been made 
The code simply looks for the words “Accepted” and “Password”. If a single log contains both of these 
words, it is considered to have been a successful login. It should be noted that these words were chosen 
specifically for Kippo and OpenSSH logs, which log a successful login with a log like that shown in 
Figure 5.3-3: 
 
Figure 5.3-3 – Accepted Password Log 
And log failed logins with Figure 5.3-4: 
 
If the log is recorded with a different message along the lines of Figure 5.3-5: 
 
Figure 5.3-5 – Alternative Failed Password Log 
The relevant code would have to change to accommodate an additional qualifier of the word “not”. If 
the word “not” is found, then the result of the code is multiplied by -1 in order to generate a minus 
number if the log displays a failed login. In the code, this is replicated through use of another if statement 
to detect the word “Failed” (which only appears in failed password logs). Upon finding this, the 
loginAttempt variable is set to -1. This means on the log database now contains: 
 Date 
 Time 
 Host IP 
 Service 
 Log Text 
 Instances 
 Login Success 
Figure 5.3-4 – Failed Password Example 
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The next step is to determine a sentiment score for the log. The sentiment score needs to be an indicator 
of how positive or negative the log text is overall. The reasoning for this is that logs depicting negative 
events are typically going to contain negative words, such as “error”, “failure” and “closed”. If a flow is 
producing mainly negative logs, then that could be taken as an indicator that the flow is malicious. 
The Python textblob library has been selected, which contains the sentiment.polarity function. This 
function scores words individually and is based upon Vader used in the Natural Language Tool Kit 
(NLTK). This creates a normalised, weighted composite score based upon the lexicon that was 
generated within VADER [75]. VADER is a sentiment lexicon that is sensitive to both the intensity and 
polarity of the statement being read and is fast enough to be used with online streaming data.  The 
score it generates varies between -1 and 1, where scores close to -1 are almost entirely negative, 
whereas scores close to 1 are almost entirely positive, and scores close to 0 are neutral. While normally 
used for sentiment analysis for online reviews, Vader has some advantages for this work as well. Vader 
attempts to qualify sentiment not only using its own lexicon, but also qualifies the sentiment being 
expressed by including punctuation and use of capital letters. This allows it to shift sentiment 
appropriately when confronted with a phrase like: “VADER is VERY SMART, handsome, and FUNNY!!” 
compared to: “Vader is very smart, handsome, and funny.” The first phrasing clearly has more emphasis 
on the positive attributes, given by the capitalisation and exclamation marks, and so will gain a more 
positive score. While logs are more structured than online comments, the use of capitals and 
punctuation is not uncommon the bring attention of the administrator to major errors or warnings. From 
the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, there is evidence of this in some logs such as in Figure 5.3-6: 
 
Figure 5.3-6 – Capitalisation of a Log being used for emphasis 
Another advantage of using textblob and Vader is that is computationally efficient [75], testing having 
shown it producing sentiment scores faster than more complex machine learning methods of producing 
sentiment, without losing accuracy. This speed is noteworthy, since any delays in producing the NHF 
will inevitably delay the final classification and slow any possible response. Pseudocode for the textblob 
found in Pseudocode 5.3-5. 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. from textblob import TextBlob 
3.   
4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
8.   database="logDB" 
9. ) 
10.   
11. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
12.   
13. log = getLogFromDataServer() 
14.   
15. blob = TextBlob(log) 
16. sentiment = blob.sentiment.polarity 
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17.   
18. query = “UPDATE logTable SET sentiment = sentiment 
19.  WHERE hostIP = hostIP AND service = service;” 
20.   
21. mycursor.execute(query) 
Pseudocode 5.3-5 – Example code for the textblob 
It is also possible to obtain the remote IP address from the Log text. This is typically not recorded 
separately and so does need log analysis to determine the address. Pseudocode for this is found in 
Pseudocode 5.3-6. 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. import re 
3.   
4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
8.   database="logDB" 
9. ) 
10.   
11. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
12.   
13. log = getLogFromDataServer() 
14. re.finadall(r'(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})', log) 
Pseudocode 5.3-6 – Code to determine IP Address from a Log 
Where IP is the IP address found within the text of the log. The regex in the final line captures four 1-3 




 Host IP 
 Service 
 Log Text 
 Instances 
 Login Success 
 Sentiment 
 Remote IP Address 
The final structure of an NHF can be found in Table 5.3-3: 
From both flows and logs – Mandatory for matching 
Date Time Host IP Remote IP Service 
Logs Flows Logs 
Instances Received Packets Received Bytes Duration Sentiment 




The analysis consists of a number of stages, laid out as follows: 
 Aggregation 
The logs and network flows need to be aggregated into an NHF. This is achieved through 
matching IP Addresses, services and ports that have been extracted in Section 5.3.1 and 
Section 5.3.2. Also utilised are two rules that state that the log must have been generated within 
a 5-minute period of a flow, and that the log must have been generated after a flow. This is 
because logically, logs must be created after a network flow, however, logs should not be 
matched to flows that have been idle too long. Because the amount of time between a flow 
being registered and a log being created can vary depending upon network conditions, server 
usage, server location within the network and a number of other conditions, a 5-minute grace 
period was selected. This period was based upon works such as [40] where similar periods 
have been chosen. Another advantage of this is that it aids in detection and consolidation of 
micro flows. Micro flows are flows that can last less than a second, and typically contain little 
data. Due to their small size and duration, micro flows are often not kept on the flow table by 
SDN controllers very long, but these can still be a sign of malicious activity. By using a process 
to drop flows that depends solely on the amount of time a flow has been idle it is possible to 
detect flows that are small and do not last long but can be frequent. 
 Initial Analysis 
It has been mentioned that there will need to be a way to organize the NHFs into a priority 
queue. Deep learning is resource intensive, and while the NHFs contain fewer features than 
many other datasets, some form of sampling is still likely. Here a risk score to evaluate which 
flows are high risk shall be calculated. This is done as a way to ensure that malicious flows can 
be analysed at line speed. 
 Initial Classification 
An initial binary classification of the NHF is made. Separate to the risk analysis made earlier, 
this uses a deep learning model that produces a classification as to whether the flow is 
malicious. The machine learning model for this is a deep one and consists of multiple 
convolutional and dense layers to arrive at the classification. While this is a complex model, its 
slowness can be compensated for in the risk analysis mentioned earlier, which should ensure 
that most benign flows are not required to be analysed. 
5.4.1 Aggregation 
Once features have been extracted from both the logs and the flows, they can be aggregated to create 
the NHF. From examining the log table and the flow table, it can be seen that there are several features 
that are shared (IP addresses, times and service). These will be used to match the various features of 
both logs and flows. Pseudocode for this is shown in Pseudocode 5.4-1. 
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1. import mysql.connector 
2.   
3. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
4.   host=host, 
5.   user=user, 
6.   passwd=password, 
7.   database="logDB" 
8. ) 
9.   
10. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
11.   
12. destIP, sourceIP, time, port = getFlowData() 
13. query = select instances, loginSuccesses, sentiment, FROM 
logFlows  
14.  WHERE (destIP == hostIP || destIP == remoteIP) AND  
15. (sourceIP == hostIP || sourceIP == remoteIP) AND 
16. port == service AND 
17. time <= logTime AND 
18. time + datetime.timedelta(minutes=5) >= logtime 
Pseudocode 5.4-1 – Creation of the NHF 
As can be seen, the first two WHERE statements match the IP addresses. The OR statements are 
used, as a reply from a server will have the source as the server IP, whereas the original message will 
have the server IP as destination. Marking these separately would result in two separate flows, when 
they are clearly supposed to be connected. Additionally, on the final line, timedelta is utilised. Logs will 
be generated after flows inherently, and so included is a requirement that logs must have been 
generated after the initial flow time. However, logs that are generated hours or even days after the initial 
flow time should not be grouped together. So, the final line gives a time limit of 5 minutes. If a log is 
generated more that 5minutes after the initial flow time, then it will be assigned to a new flow. This 
matches the flow entries, where a flow is dropped from the database if it has not been updated within 5 
minutes. A time of 5 minutes has been chosen as this broadly matches the time of many password 
lockout policies. If a malicious user initiates a brute force or dictionary attack, and the account gets 
locked, the malicious user would need to wait longer than five minutes for the system to not group the 
malicious attacks together. More accurately, if the malicious user started the attack at time s, and 
paused after receiving an account locked message at time t the amount of time the malicious user 
would have to wait (w) is shown in Equation 5.4-1: 
 𝑤 = 5 + (𝑡 − 𝑠)   
 
Equation 5.4-1 
5.4.2 Initial Analysis 
Now that the NHF has been formed, the initial analysis and risk assessment can be implemented. Every 
flow will need to go through this process, sometimes more than once as flows get updated with new 
data. As such, the process for this initial analysis needs to be computationally efficient. 
Deep learning models are computationally expensive, and this process will be adding more expense 




Often, IDS/IPS solutions will require sampling for the solutions to work at line speed. Sampling 
strategies are a focus of research, however, these have often come across what is ultimately the same 
issue, that being that less you sample, the more likely that some attacks will not be noticed simply 
because they are not sampled [76][77]. The NHFs being analysed should be quicker to analyse then 
individual packets, since the NHFs can be considered an abstract representation of the packets they 
represent. However, there still needs to be some consideration given to the analysis happening at line 
speed. 
A slight variant to sampling involves creating a “priority list”, whereby rather than packets being sampled 
randomly, or based upon position in a flow, packets are prioritised for analysis based on some measure. 
The difference being that if the computational resources are available, then every packet will be 
analysed, however those that are deemed to be high risk are analysed first. As such, a priority list is 
implemented. This leads to the second requirement, to provide an indication of the amount of risk the 
flow contains. 
This should not be a definitive sign that a flow is malicious, but that it contains some features that have 
been shown to be malicious. This stage can be completed with clustering of the flows. Clustering 
algorithms are unsupervised algorithms that place records into groups depending upon how alike they 
are. Several clustering algorithms exist; however, HDBScan is chosen. This is because HDBScan has 
several advantages. These include: 
 Not requiring a set number of groups 
Several clustering algorithms (such as K-Means) require that the number of clusters be known 
in advance. This is not known as the data has not been analysed. While datasets such as the 
NSL-KDD or UNSW-NB15 could have the number of clusters configured to be the number of 
different classes within the dataset, it should not be assumed that this is known in advance for 
most intrusion detection systems.   
 Being resilient to noise 
Another issue with K-means (and other centroid-based clustering algorithms) is that it assumes 
every record is part of some group, when this may not be the case. Network datasets are 
inherently noisy, and it is entirely possible to get benign flows that do not seem to be related to 
any other flow (a benign anomaly). As HDBScan is a density-based approach to clustering, it 
does not have this issue. Instead, there is are hyper-parameters to be set to control at what 
point a group of records can be considered a cluster. Any records that appear outside one of 
these clusters is placed into the -1 category (or simply unclassified). 
 Not assume a Gaussian cluster 
K-means assumes that clusters are Gaussian in nature and can misclassify based upon this. 




 Being efficient 
The process overall is supposed to ensure that any malicious flows are analysed quickly. If this 
process is computationally expensive, then this negates the benefits of the system as malicious 
flows may have stopped before they are detected. While HDBScan is not quite as efficient as 
K-Means (not achieving O(n log(n)) complexity), it is more efficient than many other clustering 
algorithms, and has less than O(n2) complexity [78]. K-means also has an advantage in that 
increasing the number of features has little effect on the efficiency of the computation. However, 
this work is inherently limited in the number of available features and as such the advantage of 
k-means in this regard is of limited use. 
Clustering will ideally group malicious flows together, however the goal is not classification but to 
determine a risk for the various clusters. This allows us to analyse flows in high risk groups first, leaving 
low risk groups for later should the system become too busy to analyse all the flows. The risk factor can 
be determined by calculating the proportion of malicious flows within each cluster. If a cluster has an 
unusually high proportion of malicious flows, then any later flow assigned to it can be assigned a higher 
risk. 
Assuming M is a malicious flow, and that a C is a cluster with size S, then the risk factor R can be 
determined using Equation 5.4-2: 
 





This will result in a value between 0 and 1, where 0 is a very low risk, and 1 is very high risk. The 
process logically requires supervised learning, since flows will have needed to be declared malicious 
before the risk analysis can be conducted. This feeds into the choice of a supervised model later for the 
analysis. 
Pseudocode for the process can be found in Pseudocode 5.4-2. 
1. import hdbscan 
2.   
3. groupList = [] 
4. var = [] 
5. count = 0 
6.   
7. def UpdateGroupRisk(group): 
8.  query = SELECT COUNT(*) from flowTable WHERE group = group 
9.  malicious = SELECT COUNT(*) from flowTable WHERE group = group 
AND malicious = 1 
10.  mycursor.execute(query) 
11. number = mycursor.fetchone() 
12.  mycursor.execute(malicious) 
13. maliciousInGroup = mycursor.fetchone() 
14.  newRisk = maliciousInGroup / number 
15.   
16.  query = UPDATE riskTable SET risk = newRisk 
17.   WHERE group = group 
18.   
19.  return 
20.   
63 
 
21. training, y = getTrainingData() 
22. data = getFlowData() 
23.   
24. clusterer = hdbscan.HDBSCAN(min_cluster_size=x, 
gen_min_span_tree=True,  
25.                             metric='manhattan', min_samples=y, 
prediction_data=True) 
26.   
27. clusterer.fit(training) 
28.   
29. for flow in data: 
30.  mark = 0 
31. test_cluster, tested_strength = 
hdbscan.approximate_predict(clusterer, data) 
32.  for label, y, in zip(clusterer.labels_, y): 
33.   mark = 0 
34.    for cluster in clusterList: 
35. if cluster[0] == y: 
36. cluster[1] = cluster[1] + 1 
37. mark = 1 
38.      if y == 1 
39.       cluster[2] = 
cluster[2] + 1 
40.         if mark == 0: 
41.      if y == 0: 
42.              appendList = 
[cluster, 1, 0] 
43.             
 clusterList.append(appendList) 
44.      else: 
45.              appendList = 
[cluster, 1, 1] 
46.             
 clusterList.append(appendList) 
47.   
48.   
49. query = “UPDATE flowTable SET group = group[0] 
50. WHERE hostIP = hostIP AND service = service AND time = time;” 
51.  execute.query() 
52.   
53.  UpdateGroupRisk(group[0]) 
Pseudocode 5.4-2 – Code to show how risk is created and updated 
Within this, min_cluster_size and min_samples are hyper-parameters that need to be configured 
according to the dataset. min_cluster_size is the amount of records required for a cluster to be 
considered a cluster. At a min_cluster_size of 1, all records would be clustered, though some would 
only be clustered with themselves (which logically does not make sense). At values larger than 1, these 
points would be put into group -1, and considered noise. As min_cluster_size increases, the number of 
clusters decreases and the volume of records in -1 increases, as smaller clusters no longer reach the 
requirements to be considered a cluster at all. min_samples is similar, however refers to the number of 
records within a neighbourhood for a point to be considered a core point. 
5.4.3 Initial Classification 
After the initial analysis and risk detection, a classification can be made. For this precision is prioritised 
over recall, as this will reduce the number of false positives that are passed onto the mitigation system. 
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Ideally both recall and precision will be achieved, but when it is possible to have benign usages blocked 
or redirected in an automatic fashion, it is believed that minimising the number of these would be 
preferable. Other false negatives could be caught by a later security process (for example, malware 
could still be caught through local anti-malware scans, even if it evades detection of its transmission 
over the local network). 
Data preparation will also need to be undertaken. Studies [79][80] have found that good data 
preparation can impact results significantly. As such, the flows that have been formed will undertake 
the following steps: 
1. Convert Categorical Data 
The datasets contain several pieces of categorical data, for example protocol type. This comes 
in the form of TCP, UDP, ICMP etc. These need to be converted to numerical data, as the 
model does not recognise string input. This can be done simply by assigning a number to each 
different element (0 for TCP, 1 for UDP etc.). However, this is not enough by itself. Machine 
learning can be prone to giving bias to larger numbers [81]. As such, with the procedure set out 
above, it would give UDP greater weight than TCP, simply because 1 is larger than 0. In order 
to counter this, any categorical fields that have been converted to an integer then need to be 
binarised. This takes the values and converts them into a binary vector, e.g. 001 for TCP, 010 
for UDP. This has the by-product of increasing the feature space, as instead of 1 column for 
protocol type, there is now have one column for each protocol. 
2. Scaling 
Not all the numerical data conforms to the same scales. For example, duration is measured in 
seconds and rarely lasts longer than a few minutes (or hundreds of seconds). Similarly, the 
duration of flows can also frequently last less than 1 second, leading to decimal values of less 
than 1. Port number on the other hand, can extend up to 65535. Additionally, the range from 
49152-65535 are officially unassigned, and free for use, which means than when determining 
which port to contact a client on with a client/server relationship, it will likely be one of those 
ports. The different scale of these numbers can lead to issues with bias being given to the larger 
numbers [81][82]. As such Min-Max scaling is employed. This will bring all elements of the sets 
to within the range 0-1. 
3. Reduce the Feature Space 
This may at first seem at odds with the rest of the thesis. Much of this paper has so far consisted 
of gathering additional features to those generated by a SDN controller. However, in step 1 on 
this process the feature space was increased by binarising categorical features. This leads to 
the situation where some features are redundant. To take the protocol example again, 
assuming the dataset only consists of TCP, UDP and ICMP transmissions, then the sum of 
TCP, UDP and ICMP features will always be 1. Therefore, the ICMP feature could be removed 
completely, as if the sum of the remaining TCP and UDP columns does not equal 1, then the 
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transmission must have been ICMP. Removing features like this has been shown to not have 
any significant effect on the model’s overall accuracy and can increase the processing speed 
of the model dramatically [54], [55]. 
4. Balance the Training Set 
Raw network datasets are incredibly imbalanced. The NetFlow/IPFIX dataset contains a 96% to 
4% imbalance of benign to anomalous flows for instance. This imbalance is a significant issue 
and can result in overfitting to the majority class (i.e. the model classifies every record as benign, 
as this gives greatest accuracy and precision). Balancing the dataset can have a marked 
improvement on accuracy, through forcing it to learn the minority classes. 
More details of each of these steps will be given later in the chapter. The classification itself can then 
proceed. As discussed, efficiency is important, while steps have been taken earlier in the process to 
decrease computational complexity, it is still important that the model at this point is efficient. This is the 
primary reasoning for choosing a CNN, as they have been shown to have an advantage in accuracy 
over ANNs [16], but for network datasets this advantage is typically small [83]. However, they are also 
significantly more efficient, requiring fewer parameters to get those results. For example, a convolutional 
layer with a kernel size of 3 and 16 filters has 160 parameters to compute. The equivalent fully 
connected layer of 144 has 17,568 parameters [46]. This is also the reason a CNN is used over other 
RNNs such as LSTM. LSTMs have been shown to be effective in this kind of classification [84], but are 
more computationally expensive, and CNNs can still get comparable (or better) accuracy [41]. The 
major disadvantage CNNs face is that it is a supervised learning model. Unfortunately, within the 
intrusion detection space, large and well-labelled datasets are scarce and require a great deal of 
expertise to gain. When moving to local networks that will likely require their own custom dataset for a 
system to work, (since different networks have different architectures and designs) this means that the 
expertise to create and label a dataset needs to be within the company responsible for maintaining the 
network. Additionally, as networks develop over time, it is likely that the data used to originally train the 
network will become outdated, meaning the training process needs to begin again. For this reason, 
unsupervised methods are generally seen as being a more practical approach, as data does not need 
to be labelled. However, this lack of labelling does come with drawbacks. Unsupervised models are 
often less accurate overall than their supervised counterparts. In addition, the proposed solution 
requires labelled data for the risk analysis stage (even though HDBScan is unsupervised). This is 
generally going to be true of any system that attempts to sample data based upon risk, as logically you 
cannot determine a risk level without knowing what kind of activity is risky. As such it is determined that 
a CNN best suits the requirements for the classification. 
The structure of the model is also important. Multiple papers have found it is generally better to have 
multiple small convolutional layers [85][86][87], rather than a single larger convolutional layer. Two 
convolutional layers with a kernel of size 3 are equivalent to a single layer of size 5 (each decreasing 
the feature space by 4), however the two separate layers would generally lead to superior results. It 
has also been found that pooling, and in particular max pooling can be beneficial in reducing overfitting 
[88], [89]. However, pooling dramatically reduces the feature space, halving it each time it is used. In 
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most cases this is beneficial, as it reduces the parameters that need to be calculated. However, we 
have a small feature space to begin with. This limited feature space dramatically decreases the variety 
of layers available to us within the CNN, and while decreasing overfitting would be beneficial, it needs 
to be considered within the context of its effect on the model in general. This leads us to conclude that 
batch normalisation would be the best choice for reducing overfitting within the CNN itself. Batch 
normalisation was originally thought to decrease overfitting by reducing internal covariate shift, which 
changes the distribution of inputs of each layer. By reducing the variance of the hidden values, the 
values of the next layer can be more tightly controlled. There is some minor benefit of regularisation as 
well. Similar to dropout multiplying some nodes by 0 to drop them from the network, and prevent a 
network from overusing that node, batch normalisation can have a similar effect, reducing the chance 
of overuse of a single node and forcing the rest of the network to be used. The theory of reducing 
internal covariate shift is disputed [90][91], but batch normalisation does aid in reducing overfitting 
[90][92], as well as offer some minor regularisation effects [89], [93]. 
Pseudocode for the model can be found in Pseudocode 5.4-3: 
1. #Training and testing data are located, for testing data 
2. # this would be new flows or flows that need to be reanalysed 
3. # with the model being called as an object 
4.   
5. x_train, y_unsampled = getTrainingData() 
6. x_test = getFlow() 
7. #Scaling is performed on the training data 
8. scaler = MinMaxScaler() 
9. scaler.fit(x_train) 
10. x_train_unsampled = scaler.transform(x_train) 
11.  
12. #Encoding is performed on the training data 
13. encoding = OneHotEncoder() 
14.  
15. #This allows for additional columns to be added later 
16. cols = [‘protocol’’] 
17.  
18. for n in cols: 
19.    encoding.fit(x_train[:, n]) 
20.    x_train[:, n] = encoding.transform(x_train[:, n]) 
21.  
22. #PCA is performed to removed redundant data and quicken learning 
23. pca = PCA(H) 
24. pca.fit(x_train) 
25.  
26. x_train = pca.transform(x_train_unsampled) 
27.  
28. #The training data is balanced, this will not be applied to testing 
29. #data at any stage 
30. ada = ADASYN() 
31. X, y = ada.fit_resample(x_train, y_unsampled) 
32.  
33. #The model is created using Keras 
34. model = Sequential() 
35.  
36. #A single dense layer allows us to know the shape of the data 
37. #after PCA changed it to an unknown shape 
38. model.add(Dense(121, activation='softmax', input_dim=int(inputShape))) 
39.    
40. model.add(Reshape((11, 11, 1))) 
41.  
42. #Convolutional Layers followed by batch normalaization 





46. # More layers are added after this initial one     
47. model.add(H Conv2D layers) 
48.  
49. model.add(Flatten()) 
50. # Output 
51. model.add(Dense(H, activation='H'))    
52.     
53. optimizer = H(lr=H) 
54. model.compile(optimizer=optimizer, 
55.              loss='binary_crossentropy',  
56.              metrics=['categorical_accuracy', 'accuracy'] 
57.             ) 
58. model.fit(X, y, validation=x_unsampled, y_unsampled) 
59.  
60. #Testing can be performed, this allows for individual flows to be tested 
61. #as they come into the system 
62. for x in x_test: 
63. x = scaler.transform(x) 
64. x = encoding.transform(x) 
65. x = pca.transform(x) 
66.  prediction = model.predict(x) 
Pseudocode 5.4-3 – Code for the model, H represents Hyper-parameters to be tuned 
As can be seen, the code had space for multiple hyper-parameters (H) that will need to be individually 
tested and configured. This testing will be explained in the next Chapter (implementation). The following 
will need to be configured: 
1 PCA components 
As has been explained, a system is required to reduce the data after it has been expanded to 
remove features that do not aid with classification. PCA has been chosen for this task, as it is 
efficient [94], [95] and has been shown to be helpful in reducing features and increasing 
accuracy on IDS datasets in the past [55][96]. This is done so the model is not hindered in 
attempting to use features that have little effect on the end classification, either because they 
have high correlation with other features, or contain a low entropy. Previously, in binarising the 
dataset features that have a high correlation have been explicitly added, and so this step is 
important in reducing these features and decreasing computational complexity and time. 
2 Convolutional Kernel Size 
The kernel size relates to the size of the convolutional filter that traverses the feature space. 
These have seen a steady reduction in size over recent years, from 7x7 kernels being common 
to 2x2 or 3x3 sizes being more common throughout the models, with occasionally 5x5 or 7x7 
being used to start the model. 
3 Convolutional Filters 
This indicates the dimensionality of the output space. As more layers are added the feature 
space decreases, but the output space should increase. This allows prominent features of the 
input to be recognised in early layers, and later layers to recognise less prominent features. 
4 The Activation Function 
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The activation function determines whether a neuron fires (or activates) or not. If the input 
values to a neuron are above a threshold, then that neuron will activate, if they are not then it 
will not. The threshold can be thought of as the centre of a curve that varies from function to 
function. As such, activation functions are important in the make-up of deep learning models. 
There are a few types of activation functions available, with various advantages and 
disadvantages. It would also be possible to design a custom activation function, however that 
is outside the scope of this work. One of the most prominent functions would be sigmoid. 
Sigmoid tends to be used for binary classification at the end of a model (i.e. end classification), 
since it produces a steep curve near the centre that will naturally mean most outputs will be 
pushed to one side or the other, producing clearer results. However, it does suffer from the 
issue of vanishing gradients at either side of the curve, meaning that learning will slow or stop 
if used in the middle of a deep model. Tanh has similar issues, being a scaled version for 
sigmoid.  
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLu) has a different approach, it uses a linear activation for values above 
0, else 0. It has greater efficiency than both sigmoid or tanh since any value less than 0 is 
simply made 0. However, this can cause the dying ReLu problem. This is caused when areas 
of the network have a negative or 0 value, the gradient of the network in that area will become 
0, preventing learning. This issue can be aided with a leaky ReLu. Instead of 0, this multiplies 
the figure by 0.01, ensuring the value is small and close to 0, but not actually 0 itself. This can 
aid if overfitting is occurring due to the dying ReLu problem. Finally, softmax is another 
activation function that performs well as an end classifier. Another potential issue of sigmoid is 
that its outputs are not related to each other. For a single class problem, this is not an issue, 
however for multi-class problems this can lead to a sum of probabilities becoming greater than 
1. With softmax, the outputs sum to 1, which makes sense for multi-class problems where the 
output must be one of the classes. 
5 Learning Rate 
The learning rate determines the extent of change in the model, in response to the loss. There 
is a trade off in learning rate, as higher rates will not see the model converge to the optimum 
solution, whereas smaller rates will take more epochs to converge. Generally accepted rates 
are in the range 0.01-0.0001, but this is a parameter that needs to be tuned according to the 
network, as well as the choice of optimiser. 
6 Optimiser 
The role of the optimiser is to update the weights and biases within the model in order to reduce 
the loss. Constant rate optimisers always change the weights and biases by the same amount 
(the learning rate), stochastic gradient decent falls into this category. Adaptive optimisers 
change the learning rates on a per-parameter basis, reducing the risk of the issue outlined in 
point 5, where the model can fail to converge. An example of this is Adagrad, which uses larger 
updates for infrequent parameters, and smaller ones for more frequent updates. However, 
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Adagrad runs into issues of diminishing learning on more frequently updated parameters, which 
can cause models to stop learning prematurely. Optimisers such as Adadelta, RMSProp and 
Adam attempt to fix this. Adam is frequently used in practice, as it is again computationally 
efficient [97]. 
With the model completed, a probability for the final classification will have been made. This can be 
attached to the flow and if it is over a threshold send it to the mitigation system. The probability is 
included as it gives an indication of the level of certainty that exists about the flow and the requirement 
to mitigate it. With a high degree of certainty that a flow is malicious, more dramatic mitigation measures 
can be employed. 
A table showing the model dimensions is shown in Table 5.4-1 
Layer (Type) Output Shape Number of parameters 
dense_1 (Dense) (121) 8349       
reshape_1 (Reshape) (11, 11, 1) 0          
conv2d_1 (Conv2D) (9, 9, 8) 80         
batch_normalization_1 (Batch 
Normalization) 
(9, 9, 8) 32         
conv2d_2 (Conv2D) (7, 7, 16) 1168       
batch_normalization_2 
(BatchNormalization) 
(7, 7, 16)         64 
conv2d_3 (Conv2D) (5, 5, 32) 4640       
batch_normalization_3 (Batch 
Normalization) 
(5, 5, 32) 128        
conv2d_4 (Conv2D) (3, 3, 64) 18496      
batch_normalization_4 (Batch 
Normalization) 
(3, 3, 64) 256        
conv2d_5 (Conv2D) (1, 1, 128) 73856      
batch_normalization_5 (Batch 
Normalization) 
(1, 1, 128) 512        
flatten_1 (Flatten) (128) 0          
dense_2 (Dense) (32) 4128       
dense_3 (Dense) (2) 33   




The final mitigation is achieved through classifying malicious flows according to an attack taxonomy. 
This is achieved using an ensemble of classifiers that classify according to each dimension of the 
taxonomy. Whilst this may sound especially computationally complex, in reality it is envisioned that this 
stage will only be used on a small proportion of traffic, as any benign flows should be declared as such, 
and no mitigation needs to take place. The goal of the taxonomy is to determine the threat the malicious 
flow poses and recommend a course of action. For flows where the threat is low, no action beyond 
notification to the administrator is a possible choice. For medium threats, flows can be redirected to 
protect essential services, whereas high threats can result in the flow being dropped. 
The intended taxonomy differs from other taxonomies in that the goal is to formulate an automated 
response to the attack that is being identified. This means that the branches should be designed in 
order to provide a solution that can be undertaken. Many taxonomies are designed to separate different 
attacks, ensuring that each attack type is classified in only one way (the uniqueness of the 
classification). This is beneficial for administrators seeking to classify an attack in the forensic analysis 
stage of an attack (i.e. after an attack has happened and the goal is to assess the impact and determine 
any additional threat), or testing phase (to ensure the system is secure). However, it is not as beneficial 
for the initial response. For the initial response, it rarely matters if two different attacks are classified a 
similar way if the response should be the same to both [67]. The target for this taxonomy is also 
important. Many taxonomies seek to address localhost (e.g. someone performing a password attack by 
typing in passwords on the computer they seek to gain access to) and physical attacks (e.g. someone 
physically turning off a computer), whereas this work is strictly concerned with attacks that can be 
recognised and mitigated through the network. As such, this work is built upon the work of Wu et al. 
[69], Souissi [67] and Fu et al. [68]. Wu et al. propose a response orientated taxonomy that consists of 
Source, Technique and Results, proposing that defence can be built from these. Souissi builds upon 
this and noting that Wu et al. acknowledge that blended attacks would pose an issue for their taxonomy 
propose a solution that includes Source, Vector, Target and Impact. Both papers, however, are for 
generic attacks that can be carried out on computer networks, including local attacks. As such, 
inspiration is also taken from Fu et al. who designed a taxonomy for routing systems, and use Attack 
Plane, Vector, Target and Impact. The use of attack plane rather than source makes more sense within 
the confines of a strictly network attack taxonomy, as while source can refer to internal or external 
attacks, attack plane allows the system to see exactly what level of the SDN is being used to initiate the 
attack. 




Figure 5.5-1 – The taxonomy used 
The four major aspects (Plane, Target, Vector and Impact) of the taxonomy is discussed below: 
Plane 
Related to the OSI [98] model this refers to the level the attack is taking place on. Fu et al. utilize 
physical, network or application as the attack planes. The physical layer refers to individual devices. 
Unplugging a cable, turning off a server or using a radio frequency transmitter to interfere with wireless 
signal would belong on the physical layer. The network layer includes attacks that target network 
infrastructure, but do not depend on a specific application or OS. An example would be a port scan, or 
many types of DDoS or flood attacks, where the goal is to overload processing resources, rather than 
a SYN flood, which requires open ports. The final layer is the application layer, which includes anything 
that requires an application or OS. The SYN flood mentioned earlier is one example, while another 
would be a XSS (Cross Site Scripting) attack. 
Target 
Different from the Attack Plane, this is specifically for what the attack is targeting. For example, a SYN 
flood specifically targets an OS, while the Plane is the Network (a network vulnerability being used to 
target a singular device). This contains three levels, as described: 
 Network 
This contains attacks such as floods or port scans. These attacks operate on the network level 
and work irrespective of the OS or Applications on the device or devices being targeted. If 




This contains attacks such as fingerprinting, or attacks that target specific operating systems. 
Many (though not all) buffer overflow attacks operate on the OS level for example, as different 
operating systems may treat malformed network packets in slightly different ways. 
 Application 
This contains attacks which specifically target the services being provided (HTTP, FTP etc.). 
This can involve XSS attacks, or slightly further down the stack buffer overflows that target an 
SQL server (for instance). 
Vector 
The Vector consists of what kind of attack is being performed, or what exploits attackers are hoping to 
take advantage of. Souissi shows this can be separated into six categories: 
 Misconfiguration 
This consists of administrators themselves making a mistake in the configuration of a service. 
The root password being left at default may be an example of this, or configuration files for a 
web server being left in a publicly accessible location would be another. 
 Insufficient Validation 
Insufficient validation is caused by a system failing to validate user input appropriately. Buffer 
overflows are typically validation errors, as are boundary condition errors or malformed input 
(such as SQL injection). 
 Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities are defined as potential exploits in the software being used. Administrators 
typically have little control over vulnerabilities, instead requiring the first party supplier to provide 
patches, fixes, or workarounds. 
 Users 
Users is a large source of attack vectors and consists of user error providing the exploit. A user 
not following password policy may be one example. Another might be a user opening a suspect 
email attachment, and then agreeing to install the attached software. 
 System Limitations 
System Limitation attacks involve taking advantage of the fact that systems do not have 
unlimited resources. Floods can fit here, taking advantage of the fact that networks do not 




The impact involves assessing what the end effect of the attack would be if it were not mitigated or 
stopped. Related to the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) model, this contains three 
categories: 
 Confidentiality 
This is used when the confidentiality of data is at risk. The obvious example is leaked 
usernames and passwords, or card details in an online commerce application with something 
like a SQL injection attack. However, most probes or fingerprinting attacks also fit into this 
category, as information about the network structure is leaked. 
 Integrity 
These attacks edit or change the data or a service. SQL injection attacks can be placed here 
as well if the attack is used to insert false data into a database or change records within it, for 
example, adding an illegitimate username or password to a user credentials database. 
 Availability 
These attacks seek to disrupt the availability of data or a service. Most DoS attacks would be 
placed in here for example, as would the ransomware attacks described in Section 2.1 where 
the encryption key was deleted after data was encrypted, making recovery almost impossible 
without access to unencrypted backups. Data destruction, rather than data leakage or 
modification falls within availability, as do any attacks that disrupt a service. 
Using these four aspects, it is possible to determine a SDN mitigation for the malicious activity. Knowing 
the attack plane means it may be possible to block or redirect the attack at levels 2 or 3 of the OSI 
model, ensuring that devices are kept safe. Knowing the attack target potentially allows us to refine this 
further. For example, rather than blocking level 2 or 3 data, if it is determined that an attack is at level 6 
or 7, then only that data could be blocked. The attack vector again allows us to refine this further again. 
For example, in the case of a brute force password attack, the attack would be at the OS or application 
level, but if it is known that all passwords are secure then the attack might be safely ignored. Finally, 
the attack impact provides the context required for other actions. If the attack is attempting to target the 
availability of a service, then quarantining the system (while protecting it from further damage) would 
be seen as a success from the attacker’s point of view. Alternatively, if the target is the integrity of the 
system, then quarantining it for a short period may be preferable. 
This culminates in a requirement to develop a system that can determine these aspects. Again, machine 
learning can be used in this situation, as it is effectively now a classification problem. Proposed for this 
is the usage of multiple deep learning models, which feed their answer from one model to the next. The 
way the four aspects have been arranged, information from each aspect is useful to the classification 
of the next aspect. For example, if it is determined that the first aspect involves an attack happening in 
the application plane, this is useful to the second step which can typically eliminate the network from 
consideration as it would be unusual (though not unheard of) to have an attack target the network 
through the application plane. 
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The mitigation actions the system can use in response to a malicious flow also need to be defined. 
These actions need to be suitable for a range of malicious activity and be implementable through SDN. 
These potential actions have been identified: 
 Action 1 – Block or Drop Flows 
Result: Suspicious flows are permanently dropped from all devices.  
Impact: High – Used in situations where the integrity or confidentiality of data may be 
compromised and requires a high degree of certainty. 
Potential Side Effects: This could result in benign flows being permanently dropped or 
blocked, resulting in an unintended DoS. This is more serious when the flows are integral to 
the systems being used. For example, if a HTTP server had all its SQL requests to a SQL 
server blocked, this could result in a website going down. 
This is an extreme action, with potentially serious consequences for mislabelled flows. However, this 
will also ensure that the malicious activity is stopped. Similar to the methods proposed by Yoon et al. 
[60], this would effectively turn every SDN-enabled switch within the network into an inline security 
appliance, programmed to drop matching flows. This means that the moment the flow is detected it is 
dropped, rather than having to wait until the flow meets an IPS. This could be used on flows that have 
a high degree of certainty of being malicious, and are performing malicious activity low down the 
network stack, which isn’t targeting particular machines or services (for example, port scans, or flood 
DoS attacks.) 
 Action 2 – Block or Drop an IP address or machine 
Result: A single IP address is no longer able to communicate with the network 
Impact: High - Used in situations where the integrity or confidentiality of data may be 
compromised and requires a high degree of certainty. 
Potential Side Effects: This could result in devices no longer being able to access network 
resources, resulting in an inadvertent DoS. For example, a user may not be able to access an 
FTP site or be able to login to a shared community hub. 
While like Action 1, the difference is in the scale. Action 1 will only stop the malicious activity that is 
being undertaken in relation to a specific flow, while this action prevents an IP address from performing 
any network activity (even legitimate activity). Rather than an IPS, this action could be thought of more 
like making the switches a firewall, with a blacklist of banned IP addresses. Again, this is an extreme 
example, but could be useful in instances where the integrity of the network is at stake.   
 Action 3 – Redirect the flow 
Result: A flow is redirected to a honeypot or other illegitimate destination 
Impact: High - Used in situations where the integrity or confidentiality of data may be 
compromised and requires a high degree of certainty. 
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Potential Side Effects: This could result in a legitimate user receiving illegitimate data as they 
are redirected to a site that seems like the data being requested. If not redirected to a honeypot, 
then it could result in an inadvertent DoS. 
The flow could be redirected to a honeypot or other secure area of the network. This is potentially useful 
in cases where the flow is deemed to be attempting to exploit vulnerabilities, this could allow an 
administrator to monitor the activity and learn of any potential exploits without exposing actual systems 
to damage. However, this would also likely be a temporary measure while the activity is being analysed, 
before being blocked completely. 
 Action 4 - Quarantine a system or IP 
Result: A system or IP is temporarily unable to communicate with the network 
Impact: Moderate – Used in situations where certainty is not as high and includes DoS attacks 
or potentially high-risk devices. 
Potential Side Effects: Could result in temporary inadvertent DoS.  
While superficially like action 2, the difference is in the length of time a system will be blocked, as well 
as the extent of that blocking. Broadly, this action should be time limited, whereas actions one and two 
are indefinite and could be permeant (assuming there are no negative consequences). This could be 
useful in instances where a password attack is deemed to be taking place, slowing the speed of the 
attack. 
 Action 5 – Quarantine the flow 
Result: A suspicious flow is temporarily blocked or dropped.  
Impact: Moderate - Used in situations where certainty is not as high and includes DoS attacks 
or potentially high-risk devices. 
Potential Side Effects: Could result in a temporary DoS of a service if used in a high-risk 
environment 
Rather than blocking an IP address, a flow could be temporarily dropped. Again, while similar to Action 
4, the difference is in the scope. If all activity from a service is quarantined then that service would suffer 
an unintended DoS, however, users would still be able to interact with most network resources. 
 Action 6 – Create a “sinkhole” 
Result: Responses to a potentially malicious IP are never received by that IP 
Impact: Moderate – Used in situations where certainty is not as high and can include DoS 
attacks or potentially high-risk devices. 
Potential Side effects: May not guarantee stopping attacks where responses are not required 




While the term sinkhole typically refers to DNS applications, SDN can create a similar effect. Any traffic 
that is being directed towards a particular IP (or set of IPs) could be directed towards a non-existent 
address (such as 0.0.0.0) and dropped. This technique has proven successful in disrupting the 
command and control infrastructure (C&C) of botnets in the past. This is different from actions 1 and 2, 
since the focus is on traffic directed towards a remote IP. That remote IP would still be able to send 
data into the network but would never receive a response. Due to the fact this would only affect remote 
IP addresses, it can be considered to have a moderate impact. 
 Action 7 – Redirect through legitimate source 
Result: Stress on individual devices is lessoned 
Impact: Low – Used in situations where certainty is low, and typically is used for DoS attacks 
to protect high risk devices. 
Potential Side Effects: Ineffective against access privilege or information disclosure attacks. 
May cause slightly slower services for legitimate users depending upon network composition. 
Rather than redirecting to a honeypot, traffic can be redirected to a different but still legitimate 
destination. Like load balancing, a SDN could direct suspect traffic through an alternative route, or to 
secondary servers. These servers and routes would still contain the same data and be subject to the 
same risks as the primary servers and routes, however in the case of DoS attacks the impact of the 
secondary servers going down would be lessened. The network impact of this would be low. 
 Do Nothing 
Result: No action is taken beyond logging and/or alerting an administrator 
Impact: Low - Used in situations where uncertainty about the attack is high, or the impact would 
 be minimal 
Potential Side Effects: Ineffective against legitimate damaging attacks 
If the potential impact of the attack is low, and the uncertainty of the attack is high, then potentially the 
wisest course of action would be to not employ any additional measures beyond informing the 
administrator of potential malicious activity. This could be used in password-based attacks where it is 
not certain that an attack is happening (rather than a user being forgetful). The potential impact to the 
network is low, assuming that password policies are upheld, and the services being targeted have 
methods to slow this kind of attack (timeout policies, account lockout policies etc.). 
The response that will cause the least amount of disruption to the network if a classification is incorrect 
should also be sought. Now possible responses have been found, the next step is to determine the 
optimum response. This involves using the certainty of the classification; the lower the classification 
certainty, the more likely a low impact response will be chosen. These two statements are proportional, 
so it is possible to just take the certainty provided by the first model and use that as an indication as to 
which response is correct. The certainty will have come in the range 0.5-1.0 (as below 0.5 the model 
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classifies it as benign) and so Min/Max normalisation is performed to scale these values to the range 
0-1.  
This can be calculated using Equation 5.5-1: 
 





Where x is the probability from the first model. x̄ can not become less than 0, as any probability entering 
this stage will have been at least 0.5.  The flow can then be assigned a mitigation according to Table 
5.5-1. 






Block Flow   Access Privilege, 
Information Disclosure 
Block IP   Access Privilege, 
Information Disclosure 
Redirect Flow to 
honeypot 
  Access Privilege, 
Information Disclosure 
Sinkhole  DoS DoS 
Quarantine IP  Access Privilege, 
Information Disclosure 
 





Redirect to legitimate 
source 
DoS DoS  




Table 5.5-1 – Mitigation according to probability 
The certainty ranges were chosen as in the initial analysis we aim to have as few flows classified near 
0.5 as possible. All flows reaching this point should have been classified in the initial assessment as 
being between 0.5-1, and the min-max normalisation will extend that range to 0-1, meaning differences 
in risk should be greater. This means that malicious flows that fall between 0-0.25 we were initially very 
unsure were malicious, while flows between 0.76-1 we were very sure were malicious. Risk 
management may normally use ranges 0-0.1 for low, 0.1-0.5 for medium and 0.5-1 for high, however 
these ranges are not suitable for us, as we expect many values around 0.5 (which can later be seen in 
6.3.1). Ideally, we want the system to either be very sure of the result, or very unsure, so that correct 
responses can be organised. If the system is only moderately certain, then that could lead to situations 
where a quarantine is issued instead of a block, or a DoS is redirected to a legitimate source instead of 
a sinkhole being arranged. As such we use a H-range measurement to help determine whether the 
system is achieving its goals. Even so, these number could be changed depending upon the level of 
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risk the administrator is willing to take, and different interpretations of these risk probabilities are given 
in the results. 
As can be seen, there are numerous instances where there are multiple possible actions. For example, 
in the low-risk category there is always the option to do nothing, as well as quarantining or redirection 
depending upon the kind of attack. Which option is taken will depend upon the vector of the attack. 
Some vectors will also be higher risk that others. Misconfiguration and Insufficient Validation should be 
fairly low risk (if the developers and administrators have followed good practice) and the odds of such 
an attack working should be low. Vulnerabilities and Users indicate a higher risk. If the attacker is 
attempting to use vulnerabilities it indicates that some preliminary reconnaissance has been carried out 
and the attacker is now attempting to exploit a known vulnerability. Users have a lower level of expertise 
than administrators or developers and are more prone to making mistakes. Finally, system limitations 
are also considered low since the SDN itself should generally be capable of managing itself to aid with 
managing its resources.  
As an example, if an attack is detected to be high certainty, and the impact is determined to be 
information disclosure while the vector is determined to be vulnerability then the response would be to 
block the flow (the most extreme action available for the high risk and high certainty attack.) 
Alternatively, if we were only moderately certain that there was an attack, then the flow would be 
quarantined instead. 
5.6 Models 
The deep learning models for the determination of the branches of the taxonomy are similar to those 
used earlier for the initial classification as it is a similar problem. However, there are of some differences. 
PCA does not need to be used a second time and using it multiple times on the same data would reduce 
the useful data being kept. While data is added after each model, the detrimental effect of using PCA 
outweighs the potential processing gains.  
The problem has also shifted from a binary classification problem (i.e. is the flow malicious or not?) to 
several multiclass problems (i.e. Does the attack target the Network, OS, or Application levels?). This 
places potentially more emphasis on using softmax as the end classifier, over something like sigmoid. 
This, combined with the additional data, means that the structure of the models may be different. The 
training process for the models should also be considered.  
Since the models should only experience malicious data, one potential option is to take all the malicious 
flows from the original training set, configure their outputs and use that data. However, this is not 
representative of the data that the model will receive. While false positives will be reduced to a minimum, 
the possibility of false positives still exists. If the process laid out above is used for training data, then 
these false positives will never be seen by the models. The alternative of this is also true, the model will 
be trained on true positives that are never seen. This leads to the best solution being that the model is 
trained on the training data that the initial model produces, even if that data is incorrect. The next step 
is to create pseudocode for the models that will determine which subcategory of Plane, Target, Vector 
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and Impact the malicious activity falls into. As there are four models, there are also four sets of 
pseudocode (one for each model) as follows: 
1. def plane(): 
2.  K.clear_session() 
3.  model = load_model(path) 
4.  tf.Session().as_default() 
5.  with K.get_session().as_default() 
6.   prediction = model.predict(flow) 
7.   return prediction 
8.   
9. def vector(): 
10.  K.clear_session() 
11.  model = load_model(path) 
12.  tf.Session().as_default() 
13.  with K.get_session().as_default() 
14.   prediction = model.predict(flow) 
15.   return prediction 
16.   
17. def target(): 
18.  K.clear_session() 
19.  model = load_model(path) 
20.  tf.Session().as_default() 
21.  with K.get_session().as_default() 
22.   prediction = model.predict(flow) 
23.   return prediction 
24.   
25. def result(): 
26.  K.clear_session() 
27.  model = load_model(path) 
28.  tf.Session().as_default() 
29.  with K.get_session().as_default() 
30.   prediction = model.predict(flow) 
31.   return prediction 
32.   
33.   
34. x_train, y_unsampled = getTrainingData() 
35. x_trainResult = getTrainingResult() 
36.   
37. x_test = getFlow() 
38. x_testResult = getResult() 
39. X = np.concatenate(x_train, x_trainResult) 
40. #First model 
41. model.add(Conv2D(H, (H, H), activation='H')) 
42. model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
43.   
44. # More layers are added after this initial one     
45. model.add(H Conv2D layers) 
46.   
47. model.add(Flatten()) 
48. # Output 
49. model.add(Dense(H, activation='H'))    
50.   
51. optimizer = H(lr=H) 
52. model.compile(optimizer=optimizer, 
53.               loss='categorical_crossentropy',  
54.               metrics=['categorical_accuracy'] 
55.              ) 
56. model.fit(X, y, validation=x_unsampled, y_unsampled) 




Pseudocode 5.6-1 – Showing how the first model is set up and how the models are called 
Pseudocode 5.6-1 shows how the models are set up and they are called. Note that there are still hyper-
parameters that will need to be configured, as with the initial model, and these hyper-parameters fall 
into the same categories with learning rate, the exact structure being used, and activation. There are 
also several classes to move from one model to another, pulling the saved weights and structures from 
training to run the models on demand. 
From here the pseudocode is broadly similar, as the changes are in the hyperparameters and the name 
of the model being called. The basic shape is shown in Pseudocode 5.6-2. 
1. #Basic model 
2.   
3. X = np.concatenate(X, previousResult) 
4.   
5. k.clear_session() 
6.   
7. model.add(Conv2D(H, (H, H), activation='H')) 
8. model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
9.   
10. # More layers are added after this initial one     
11. model.add(H Conv2D layers) 
12.   
13. model.add(Flatten()) 
14. # Output 
15. model.add(Dense(H, activation='H'))    
16.   
17. optimizer = H(lr=H) 
18. model.compile(optimizer=optimizer, 
19.               loss='categorical_crossentropy',  
20.               metrics=['categorical_accuracy'] 
21.              ) 
22. model.fit(X, y, validation=x_unsampled, y_unsampled) 
23.   
24. model.save(categoryName.h5) 
25.   
26.   
27. targetResult = model.predict(X) 
Pseudocode 5.6-2 – Pseudocode to show the basic code structure for the models 
In line 3, training results from previous models are concatenated into the training data of the next model.  
In line 24 the model is saved under the category name, and it is this model that will be restored within 
the classes of Pseudocode 5.6-1. The same hyperparameters as earlier still need to be configured, 
though of course this is on a model by model basis and may not be the same for all the models. 
The final process is to select a mitigation that matches the results of the models, pseudocode for which 
can be found in Pseudocode 5.6-3. 
1. X_test = np.concatenate(x_test, x_testResult) 
2.   
3. y_test = plane(X_test) 
4. X_test = np.concatenate(x_test, y_test) 
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5. Y_test = vector(X_test) 
6.   
7. X_test = np.concatenate(x_test, y_test) 
8. Y_test = Target(X_test) 
9. target = Y_Test 
10.   
11. X_test = np.concatenate(x_test, y_test) 
12. Y_test =Result(X_test) 
13.   
14. certainty = (y_test-0.5)/0.5 
15. action = [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8] 
16.   
17. if y_test == DoS: 
18.  action.drop(1,2,3) 
19. else: 
20.  action.drop(4,7) 
21.   
22. certainty = x_testResult 
23. if certainty < 0.25 
24.  action.drop(1,2,3,4) 
25. elif certainty > 0.75 
26.  action.drop(5,6,7,8) 
27. else: 
28.  action.drop(1,2,3,8)  
29.   
30. if action.count == 1 
31.  EmployAction(action) 
32. elif (target == vulnerability) || (target == user) 
33.  action = max(action) 
34.  EmployAction(action) 
35. Else 
36.  action = min(action) 
37.  EmployAction(action) 
Pseudocode 5.6-3 – Showing how the mitigation is chosen 
This ultimately ends with one action being selected and undertaken by the SDN, using the code that 
comes with the SDN controller. This code will vary from controller to controller, but for an OpenFlow 
controller it would be similar to that shown in Table 5.6-1: 
Action Command 
Block Flow ovs-ofctl add-flow brX ip nw_src=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, 
nw_dst=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, ,actions=drop 
Block IP ovs-ofctl add-flow brX ip nw_src=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx,actions=drop 
Redirect Flow to honeypot ovs-ofctl add-flow brX ip nw_src=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, 
nw_dst=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, ,actions=mod_nw_src:xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 
Sinkhole ovs-ofctl add-flow brX ip nw_src=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, 
nw_dst=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, ,actions=mod_nw_src:0.0.0.0 




Quarantine Flow ovs-ofctl add-flow brX ip nw_src=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, 
nw_dst=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, idle_time-out=Y ,actions=drop 
Redirect to legitimate source ovs-ofctl add-flow brX ip nw_src=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, 
nw_dst=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, ,actions=mod_nw_src:xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 







Discussed within this chapter is how the methodology is implemented for testing purposes, including 
actual code extracts linked to the pseudocode code discussed in previous chapters, as well as 
discussing any changes that have been made.  
6.1 Initialisation and Creation 
While Section 5.2 discusses how to potentially obtain the features available, it does not describe how 
these features will be obtained within this work. While creation of a new dataset is possible, through 
setting up a SDN (using a tool such as Mininet), this means that it becomes difficult to compare to other 
works (a problem that has been highlighted in Chapter 2). Instead a combination of the NetFlow/IPFIX 
dataset and the UNSW-NB15 dataset is used. 
6.1.1 The SSH Compromise Detection using Netflow/IPFIX dataset 
The NetFlow/IPFIX dataset consists of connection monitoring for multiple SSH servers, which is 
organised into flows matching the IPFIX standard. The dataset consists of both the flows, and the logs 
from the SSH servers. The purpose of this dataset is to show process the data goes through, and 
realistic results that could be obtained. An example of the flows is shown in Figure 6.1-1. 
 
Figure 6.1-1 – An example of the flows from the NetFlow/IPFIX Dataset 
The first step is to clean up the flows and logs, keeping only the useful data. Lines such as those from 
58-63 would need to be removed completely since these lines are just metadata about the later flows. 
This was done with use of a script, shown in Code 6.1-1. 
1. #!/bin/bash 
2. FILES=/media/dataset.log 
3. sed -i -e '/^[0-9]/ !d' $FILES 
Code 6.1-1 – Code to remove extra lines 
This simply checks if the line starts with an integer (0-9). If it does, then the line is not deleted, otherwise 
it is. This way all flows are kept, while the additional lines are deleted. From here, the flow lines 
themselves need to be organized into a csv with categories previously identified for the flows. 
There are no commas included within the flow lines, and so these can be added first. 
sed -e 's/  */,/g' dataset.log > dataset2.log 
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This converts any amount of blank space into a comma. It also reads the new data into a new file, called 
dataset2.log. This allows comparing to the original file if needed. Finally, the -> between the two IP 
addresses can be removed with the use of: 
sed -e 's/->/ /g' dataset2.log > dataset3.log 
This results in lines that look like: 
2014-01-09,23:11:10.898,0.478,TCP,42.22.248.22:22, ,161.166.5.234:35568,17,66356,1 
Additionally separation the port numbers from the IP addresses is necessary, however this cannot be 
done in the exact same way as previously, as the symbol separating them is a colon. This is also what 
separates the hour, minute, and seconds within the time field. However, given that every line has the 
same format, the following code will achieve the desired effect: 
sed -e 's/://2g' dataset3.log > dataset4.log 






 Source IP 
 Source port 
 Destination IP 
 Destination Port 
 Packets 
 Bytes 
 Number of Flows 
The only differences between Table 5.3-1 and this is that the flows in the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset do not 
contain a priority field, and instead do contain a “number of flows” entry. This is acceptable since 
Number of flows was one of the optional fields discussed in Chapter 2. The loss of priority is unfortunate, 
however this is not considered important, since priority does not relate to the packets themselves, but 
to how the SDN has determined the priority of the rule for the flow as a whole, and therefore is another 
derived field. 
The data is then imported into the database for comparison with log data, as is explained in SectionFlow 
Features are Extracted 5.3.1. This is accomplished using the script presented in Code 6.1-2.  
1. import csv 
2. import mysql.connector 
3. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
4.   host="localhost", 
5.   user="user", 
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6.   passwd="password", 
7.   database="flows" 
8. ) 
9.   
10. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
11. query="INSERT /*+ append */ into flows VALUES 
('%s','%s','%s','%s','%s','%s','%s','%s','%s','%s','%s');" 
12.   
13. with open(r'dataset4.log') as csv_file: 
14.  reader = csv.reader(csv_file, delimiter=',') 
15.  for row in reader: 
16.   date = row[0] 
17. time = row[1] 
18. duration = row[2] 
19. protocol = row[3] 
20. sourceIP = row[4] 
21. sourcePort = row[5] 
22. destinationIP = row[7] 
23. destinationPort = row[8] 
24. packets = row[9] 
25. bytes = row[10] 
26. flows  = row[11] 
27.   mycursor.execute(query%(date, time, duration, 
protocol, sourceIP, sourcePort, 
28. destinationIP, destinationPort, packets, bytes, flows)) 
29.   mydb.commit() 
30. print("Done") 
Code 6.1-2 – Code to show import of flows to SQL DB 
It should be noted that row[6] is not imported. This is because that row is empty. In the final example 
flow given above, it can be seen that there is a gap between the source and destination IPs, where the 
-> symbol was. This is still surrounded by two commas, and so is imported as a blank cell by the CSV 
reader. 
The next process is the aggregation of the log files; an example of the log files provided is shown in 
Figure 6.1-2. 
 
Figure 6.1-2 – An example of the log file from the NetFlow/IPFIX Dataset 
Again, some clean-up is needed before the lines can be incorporated into the database. Similar sed 
commands as earlier are used, however this time there is no need to delete any lines, as each line is 
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an addition to the log. The first step is to remove some hidden characters (in particular a ^A character 
which normally results from a Control +A key combination in a console) with: 
sed -i -e 's/ //g' logs.log > logs2.log 
Then double spaces are removed from the file with: 
sed -i -e 's/  */ /g' log2.log > log3.log 
There are no headers or footers, and so the data can now be converted into a CSV format. This is done 
by replacing the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th spaces with a comma, as shown below: 
sed -e 's/  */,/2' log3.log > log4.log 
sed -e 's/  */,/3' log4.log > log5.log 
sed -e 's/  */,/4' log5.log > log6.log 
sed -e 's/  */,/5' log6.log > log7.log 
The following fields have been obtained: 
 Date 
 Time 
 Server IP 
 Service 
 Log text 
This again closely matches the listed available features in Section 5.3.2, only missing the derived fields 
of Instances, Login Successes, Sentiment and Remote IP. However, these steps are accomplished 
within the database. As such, the logs can be uploaded to the server using code like that of Code 6.1-2. 
The missing features can be obtained using the pseudocode throughout Section 5.3.2, and are 
explained as follows: 
Remote IP Address 
The remote IP address can be obtained using the Pseudocode 5.3-6, and in particular the string: 
SELECT * FROM logs WHERE logText REGEXP '[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}+$'; 
However it will only obtain all the records that include a remote IP, in effect becoming the query required 
for getLogFromDataServer() in Pseudocode 5.3-6. The full code is found in Code 6.1-3: 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. import re 
3.   
4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
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8.   database="logDB" 
9. ) 
10.   
11. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
12.   
13. query = SELECT * FROM logs WHERE logText REGEXP '[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-
9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}+$'; 
14.   
15. result = mycursor.execute(query) 
16. mydb.commit() 
17.   
18. for text in result: 
19. ip = re.findall(r'(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})', text) 
20. query2 = INSERT INTO logs (rip) VALUES(ip) WHERE id = id 
21. mycursor.execute(query2) 
22. mydb.commit() 
Code 6.1-3 – Getting remote IP Address 
Instances 
Instances becomes easier to check within the SQL database, and can be obtained using the code: 
SELECT count(*) FROM logs WHERE hostIP = hostIP AND service = service AND time>= 
time AND date = date AND remoteIP = remoteIP; 
Full code can be found in Code 6.1-4: 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. import re 
3.   
4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
8.   database="logDB" 
9. ) 
10.   
11. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
12.   
13. query = SELECT count(*) FROM logs WHERE hostIP = hostIP AND 
service = service AND time>= time AND date = date AND remoteIP = 
remoteIP; 
14.   
15. result = mycursor.fetchall(mycursor.execute(query)) 
16. mydb.commit() 
17.   
18. for row in result: 
19.  id = row[0] 
20.  number = row[1] 








Again, the pseudocode from Section 5.3.1 is used, however the full SQL command can be substituted 
in, and the full code is shown in Code 6.1-5. 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. import re 
3.   
4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
8.   database="logDB") 
9.   
10. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
11.   
12. query = SELECT id, text FROM logs; 
13.   
14. result = mycursor.fetchall(mycursor.execute(query)) 
15. mydb.commit() 
16.   
17. for row in result: 
18.  id = row[0] 
19.  text = row[1] 
20.  password = 0 
21.  Not = 1 
22. x = text.split() 
23. for word in x: 
24.   if (word == “not”) or (word == “Failed”): 
25.    Not = 1 
26.   elif (word == “password”): 
27.    password = 1 
28.   
29. if (password == 1): 
30.   loginAttempt = 1 
31. if (Not == 1):  
32.   loginAttempt = loginAttempt * -1 
33.   
34. query2 = INSERT INTO logs (loginAttempt) VALUES(loginAttempt) 
WHERE id = id 
35. mycursor.execute(query2) 
36. mydb.commit() 
Code 6.1-5 – Get Login Successes 
Seen is that the changes for the “not” have been included, so if a failed login occurs, the result should 
be -1 in the loginAttempt column. Additionally, if a password attempt has not been made then the result 
will be 0, and if one succeeded the result will be 1. The word “not” could be expanded to additional 
words that could indicate a failed password attempt (for instance, failed), however this is sufficient for 
the logs used. 
Sentiment 
The sentiment analysis can be completed in the same manner, with the final code being provided in 
Code 6.1-6: 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. import re 
3.   
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4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
8.   database="logDB") 
9.   
10. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
11.   
12. query = SELECT id, text FROM logs; 
13.   
14. result = mycursor.fetchall(mycursor.execute(query)) 
15. mydb.commit() 
16.   
17. for row in result: 
18.  id = row[0] 
19.  text = row[1] 
20.  blob = TextBlob(text) 
21. sentiment = blob.sentiment.polarity 
22.   




Code 6.1-6 – Get Login Successes 
Each of the steps described above was performed individually, and so the code is as written. 
The dataset is not labelled, so the next step is to label the dataset appropriately. While the dataset 
provided is not labelled, the authors do provide details of what they consider to be an attack. They 
consider any flow that has six unsuccessful login attempts and has no idle period of more than one hour 
to be an attack. This requires comparing the flows to the logs, since the logs are the only way to confirm 
a login. The method used for this is described below. 
Compared is the logs and flows using Remote IP address, time, and date. The flow time and log time 
are by necessity going to be slightly different. This is because the flow will always be generated before 
the log. Additionally, it is possible that a single flow can generate multiple logs. Indeed, Hofstede et al. 
[99] explicitly state that a single flow can result in three failed password logs, before the flow is reset 
and a new connection needs to be made. The SQL command used for this is: 
SELECT * FROM logs WHERE logRemoteIP = flowRemoteIP AND logTime > flowTime – 5mins 
AND logTime < flowtime 
A timer of five minutes was chosen as this matches the account lockout duration of many security 
policies, and if connection attempts are still being registered after an account has been locked out this 
can be a sign of automated malicious activity (a brute force or password attack). After the process has 







 Source IP 
 Source Port 
 Destination IP 





 Login Success 
 Sentiment 
This comes from the code found in Code 6.1-7: 
1. import mysql.connector 
2. import re 
3.   
4. mydb = mysql.connector.connect( 
5.   host=host, 
6.   user=user, 
7.   passwd=password, 
8.   database="logDB") 
9.   
10. mycursor = mydb.cursor(buffered=True) 
11.   
12. query = select * FROM flows; 
13. query2 = SELECT instances, loginsuccess, sentiment FROM logs 
WHERE remoteIP = flowRemoteIP AND time > flowTime – 5mins AND time 
< flowTime AND date = flowDate; 
14.   
15. result = mycursor.fetchall(mycursor.execute(query)) 
16. mydb.commit() 
17.   
18. for row in result: 
19.  flows = row[10] 
20.  bytes = row[9] 
21.  packets = row[8] 
22.  dport = row[7] 
23.  destip = row[6] 
24.  sport = row[5] 
25.  flowRemoteIP = row[4] 
26.  protocol = row[3] 
27.  duration = row[2] 
28.         flowTime = row[1] 
29.  flowDate = row[0] 
30.   
31. results2 = mycursor.fetchall(mycursor.execute(query2)) 
32. for rows in results2: 
33.  count = count + 1 
34.  instances = rows[0] + instances 
35.  sentimentsum = rows[2] + sentimentsum 
36.   sentiment = sentimentsum / count 
37.  if count > 6: 
38.   attack = 1 
Code 6.1-7 – Getting the Network Health Flows 
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The flows that can be used for the analysis are complete. The attack column is removed for most of this 
process and is only used as the Y value in any supervised training, and for analysing results at the end 
of the process. 
6.1.2 The UNSW-NB15 Dataset 
As has been explained in Section 2.6, the prepared UNSW-NB15 dataset contains 43 features and 2 
labels. These are shown in Table 6.1-1. 
Feature 
Number 
Feature Name Feature 
Number 
Feature Name Feature 
Number 
Feature Name 
1 id 16 dloss 31 response_body_len 
2 dur 17 sinpkt 32 ct_srv_src 
3 proto 18 dinpkt 33 ct_state_ttl 
4 service 19 sjit 34 ct_dst_ltm 
5 state 20 djit 35 ct_src_dport_ltm 
6 spkts 21 swin 36 ct_dst_sport_ltm 
7 dpkts 22 stcpb 37 ct_dst_src_ltm 
8 sbytes 23 dtcpb 38 is_ftp_login 
9 dbytes 24 dwin 39 ct_ftp_cmd 
10 rate 25 tcprtt 40 ct_flw_http_mthd 
11 sttl 26 synack 41 ct_src_ltm 
12 dttl 27 ackdat 42 ct_srv_dst 
13 sload 28 smean 43 is_sm_ips_ports 
14 dload 29 dmean 44 attack_cat 
15 sloss 30 trans_depth 45 label 
Table 6.1-1 – List of features available in the UNSW-NB15 Dataset 
However, most of these features are not available. There are many similarities to the features obtained 
from the Netflow/IPFIX dataset, however. The matched features are shown below: 
1. Duration (Entry 2 – Dur) 
2. Protocol (Entry 3 – Proto) 
3. Packets (Entry 6 spkts and entry 7 dpkts) 
4. Bytes (Entry 8 sbytes and entry 9 dbytes) 
5. Login Success (Entry 38 Is_ftp_login) 
Several other features can be used, using the same methodology as is described in Section 5.3, these 
include: 
6. Source packets retransmitted or lost (Entry 15 sloss) 
7. Destination packets retransmitted or lost (Entry 16 dloss) 
8. Source bits per second (Entry 13 sload) 
9. Destination bits per second (Entry 14 dload) 
10. Number of flows that has a command in the ftp session (Entry 39 ct_ftp_cmd) 
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11. Number of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in http service (Entry 40 
ct_flw_http_mthd) 
12. If source equals destination IP addresses and port numbers are equal, this variable takes value 
1 else 0 (Entry 43 is_sm_ips_ports) 
 
Entries 6 and 7 are typically derivable through looking for flow entries with the same ACK numbers 
within a single flow. This is something many SDN solutions will keep track of regardless, since 
retransmitted packets can be a sign that a network is reaching capacity and starting to drop flows. The 
optional counters Receive Drops and Transmit Drops within the SDN specification track the same sort 
of activity, except they count a switch dropping packets (which would inevitably lead to retransmitted 
ACKS).  
Entries 8 and 9 are extremely easily derivable from the data already collected, simply being a division 
of bytes by the duration of the flow, both of which are required by the OpenFlow specification. The same 
is true for entry 12, which compares the source and destination IP addresses and ports, and if they are 
equal assigns a 1.  
Entries 10 and 11 can be determined in a similar manner to that of the Login Success, which is explained 
in Section 5.3.2. The change is that instead of searching for the word “Success” or “failure” you instead 
search for logs containing the HTTP or FTP commands you are interested in tracking. This adds load 
to the log processing sections of the system, but this is the area least concerned about load. 
6.1.3 Comparison of Both Datasets 
The features that have been determined as available from both datasets are shown in Table 6.1-2. 
NetFlow/IPFIX from the University of Twenté UNSW NB-15 
1 Date 1  
2 Time 2  
3 Duration 3 Duration 
4 Protocol 4 Protocol 
5 Source IP 5 Source retransmitted 
bits per second 
6 Source Port 6 Destination 
retransmitted bits per 
second 
7 Destination IP 7 Source bits per second 




9 Packets 9 Packets 
10 Bytes 10 Bytes 
11 Flows 11 Number of flows that 
has a command in the 
ftp session 
12 Instances 12 Number of flows that 
has a command in the 
HTTP session 
13 Login Success 13 Login Success 
14 Sentiment 14 Are source and 
destination IP address 
and ports equal 
Table 6.1-2 – Table comparing features of the Datasets Used 
It can be seen the datasets contain different features. However, this is typical of real-world situations. 
Networks are diverse, and very few have the same SDN configuration, let alone server configurations. 
However, all the features can be found using the methodology shown in Chapter 5. The most important 
difference is the lack of a sentiment score within the UNSW-NB15 dataset. This is because the pre-
prepared version of the dataset does not come with logs to analyse in the same way as the 
NetFlow/IPFIX dataset. The full version does have Bro IDS logs, however, these logs do not contain 
log text to analyse in the same way sentiment analysis requires. Instead, Bro-IDS logs consist of listing 
requests and the server result of that request. For instance, in Figure 6.1-3 the result for inbound 
requests on the SSH server can be found. The “log text” for this would simply be “Failure”, “Success” 
or “Undetermined” which allows for simpler methods to be used to be understood. 
 
Figure 6.1-3 – Bro IDS logs from the UNSW-NB15 Dataset for SSH connections 
The FTP and HTTP logs are much the same, except they also list the command being used (for 
example, “RETR README.txt - 226 Transfer complete” for FTP logs) 
However, it does highlight the ease of determining the counts that have been used within the dataset. 
After comparing time and IP addresses from the flows and logs, and on a match add one to the 
corresponding count in the log table.  
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Ultimately, depending on the logs being generated, sentiment analysis may not be required or suitable 
and exactly what is suitable will vary from server to server. It is believed that the sentiment analysis 
makes sense for the Kippo/Open SSH logs for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, but not for the UNSW-NB15 
dataset. With the different features it becomes obvious that the datasets are not directly comparable. 
However, the reasoning behind using both datasets is different. The NetFlow/IPFIX dataset advantage 
is that it does have both logs and flows and so the full process can be followed from start to finish. 
However, it is not as well known or used, and so comparisons to other works are difficult. The UNSW-
NB15 dataset is better known and understood. Additionally, direct comparisons to other works can be 
made as no additional unusual features are being used. Finally, the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset is for SSH 
connections only, while the UNSW-NB15 dataset contains a mix of services. This allows for examination 
of how the system works when moved over to services outside SSH. 
6.2 Extraction 
From here the data preparation needs to be performed. The first step is to convert any text data into 
numerical data. This is performed through the use of the LabelEncoder() function within sklearn. This 
encodes strings into an integer between 0 and n_classes-1. So, for a dataset that contains TCP, UDP, 
ICMP and ARP, the values would be converted into 0, 1, 2 and 3. Within the dataset only protocol needs 
to be converted this way. The code for this is shown in Code 6.2-1: 
1. from sklearn.preprocessing import LabelEncoder 
2. encoding = LabelEncoder() 
3. i = ['proto'] 
4.   
5. for n in i: 
6.     print("Processing column", n) 
7.     encoding.fit(X_train[:, n]) 
8.     X_train[:, n] = encoding.transform(X_train[:, n]) 
9.     X_test[:, n] = encoding.transform(X_test[:, n]) 
Code 6.2-1 – Code to shown LabelEncoder Function 
Where X_train is the training set, and X_test is the testing set. However, this method potentially 
introduces bias within the process. The implication is that protocol is ordinal, and so that larger values 
are “more significant” than smaller ones. In practice, this is not true. The data is therefore transformed 
once more using OneHotEncoding(). This converts the integer into a binary vector. Using the example 
of the four protocols above, this means there would be 0,0,0,1 – 0,0,1,0 – 0,1,0,0 and 1,0,0,0. Each 
new column refers to one of the protocols, and these in practice become new features. The code for 
this is shown in Code 6.2-2: 
1. from sklearn.preprocessing import LabelEncoder 
2. encoding = OneHotEncoder() 
3. i = ['proto'] 
4.   
5. for n in i: 
6.     print("Processing column", n) 
7.     encoding.fit(X_train[:, n]) 
8.     X_train[:, n] = encoding.transform(X_train[:, n]) 
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9.     X_test[:, n] = encoding.transform(X_test[:, n]) 
Code 6.2-2 – Code to show OneHotEncoder 
Recently, sklearn has allowed OneHotEncoder to take strings as inputs, however that was not the case 
when this code was originally developed, and the data need to be converted into numerical form before 
One Hot Encoding could be applied. As such the only code needed now is the code shown in Code 
6.2-2 for the OneHotEncoder. 
The data will then need to be scaled. Later processes can show bias towards larger numbers, deciding 
that they are more significant. Again, this is not necessarily true. As such, the data will be transformed 
using Min-Max scaling. The process for this is carried out by the sklearn MinMaxScaler() function, with 
the code very similar to the above encoding functions and is shown in Code 6.2-3: 
1. scaler = MinMaxScaler() 
2. scaler.fit(X_train) 
3. training_data = scaler.transform(X_train) 
4. testing_data = scaler.transform(X_test) 
Code 6.2-3 – Code for the MinMaxScaler 
This will fit the data according to the training data. If values in the testing data are larger than those 
supplied within the training data appear, then this will mean that those values will appear as over 1 with 
the testing data. Similarly, smaller values in the testing data then those that appear in the training data 
will become negative values. However, this is not considered a significant disadvantage, since these 
values are statistically abnormal, and so appearing outside the normal 0-1 range would emphasise this 
discrepancy. 
The code for the functions in this section does not change for the different datasets.  
6.3 Analysis 
While this Section does consist of aggregation, initial analysis, and initial classification, in practice the 
aggregation for the datasets has been completed in the previous step. This means this subsection will 
consist of initial analysis and initial classification, for which the primary steps to be discussed are the 
way the values for the hyper-parameters for the models discussed in Section 5.4.2 and Section 5.4.3 
have been determined. 
6.3.1 Initial Analysis 
The goal of this assessment is to gain an initial idea as to the category of risk the flows contain. In 
Section 5.4.2 it was discussed how this would take the form of a clustering algorithm that creates a risk 
score based upon the ratio of benign to malicious flows within each cluster. As the goal is ultimately to 
create a risk score for the clusters, metrics such as accuracy are not the best indication of success. It 
is not significant if occasional benign samples are mixed with malicious samples, so long as the mixing 
of benign and malicious is not equal (i.e. clusters of benign and malicious samples evenly mixed). The 
goal is to achieve two sets of groups of clusters (or two sets of super clusters, i.e. clusters of clusters), 
one with as high to a value of 1 as possible, and one with a value as close to 0 as possible as this gives 
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the best indication as to whether flows are malicious or benign. If placed on a graph with risk score as 
the X axis, and number of samples in the Y axis, this should result in a graph that resembles an y2 + 
0.5 line, so that when x reaches 0.5 reaches y reaches 0, where y is the number of samples.  
Additionally, minimising the number of groups would be beneficial, as too many groups defeat the 
purpose of being efficient. As discussed, there are 2 hyper-parameters to be configured, 
min_cluster_size and min_samples. Both values can be increased to increase the number of records 
that are clustered into a specific group.   
HDBScan works through plotting the records onto an n-dimensional graph (where n is the number of 
features). It then groups together records depending upon their distance from other clusters. As stated 
in chapter 3, for a cluster to be defined, there must be at least n records, where n is the min_cluster_size. 
Single linkage splits that contain fewer points than this will be considered noise, rather than a separate 
cluster. Additionally, min_samples refers to the number of samples within a neighbourhood for a point 
to be considered a core point. The effect of increasing these is to make more points be considered 
noise, or to be put into the -1 cluster. These points have little relation to other core points, either not 
having enough points close enough to be considered a cluster by themselves, or not having enough 
points close enough together for a core point (and therefore a cluster) to be defined. In this sense, 
min_cluster_size can be considered to be the absolute number of points required for a cluster to exist, 
while min_samples can be considered the minimum density of the points required for a cluster centre 
to be defined. 
There is a balance between having values too high and too low for both values. If values are too low 
then there will not be enough clusters, as clusters will be merged into each other, leading to the risk 
scores tending towards 0.5. Alternatively, if the values are too high than too many points will be regarded 
as noise. 
While testing started with low values for both min_cluster_size and min_samples and increased them 
until the -1 cluster started to increase in size significantly. This led to an optimum  min_cluster size of 





Figure 6.3-1 – Risk score against size of clusters for Min_cluster size of 2000 and min_sample size of 400 for the 
UNSW-NB15 dataset 
The only cluster between the risk score of 0.4 and 0.6 is the unclustered group -1. Additionally, there is 
only one group between the risk score of 0.3-0.7, and this is a borderline line case with a probability of 
0.30273. Five groups have between 2000-2500 samples, and seven have between 3000-4000, with the 
largest of these being 3658. This means 12 of the 21 groups have less than 4000 samples. If the size 
of the hyper-parameters is increased beyond this, the size of the -1 cluster increases significantly as 
the five smaller clusters become unclustered. Smaller values start to have multiple clusters not be well 
defined in terms of their risk score, with scores between 0.4 and 0.6, additionally it also results in more 
clusters being created, which adds computational complexity in a system designed to reduce it.  
The next step is to ensure that the clustering is effective over multiple datasets using the same hyper-



























Figure 6.3-2 – Risk score against size of clusters for Min_cluster size of 2000 and min_sample size of 400 for the 
NetFlow/IPFIX dataset 
The same pattern as with the UNSW-NB15 dataset emerges. The only cluster to have a risk score 
between 0.4-0.6 is the -1 grouping, which has a risk score of 0.4067. Additionally, the only clusters 
between 0.3-0.7 are two clusters with risk scores 0.67 and 0.68. These indicate good probabilities of 
any flows being assigned as being benign or malicious, respectively. There is a high number of 
completely benign clusters, which will significantly aid in reducing the number of flows that require 
analysis, however the malicious clusters are not as focused as in Figure 6.3-1. In practice, the only 
difference should be that there is not as high a degree of certainty moving into the Initial Classification 
stage, as any flows with a risk score above 0.7 should be being analysed with a high priority. With the 
-1 group score being so low, it is possible there is scope to tune these results further, by increasing the 
hyper-parameter values, however, it is considered that these are sufficient to proceed with and doing 
so allows us to keep the hyper-parameters the same between the UNSW-NB15 and NetFlow/IPFIX 
datasets. As such the final hyper-parameters chosen are a min_cluster size of 2000 and min_sample 
size of 400. 
During this run, it took approximately 7mins to fit the UNSW-NB15 training data using an Intel Core I7-
3770 clocked at 3.4GHz, and another 3mins to analyse the testing dataset. 
6.3.2 Initial Classification 
The first step is the feature reduction, for which PCA is used. PCA has been found to be useful in 
reducing features in the past, with common values above 0.95 and below 1, or when n_components is 
above 1, the top n ranked features are selected [100]. PCA works through measuring the variance that 



























of the original dataset, which maximise the variance and are unrelated to each other (which is 
important). 
The binarisation of the protocol feature (explained in Sections 5.4.3 and 6.2) means there is always at 
least one feature that can be removed without any loss of data, since the sum of the protocol features 
should always equal 1, and the protocol features will always be labelled 0 or 1 (e.g. UDP 0, TCP 0, 
ICMP 1). Collectively, this means that if one of the features is removed (for example, the ICMP feature) 
it can be inferred from the remaining features. This does extend to features outside of the expanded 
ones created, however. Additionally, several papers have found that some features are more useful 
than others or explain more variance than others [101], [71], [102], [103]. 
The goal of feature reduction is to remove only those redundant features that are left after the initial 
processing, and any features that do not contribute to the overall model. This means using higher values 
of n_components. 
As was stated in Section 5.4.3, a method of balancing the training data is also needed. Section 3.1.3 
highlighted how SMOTE based techniques have improved accuracy, and as such comparing both 
SMOTE and ADASYN is required. 
Default “reasonable” values for other hyper-parameters within the model were selected. The model was 
then run using these reasonable values on a range of values for n_components, using 10-fold cross 
validation to gather a suitable average of the results. 
The results on the UNSW-NB15 dataset are shown in Table 6.3-1 and Table 6.3-2: 
PCA Value (Amount of variance 
explained) 
Accuracy Recall Precision F1 Features 
Selected 
0.99 83.81 87.63 83.93 85.63 118/171 
0.98 83.05 70.48 98.23 82.08 84/171 
0.97 85.06 75.41 96.73 84.75 51/171 
0.96 81.66 74.81 90.20 81.79 23/171 
0.95 82.05 70.51 95.78 81.22 16/171 
0.94 80.44 75.17 87.55 80.89 13/171 
Table 6.3-1 – Table to show the effect of PCA n_components value on Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1 and 
number of features on the UNSW-NB15 Dataset using ADASYN 
PCA Value (Amount of variance 
explained) 
Accuracy Recall Precision F1 Features 
Selected 
0.99 84.87 89.57 84.01 86.70 118/171 
0.98 85.34 87.68 85.98 86.82 84/171 
0.97 85.10 86.40 86.51 86.46 51/171 
0.96 83.92 92.53 80.97 86.37 23/171 
0.95 81.60 96.00 76.55 85.18 16/171 
100 
 
0.94 83.02 89.09 81.72 85.25 13/171 
Table 6.3-2 – Table to show the effect of PCA n_components value on Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1 and 
number of features on the UNSW-NB15 Dataset using SMOTE 
It can be seen from the tables that accuracy and F1 score start to be affected negatively below 0.97. At 
this point, so many features are being removed that overfitting starts earlier. Figure 6.3-3 shows loss 
against epoch for the PCA value 0.96, which shows this overfitting occurring. 
 
Figure 6.3-3 – Accuracy against epoch for PCA n_component = 0.96 
Accuracy peeks at the 61st (86.7%) epoch, and the model settles into a local optimum at about that 
same point. The other peaks at points 80 and 92 were both lower than the 61st result, with the 92nd 
epoch still being lower than the 80th (85.67% vs 85.14%). It is likely that even if training had been 
allowed to continue beyond the 100th epoch, the results would have continued to decline as the model 
become more and more overfitted. We can compare this to the same graph at 0.98 for the PCA 




Figure 6.3-4 – Accuracy against epoch for PCA n_component = 0.98 
The graph starts to find the local optimum at epoch 44 here (rather than epoch 39 above). It also finds 
values nearing 90% at epochs 56, 61 and 67. The tail also appears to be flatter, with less variance 
between epochs. This could indicate that the extra data has given more stability to the optimum solution 
found by the model. 
From the effects on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, it can be seen that SMOTE has the effect of increasing 
Recall at the expense of Precision. Alternatively, ADASYN has the effect of increasing Precision at the 
expense of Recall. This makes sense because the aim of ADASYN is to give more training data to more 
difficult-to-classify records. ADASYN would make more records of the difficult-to-classify malicious 
activity, whereas SMOTE will just make more malicious examples, without targeting the difficult to 
classify records. This would naturally have the effect of increasing precision with ADASYN over 
SMOTE. F1 scores however show a slight preference for SMOTE. This indicates that while ADASYN 
may be better at ensuring benign records are not misclassified, SMOTE may be more successful at 
detecting malicious activity overall. SMOTE with a PCA n_components value of 0.98 is chosen. 
6.3.3 Binary Classification 
The next step is the initial classification itself. The goal of the initial classification is to determine which 
flows will undergo the mitigation process (i.e. a binary classifier). This is different to determining which 
flows are malicious, in that even if this initial classification determines a flow is malicious, the mitigation 
process may later decide the flow is benign or not a threat. A secondary consideration of this is that this 
stage can be used to add more data to the mitigation process. Therefore, a softmax classifier is used 
to produce the end classification result. This is unusual, as typically binary classification would be 
performed with a sigmoid classifier. However, sigmoid gives results as a float that is not constrained 
and therefore it is difficult to compare different runs of the same model. Softmax alternatively gives 
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results in a float between 0 and 1, where the result is a direct probability of record being that class, and 
where the sum of the probabilities equal 1. 
As a CNN-based model is being used, there are various hyper-parameters that require tuning (identified 
within Section 5.4.3), such as learning rate, epochs and batch size. The issue with these values is that 
the optimum for them can change depending upon other hyper-parameters. For the hyper-parameters 
involved with the PCA analysis and the model structure, it would be expected the same trends to follow 
regardless of other hyper-parameters. With learning rate, batch size, epochs this is not the case. 
Changing one can have a marked effect on the optimum value for the other values. There are several 
ways to manage this. The first is to change each value one at a time, and mark down results for every 
possible value. While this will work, it is time consuming. The second is to use either a grid or random 
search. 
Grid search can be thought of as exhaustive searching. The programmer specifies several values to 
test and the model will test every combination of those values. This reduces the time involved in 
specifying new values for hyper-parameters, recording the results, and restarting the model, but can 
result in large processing times otherwise. For the three key hyper-parameters identified, if each hyper-
parameter is given 5 values, this would result in 53 or 125 runs of the model. With 10-fold validation, 
this becomes 1,250 runs. Assuming one full run of the model were to take 30 minutes, this would result 
in a run time of 37,500 minutes, or slightly over 26 days. This time can be reduced by configuring fewer 
hyper-parameters, or running fewer validations. 
The optimum learning rate can be estimated to be in the range 0.01-0.0001. This means reasonable 
values can be 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001. Likewise, batch size can be estimated to be between 50 and 
200 based upon previous works [92][104]–[106]. This means reasonable values can be 50, 125 and 
200. Finally, epochs can be estimated using the values 10, 50, and 75. This will cut the processing time 
from 26 days to approximately 4.5 hours (or 270 runs, using the same estimate on processing time). 
This is significantly more manageable; however, it also means that the optimum values are somewhere 
close to the ones selected, rather than being a conclusive estimate. 
Random search is an alternative method, where instead of predetermined values being selected, 
random values are selected to be testing in a range of values that are specified. So, for learning rate, 
instead of selecting 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001, a range 0.01-0.0001 can be selected. Then the model will 
randomly select learning rates within the range to test on. The advantage with this method is that it is 
possible to select the number of runs that are made, corresponding to how long the model should run 
for. The model will randomly select values for the hyper-parameters for each run. This randomness 
makes it difficult to determine whether the optimum value have been obtained, however random search 
has been shown to obtain good results in the past [107], [108], [109], [110]. 
One other possibility to reduce the amount of processing time is to use early stopping. Early stopping 
only varies the number of epochs and works through measuring the results of each epoch. If the results 
for the epoch do not improve, then it is assumed the model is optimised, and results are shown for that 
number of epochs. This in itself can be configured a number of ways, including waiting for a specific 
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number of  epochs to see if results improve any further, how much a results need to improve by, and 
importantly which measure to use when comparing results through epochs. Using early stopping could 
allow us to remove epochs as a hyper-parameter from the grid search, which would result in a squared 
increase with number of features, rather than cubed. It does however then mean that new parameters 
need to be selected in order to gather a suitable stopping point (hyper-parameters to configure hyper-
parameters). 
From the graphs of accuracy compared to epochs shown earlier (Figure 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-4), it can 
be seen that accuracy can vary quite dramatically from epoch to epoch. Therefore, parameters to 
determine when accuracy may have peaked need to are defined. Weights will need to have had time 
to stabilise before training stops. Again, using the graphs, it appears that broadly if accuracy is to 
increase at all again, it will increase within 20 epochs. Much of the time, 10 epochs would be enough, 
however there are edge cases where this is not true. For instance, there was a peak at epoch 26, which 
was not overtaken until epoch 44. At epoch 26 the model had clearly not had enough time to stabilise 
and did not start to stabilise until around epoch 50. The patience parameter is therefore set to be 20. 
With a patience parameter so high, restore_best_weights will be changed to true as the values 20 
epochs after the optimum are likely to be different. Other details can be left at default. Min_delta looks 
for any improvement, and mode defaults to auto which will work for the proposed model. This produces 
code similar to Code 6.3-1: 
1. earlyStopping = EarlyStopping(monitor='val_recall', min_delta=0.1, 
patience=20, verbose=50, mode='auto', restore_best_weights=True) 
Code 6.3-1 – Code to show Early Stopping 
A combination of early stopping and grid search is used in order to find the optimum values for the 
hyper-parameters. While the learning rate options will remain at 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001, the batch size 
options can be increased to 50, 100, 150 and 200 in order to home in on the right batch size more 
quickly. As earlier tests have shown a direct relationship between precision and recall, recall is selected 
as the parameter to test against with the early stopping. It shall also be tested against the validation set 
and not the main set in order to prevent overfitting. The test set is the same set as the main training set, 
but without any of the additional records created by ADASYN or SMOTE. While ideally training and 
validation sets would be completely separate, in order to allow for comparisons to other works to still 
be made, the testing and training set of the UNSW-NB15 cannot be changed dataset beyond what has 
been described in the data pre-processing steps. Reusing the training set allows for the testing set to 
be completely unseen until testing is required.  
Moving on to the structure of the model itself, CNN models generally have become deeper, not wider, 
with convolutions kernel sizes of 1x1 being used. This size of convolution would not reduce the size of 
the feature set but allows for the number of layers to be increased. Generally, the kernel sizes should 
decrease as the number of layers increase, which should allow the model to find increasingly latent 
features. As such proposed are models with 1x1 kernel sizes in the last few layers, increasing the 
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number of layers in the model. Also proposed are models with the 1x1 kernels earlier and spaced 
throughout the model to see the effects this will have. 
Several model structures will need to be tested, and generally the kernel size should decrease in size 
as the model progresses. This is based on works such as [47], [46], [111]. Because of the small size of 
the feature space, and the need for multiple layers, the first layer should be limited to at most a kernel 
size of 5x5, and 3x3 should be tested. As such the following model sizes will be tested: 
1 3x3 kernels stacked 
2 3 3x3 kernels, followed by 1x1 kernel, 2 3x3 kernels 
3 2 3x3 kernels followed by 1x1 kernels, 3 3x3 kernels 
4 2 3x3 kernels, 1 1x1 kernel, 2 3x3 kernels, 1 1x1 kernel, 1 3x3 kernel 
5 3 3x3 kernels, 4 2x2 kernels 
6 1 5x5 kernel, 3 3x3 kernels 
As such code for the final model will be coded as shown in Code 6.3-2: 
1. def create_model(dropout_rate=0.2, learn_rate=0.01): 
2.  # create model 
3.     model = Sequential() 
4.     model.add(Dense(121, activation='softmax', 
input_dim=int(inputShape))) 
5.      
6.     model.add(Reshape((11, 11, 1))) 
7.     
8.     model.add(Conv2D(8, (3, 3))) 
9.     model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
10.     model.add(Activation('relu')) 
11.      
12.     model.add(Conv2D(16, (3, 3))) 
13.     model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
14.     model.add(Activation('relu')) 
15.   
16.     model.add(Conv2D(32, (3, 3))) 
17.     model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
18.     model.add(Activation('relu')) 
19.      
20.     model.add(Conv2D(64, (3, 3))) 
21.     model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
22.     model.add(Activation('relu')) 
23.      
24.     model.add(Conv2D(128, (3, 3))) 
25.     model.add(BatchNormalization()) 
26.     model.add(Activation('relu')) 
27.      
28.     model.add(Flatten()) 
29.     model.add(Dropout(dropout_rate)) 
30.   
31.     model.add(Dense(32, activation='relu')) 
32.     model.add(Dense(1, activation='softmax')) 
33.      
34.     optimizer = RMSprop(lr=learn_rate, rho=0.9) 
35.     model.compile(optimizer=optimizer, 
36.                   loss='binary_crossentropy',  
37.                   metrics=[km.binary_precision(), 'accuracy'] 
38.                  ) 
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39.   
40.     return model 
Code 6.3-2 – Full model code 
The model shapes are tested by only changing the model function. Results for the different model 





Learning Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
1 100 75 0.001 85.39% 97.05% 75.76% 85.10% 
2 100 100 0.001 84.06% 98.64% 73.60% 84.30% 
3 100 50 0.01 85.03% 90.52% 81.33% 85.68% 
4 100 100 0.01 66.78% 67.16% 77.62% 72.01% 
5 100 100 0.01 72.37% 76.65% 71.65% 74.07% 
6 100 100 0.001 83.82% 99.19% 71.19% 82.90% 
Table 6.3-3 – Model accuracy, precision, recall and f-score, as well as grid search metrics for the UNSW-NB15 
dataset 
Model Epoch Stopped Batch 
Size 
Learning Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
1 100 100 0.001 89.7% 91.5% 97.5% 94.4% 
2 75 150 0.01 82.1% 72.3% 87.54% 79.22% 
3 75 100 0.01 83.82% 70.62% 99.98% 82.77% 
4 100 100 0.001 83.81% 71.06% 99.29% 82.84% 
5 100 100 0.001 85.5% 73.96% 98.00% 84.29% 
6 100 100 0.001 83.2% 72.81% 97.81% 83.51% 
Table 6.3-4 – Model accuracy, precision, recall and f-score, as well as grid search metrics for the NetFlow/IPFIX 
dataset 
Models 1, 2 and 3 perform best in terms of accuracy and F-Score. A requirement for precision to be 
emphasised has been stated, so that as few false positives are passed to the mitigation system as 
possible. This would lead us to using Model 1 or 2, and since Model 1 has a slight advantage over 
Model 2 in terms or F1 and accuracy, Model 1 will continue to be used. 
Using an Intel I7-3770 with a base clock at 3.4GHz, and 16GB of DDR3 RAM training takes 53secs per 
epoch. With early stopping on, the amount of time each run takes does vary, however, the models 
usually stop training before 50 epochs, we can say that one complete run takes approximately 8 hours. 
Using a GPGPU dramatically decreases this, and runs using a RTX2080 typically took less than 2hrs 
when combined with an Intel I9-9900 clocked at 3.6GHz.  
6.4 Mitigation 
This section shall be split into four subsections, each representing one model within the mitigation plane. 
These are the Network Layer, the Attack Target, the Attack Vector, and the Attack Intended Impact. 
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6.4.1 Network Layer Targeted 
While the model for the first stage of the mitigation process could be based off the model for the binary 
classification (Section 6.3.3), there are several changes that would need to be made to make it suitable 
for multi-class classification. Previously the model (shown in Code 6.3-2) used precision to compare 
the success of it between epochs. This logically does not make sense for a multi-class problem, and so 
the metric is changed to mean squared error. Rather than attempting to increase precision, the model 
will now attempt to reduce the error between epochs. The different model shapes and sizes can be 
tested once more. The reduced size and composition of the datasets (caused by not training on any 
records that have not been identified as malicious in the initial analysis) means the other model shapes 
might be more effective. The model structures chosen are shown in Table 6.4-1. 
Model Number Model Structure 
Model 1 3x3, 3x3, 3x3, 2x2 
Model 2 2x2, 2x2, 2x2, 2x2, 2x2, 2x2, 2x2 
Table 6.4-1 – Table of model structures for the Layer Mitigation Model 
Additionally, the loss metric should be changed from binary crossentropy to mean squared error, as the 
problem is no longer a binary problem.    
In Chapter 3, it was stated that flows that were marked as being malicious from the classification phase 
would be used. This gives a better representation of the data the models would actually receive more 
generally, as if only malicious flows from the dataset were used, then the model would not ever be 
trained on benign data (or false positives). Part of the reasoning for this is that false positives should be 
flagged as having no action taken against them, and so should be included in the training set. The code 
needed to gather the data for training and testing is comparatively simple, as shown in Code 6.4-1: 
1. for row, Y in zip(X, classification_results): 
2.               if Y == 1: 
3.                   layerX.append(X) 
Code 6.4-1 – Code to gather data for mitigation stage 
This leads to the results found in Confusion matrix 6.4-1 and Confusion matrix 6.4-2: 
 Benign Network Application 
Benign 88.0% 0.9% 11.1% 
Network 4.7% 69.5% 25.8% 
Application 16.8% 0.3% 82.9% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-1 – Results for the Network Layer model within the Mitigation taxonomy with the first model 
structure 
 Benign Network Application 
Benign 44.7% 2.1% 53.2% 
Network 1.8% 74.3% 23.9% 
Application 12.2% 0.4% 87.3% 
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Confusion matrix 6.4-2 – Results for the Network Layer model within the Mitigation taxonomy with the second 
model structure 
Seen is that the first model has greater success in correctly identifying benign flows, while the second 
model has greater success in identifying Network and Application level attacks. At this stage, it is still 
important to minimise the number of misclassified benign flows, and the advantage the Model 2 has in 
accurately identifying Network and Application malicious activity is minor compared to Model 1 (74.3% 
vs 69.5% for Network and 87.3% vs 82.9% for Application). Additionally, the advantage for Model 1 in 
accurately defining benign flows is significant (88% vs 44.7%). For this reason, the Model 1 structure is 
chosen to continue. However, it is important to note that there are more malicious flows defined as 
benign for Model 1. This means automatic mitigation will not be undertaken against these flows; 
however, an alert will still have been raised with an administrator. 
6.4.2 Attack Target 
The next stage is the Attack Target. This model serves two main functions, the first is to remove any 
remaining benign activity. The second is to gain a reasonable idea of where the attack is taking place, 
so that this can be fed into the final decision on the activity to take.  
There are not many benign records left within the data set, and this can cause errors with upscaling 
methods such as SMOTE or ADASYN, since the number of examples can be less than the number of 
neighbours. Random Oversampling is therefore used in place and is compared to no oversampling at 
all. This is shown in Confusion matrix 6.4-3 and Confusion matrix 6.4-4: 
 
Benign Network OS Application 
Benign 100% 0% 0% 0% 
Network 3.8% 75.5% 1.3% 22.4% 
OS 1.2% 0.3% 31.1% 67.3% 
Application 0.3% 0% 1.0% 98.6% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-3 – Confusion Matrix for the Target in the Mitigation system with Random Oversampling 
 
Benign Network OS Application 
Benign 0% 66.7% 33.3% 0% 
Network 0% 75.8% 24.2% 0% 
OS 0% 0.3% 99.6% 0% 
Application 0% 0% 84.9% 15.1% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-4 – Confusion Matrix for the Target in the Mitigation system without Random Oversampling 
With oversampling all remaining benign flows are detected as such (with a small number of malicious 
flows being misclassified as benign). Without oversampling, no benign flows are detected as being 
classified as benign. Additionally, with the Random Oversampling the results for OS drop significantly 
(from 96.6% without to 31.1% with), however, this comes at the cost of also misclassifying Application 
Targets which also have results that drop without Random Oversampling (from 98.6% with 




6.4.3 Attack Vector 
The next stage is to determine the Vector for the remaining attacks. Again, the effect of random 
oversampling can be seen, however, now all benign flows have been classified as such the effects may 
not be as prominent. The results for these are shown in Confusion matrix 6.4-5 and Confusion matrix 
6.4-6. 
 
Benign Misconfiguration Insufficient 
Validation 
Vulnerabilities Users System 
Limitations 
Benign NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Misconfiguration 0% 78.8% 18.0% 3.2% 0% 0% 
Insufficient 
Validation 
0% 65.7% 29.3% 4.2% 0.8% 0% 
Vulnerabilities 0% 53.6% 11.4% 32.7% 2.0% 0.4% 
Users 0% 0% 0% 50.0% 50.0% 0% 
System 
Limitations 
7.2% 18.9% 3.5% 2.1% 0.3% 68.0% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-5 – Confusion Matrix for the Vector in the Mitigation system with Oversampling 
 
Benign Misconfiguration Insufficient 
Validation 
Vulnerabilities Users System 
Limitations 
Benign NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Misconfiguration NA 0.3% 0% 99.7% 0% 0% 
Insufficient 
Validation 
NA 0.2% 26.3% 73.5% 0% 0% 
Vulnerabilities NA 0% 0% 99.6% 0% 0.3% 
Users NA 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
System 
Limitations 
NA 0% 0% 25.4% 0% 74.6% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-6 – Confusion Matrix for the Vector in the Mitigation system without Oversampling 
As expected, the case to keep oversampling is far less clear. While it has a positive effect on the 
accuracy of Misconfiguration, Insufficient Validation and Users, it has a negative effect on all other 
vectors. 7.2% of System Limitation vector-based attacks are incorrectly classified as benign, meaning 
those attacks would not be automatically mitigated. However, without oversampling most vectors are 
being labelled as vulnerabilities. This is potentially showing signs of overfitting, as the model starts to 
show preference to the majority class. It is chosen to continue with oversampling for now. 
6.4.4 Impact Sought from Attack 
The final stage is to determine the impact the attack is attempting to achieve. The confusion matrix for 




Benign DoS  Information 
Disclosure 
Access Privilege 
Benign NA NA NA NA 
DoS 0.1% 93.6% 0.5% 5.8% 
Information 
Disclosure 
0% 12.0% 87.4% 0.6% 
Access Privilege 0% 67% 0.3% 32.6% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-7 – Confusion Matrix for the Impact in the Mitigation system without Oversampling 
 
Benign DoS  Information 
Disclosure 
Access Privilege 
Benign NA NA NA NA 
DoS 0% 99.7% 0.3% 0% 
Information 
Disclosure 
0% 5.1% 94.9% 0% 
Access Privilege 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Confusion matrix 6.4-8 – Confusion Matrix for the Impact in the Mitigation system with Oversampling 
It can again be seen that oversampling does aid overall accuracy. While both DoS and Information 
Disclosure attacks have good results without the oversampling, achieving 93.6% on DoS and 87.4% on 
Information Disclosure. However, only 32.6% of Access Privilege attacks are identified correctly. 
Additionally, only 0.1% of records are misclassified as benign, meaning that 99.9% of malicious activity 
that makes it to the final model will have some sort of mitigation applied to it. However, adding in 
oversampling achieves 100% accuracy on Access Privilege attacks, with 99.7% of DoS attacks correctly 
classified and 94.9% of Information Disclosure attacks correctly classified. This leads us to believe that 
Oversampling is still helping with the training process, despite the mixed results for Section 6.4.3 and 
the Attack Vector.   
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7 Evaluation and Results 
This Chapter will practically demonstrate the extent to which the objectives outlined in Section 1.2  have 
been achieved. This will be done by listing the objective, the experiment performed to show the objective 
was achieved and the results of the experiment. 
7.1 Develop a method to mitigate the effects of the limited data 
While the effects of the limited data on detection accuracy have been mitigated through using 
techniques such as SMOTE or ADASYN, as well as developing a custom model designed to handle 
the fewer features, this needs to be put into the context of wider works. As such, this section will 
compare the initial classification results to other state of the art results. This primarily needs to be done 
with the UNSW-NB15 dataset, as this is the most widely used. This work is compared to [41], [42], [43], 
[44]. 
 
Figure 7.1-1 – A comparison of this work to other state of the art results 
This work is broadly comparable to the others listed; however, this needs to be put into the perspective 
of the features used. All the comparable papers listed use the entire dataset, and all its features to gain 
their results. Alternatively, these results use a fraction of the features (70% fewer features than the 
cutting-edge works compared against). While accuracy may be slightly lower (at 85.1% vs an average 
of 89.5%), precision, and F-score are both competitive. SMOTE reaches a precision of 86.5% vs an 
average of 87.1%, and ADASYN achieves a higher precision then any of the works mentioned. 
Similarly, F-Score reaches 86.5% for SMOTE, verses an average of 88.5% for the other papers. The 
model should run quicker on comparable hardware (simply because there are fewer features to 












Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score
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7.2 Identify Other Potential Data Sources 
While results are comparable to other in the space, it is still needed to identify if the extra data extracted 
from logs has aided this, and to what extent. This can be performed through measuring the success of 
the initial model both with the extra data collected by logs and without. 
In Tables Table 7.2-1 and Table 7.2-2 are the results from models 1 and 3 for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. 





Learning Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
1 100 75 0.001 85.39% 97.05% 75.76% 85.10% 
3 100 50 0.01 85.03% 90.52% 81.33% 85.68% 





Learning Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
1 50 75 0.001 80.96% 88.43% 75.27% 81.32% 
3 75 100 0.001 84.06% 99.35% 71.52% 83.17% 
Table 7.2-2 – Results with the highest Accuracy and F-score for the UNSW-NB15 dataset without logs 
There is a clear difference, with accuracy and F-Score consistently lower for the results without logs. 
Precision is high for model 3 without logs, however this comes with very low recall, which indicates that 
overfitting is occurring, and the model is starting to register all activity as malicious. The number of 
epochs is lower for the results without the log data. This is another indication that overfitting is occurring, 
as early stopping is stopping the model learning significantly earlier than with the log data as accuracy 
has peaked. 





Learning Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
1 100 100 0.001 89.7% 91.5% 97.5% 94.4% 
3 75 150 0.01 82.1% 72.3% 87.54% 79.22% 





Learning Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
1 75 100 0.01 79.4% 79.3% 99.1% 88.1% 
3 50 150 0.01 76.2% 75.7% 99.4% 85.9% 
Table 7.2-4 – Results with the highest Accuracy and F-score for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset without logs 
These show similar trends, with lower accuracies and fewer epochs being run. It should also be noted 
that without logs, it is recall that showcases the overfitting, with results over 99% while precision is less 
than 80% for both models without logs. The difference between precision and recall is much less 
pronounced in both models with the extra log data. 
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7.3 Determine how to run the system at near line speed 
While steps have been taken throughout this thesis to ensure that processing complexity is kept to a 
minimum, it was stated in Sections 1.2 and 2.5 it was likely that some sort of sampling method for the 
occasions network load exceeds capacity to analyse that load. To that end a method has been 
established to assess the risk a flow may pose, through the use of HDBScan clustering. The next step 
is to determine if the clustering was successful. The goal of the clustering was to provide a risk score 
so that high risk clusters could be analysed first, and low risk clusters could be analysed last, or even 
ignored if system resources were stretched. In practice, both the UNSW-NB15 and NetFlow/IPFIX 
datasets that were used contain more malicious activity than would be normal. The NetFlow/IPFIX 
dataset was taken from a real-world network, however as part of the data preparation the size of the 
dataset was reduced, and malicious activity oversampled. Effectively this means that malicious data 
increased from being approximately 4% of the total dataset to being approximately 39%. This means 
that looking at absolute numbers is not effective, since these would not be representative. 
As such the proportion of flows that would have been clustered in a correct flow is analysed. For these 
four categories of risk are proposed. Clusters within 0%-25% are considered low, clusters within 26%-
50% are considered moderately low, clusters within 51%-75% are considered moderately high and 
clusters within 76%-100% are considered high risk. Ideally benign clusters are labelled as low risk, and 





















0% - 25% 
Low Risk 
789 0.015 0.012 211 0.002 0.012 
26% - 50% 
Moderately 
Low Risk 
6421 0.125 0.406 1481 0.012 0.303 
51% - 75% 
Moderately 
High Risk 
6373 0.124 0.678 48508 0.406 0.596 
76% - 100% 
High Risk 
37705 0.735 0.876 68141 0.571 0.959 
Table 7.3-1 – Proportion of malicious flows in the super clusters 
It can be seen that for both datasets the proportion of flows that is considered low risk (0%-25% risk 
score) is exceptionally small, with only 1.5% of the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, and 0.2% of the UNSW-
NB15 dataset. This is good since these flows are least likely to be analysed further. Additionally, 
malicious flows only make up 12.5% of moderately low risk (26%-50%) flows within the NetFlow/IPFIX 
dataset, and 1.2% for the UNSW-NB15 dataset.  
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Similarly, most malicious flows are correctly identified as high risk (76%-100%). For the NetFlow/IPFIX 
dataset, 73.5% of malicious flows are deemed high risk, and 57.1% of flows for the UNSW-NB15 
dataset. This means that 87.6% of flows within the high-risk category for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset are 
malicious, and 95.9% of high-risk flows within the UNSW-NB15 are malicious. In both cases, even if 
only high-risk flows were analysed, more than 70% of malicious activity would be analysed. If this 
analysis is moved to include both high and moderately high risk (51%-75%), then more than 85% of 
malicious activity will be analysed for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, and more than 95% of malicious 
activity will be analysed for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. This compares to only slightly more than 10% of 
benign flows being analysed for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, however slightly more than 60% of benign 
activity would also be analysed for the UNSW-NB15. Still, in a real-world system, being able to ignore 
40% of flows in exchange for analysing 95% of malicious activity might be considered worthwhile.  
7.4 Determine a method to mitigate even 0-day threats 
The mitigation method developed is flexible, and rather than attempting to identify the exact attack being 
performed (something that is logically not always possible for 0-day threats), instead attempts to 
determine the major aspects of the attack that could lead to a successful mitigation strategy. To 
determine whether this method has been successful, two factors need to be established. The first is 
whether the cascading nature (i.e. the feeding of results from lower level models to higher level models) 
of the mitigation models has been successful. If there is no benefit from the cascading results, then the 
models could be run in parallel to decrease reaction time. The second is to compare the results to other 
state of the art results attempting to classify all attack types, to ensure the results are comparable.  
The first step is to identify that the cascading model structure is effective through comparing results on 
the Vector and Impact models, both with and without the previous model’s data. Vector and Impact are 
chosen, as these have the largest effect on what the end mitigation would be. 
7.4.1 Vector 
The first step is to compare the Vector results with and without the extra data provided by previous 
models in Confusion matrix 7.4-1 and Confusion matrix 7.4-2: 
 
Benign Misconfiguration Insufficient 
Validation 
Vulnerabilities Users System 
Limitations 
Benign NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Misconfiguration NA 0.3% 0% 99.7% 0% 0% 
Insufficient 
Validation 
NA 0.2% 26.3% 73.5% 0% 0% 
Vulnerabilities NA 0% 0% 99.7% 0% 0.3% 
Users NA 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
System 
Limitations 
NA 0% 0% 25.4% 0% 74.6% 




Benign Misconfiguration Insufficient 
Validation 
Vulnerabilities Users System 
Limitations 
Benign NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Misconfiguration NA 0% 0% 99.4% 0% 0.6% 
Insufficient 
Validation 
NA 0% 24.4% 75.2% 0% 0.4% 
Vulnerabilities NA 0% 0.1% 99.4% 0% 0.5% 
Users NA 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
System 
Limitations 
NA 0% 0% 24.6% 0% 75.4% 
Confusion matrix 7.4-2 – Vector Confusion Matrix without taking extra data from earlier models 
While there are common trends between both confusion matrixes (such as the propensity for malicious 
activity to be labelled as vulnerabilities) it can be seen that the extra data seems to have had an effect. 
Insufficient validation, vulnerabilities and misconfiguration all show an increase in accuracy (albeit 
minor) and misclassified flows are generally higher without the extra data. The exception is system 
limitations, which has slightly more flows classified as vulnerabilities with the additional data. It is 
possible that the changes are caused by run to run variance, as they are all within 3%, and frequently 
within 1%. It should be noted however, that by this point the dataset is growing quite small as all benign 
flows have been removed. This means that comparatively small numbers of flows changing classes 
can cause comparatively large shifts in the results. It should also be remembered that the models were 
run 10 times (through 10-fold cross validation) in an attempt to remove variance. It is concluded 
therefore that the extra data does have a positive effect, though the effect is small for the Vector itself. 
Additionally, it should be remembered that the small size of the remaining dataset will be affecting 
accuracy. Deep learning models require large volumes of information (Section 2.3) and by this point all 
benign data has been removed from the dataset, as well as some misclassified malicious data, reducing 
the amount of data available to learn. 
7.4.2 Impact 
The same comparison is then made, but with Impact rather than Vector. The final model is most 
important, since it has the largest effect on the end mitigation taken. Quarantining systems under a DoS 
attack for example would not be effective, and redirection of flows to another legitimate target will not 
be effective for Access Privilege attacks. Presented are the results of the Impact both with and without 
the extra data in Confusion matrix 7.4-3 and Confusion matrix 7.4-4: 
 
Benign DoS  Information 
Disclosure 
Access Privilege 
Benign NA NA NA NA 
DoS 0% 99.7% 0.3% 0% 
Information 
Disclosure 
0% 5.1% 94.9% 0% 
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Access Privilege 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Confusion matrix 7.4-3 – Confusion Matrix for Impact with extra data from earlier models 
 
Benign DoS  Information 
Disclosure 
Access Privilege 
Benign NA NA NA NA 
DoS 0% 0.8% 0.7% 98.5% 
Information 
Disclosure 
0% 0% 87.6% 12.4% 
Access Privilege 0% 0% 0.6% 99.3% 
Confusion matrix 7.4-4 – Confusion Matrix for Impact without taking extra data from earlier models 
Here the results are much more pronounced than with the Vector. All categories achieve above 90% 
accuracy with the data from previous models. The difference is clearly in the classification of Access 
Privilege Impacts, which while only increasing accuracy from 99.3% to 100% also eliminates any 
misclassification of other Impacts as Access Privilege. Without the extra data there is a tendency for 
the model to classify as Access Privilege, which is particularly pronounced in DoS attacks. This again 
could be a sign of overfitting, which the extra data negates.  
7.4.3 Comparisons to previous works 
While comparisons to previous works are more difficult, owing to the novel way malicious activity is 
being classified, some comparisons can still be made. Table 7.4-1 shows this work compared to others 
with categorial accuracy and FAR: 
Work Accuracy FAR 
This work 88.2% 10.3% 
Deep Reinforcement Learning 
based Intrusion Detection 
System for Cloud Infrastructure 
[112] 
83.8% 2.6% 
A Network Intrusion Detection 
Method Based on Stacked 
Autoencoder and LSTM [84] 
89.2 10.8% 
An Ensemble-based Network 
Intrusion Detection Scheme 
with Bayesian Deep Learning 
[113] 
96.9% 0.9% 
Hybrid Machine Learning For 
Network Anomaly Intrusion 
Detection [114] 
95.4% 11.9% 
Table 7.4-1 – Comparisons of multi-class classification 
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It can be seen that this work achieves comparable accuracy to other state of the art works, however 
FAR is slightly higher than usual. Part of the reasoning for this is that there was an emphasis on ensuring 
that there were no benign flows being mitigated. As such, all of the misclassified flows are from 
malicious flows being misclassified as other types of malicious flows. Most of these are from the Vector 
model, which from Confusion matrix 7.4-1 can be seen did have a number of misclassified flows, notably 
Users and Insufficient validation.   
It should also be noted that the same thing is not strictly being classified. All of the above papers are 
classifying based on the single attack type (described in Section 2.6). This is potentially more difficult, 
since there are 9 classes, rather than the (at most) 6 used in this work. At the same time, this work uses 
far fewer features, and a far smaller dataset with all of the benign records removed by this point. 
Additionally it should also be noted that [113] and [114] use the full unprepared dataset, which has been 
stated is slightly easier. At the time of running, the dataset has been reduced to 74,854 records from 
the original 175,341, a reduction of more than 100,000 records, or 58% of the dataset records. This 
work is also still only using the data features provided in earlier sections, plus the additional analysis 
performed as part of the process. We start with only 28% of the features, and less than half of the 







The clustering method to create a risk score was successful. While it is possible that some flows may 
not be analysed due to being placed in a low risk grouping, this is possible with any kind of sampling 
method. It is unlikely with the method proposed however, with only 1.2% of all attacks for the 
NetFlow/IPFIX dataset and 0.2% of all attacks for the UNSW-NB15 dataset being placed into the lowest 
risk grouping. Additionally, 57.1% of malicious flows from the UNSW-NB15 dataset, and 73.5% of 
malicious flows from the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset are placed in the highest risk class, ensuring they are 
analysed with a high priority. This extends to over 95% for the UNSW-NB15 dataset and over 85% for 
the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset if you include any cluster that had a risk score of over 50%.  
With regards to the initial classification, it is acknowledged that recall could use improvement, with the 
best results from SMOTE being around 86%-89%. However, this means that precision is lowered, 
meaning that more benign flows could be classified as malicious. It is also important to note that these 
results should be taken into consideration with other results from other authors. The UNSW-NB15 
prepared dataset is difficult, and the best state of the art results range between 90%-95%. Chapter 2 
shows this with some comparative papers, and the results achieved within this thesis tend to be within 
5% of the best. This work also uses only 29% of the whole dataset, and that these comparative works 
use the entire set. The benefits of using a smaller dataset include faster processing time, as well as it 
being more applicable to multiple SDN environments and situations.  
It should also be noted that that the ADASYN model has lower recall specifically. This is likely due to 
overfitting starting to occur, combined with ADASYN increasing the number of difficult to classify 
attacks. SMOTE (which increases all records equally) instead sees an increase in recall n_components 
equalling 0.96 onwards. The ADASYN model is used in order to reduce the number of false positives, 
however given the mitigation solution removes false positives as well, it could be considered better to 
aim for higher recall at this stage and reduce the number of false positives later.  
Additionally, the classifier for the model is a DNN with a softmax activation. Other types of shallow 
classifiers have been found to work particularly well, including more recently random forests. While 
some experimentation was carried out, the initial results were not significantly better than the DNN after 
the CNN, and so more experimentation and refinement was not pursued. However, previous studies 
[103] show that this is potentially something to return to, and random forests can prove effective 
classifiers after a CNN has been used to reduce the dataset. Potentially the initial lack of results could 
have been due to the use of PCA at the start of the process, and again this is something that could be 
experimented with. 
The same can be said of PCA itself. There are numerous ways of reducing the feature space. PCA was 
chosen as it has been shown to be successful in the past [49], [84], and its implementation allows for 
us to decide how much information to keep, whereas other methods decide how many features to have 
at the end of the process. It is possible however, that other systems would lead to better classification 
accuracy. Again, some experimentation was carried out with using random forests as a feature 
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extractor, but the results were not significantly better than PCA and so further experimentation or 
refinement was not pursued. 
The process of “chaining” together multiple models in order to gather a final classification and mitigation 
proved successful as the results show that data from previous models aids in accuracy of the following 
models, even though they are not directly classifying the same thing. The fact that there is always an 
option for benign results mean that any benign flows get removed after the second (Target) model. The 
number of false negatives also stays consistently low, meaning that most of the initially detected attacks 
stay within the mitigation system. More to the point, the type of attack (DoS, Information Disclosure or 
Access privilege) is successfully determined with high degrees of success. 93.6% of DoS attacks are 
correctly identified, which is important since they have been assigned a unique mitigation measure 
(sinkhole or redirection to other legitimate source depending upon the certainty of malicious intent). 
Information disclosure is correctly predicted 87.4% of the time, however Access privilege is only 
correctly predicted 32.6% of the time. More importantly access privilege is incorrectly identified as DoS 
67% of the time. This will cause issues with the mitigation strategies, as it means several access 
privilege attempts will be mitigated through Sinkhole or redirection. Developing a sinkhole would work, 
in much the same way blocking the relevant IP would work, however redirection would not be successful 
at all. 
Both methods would remove the opportunity to view the attacker’s actions through the safety of a 
honeypot, which could be the preferred option as it would give an idea as to what access the malicious 
user was aiming for, and why. However, it is likely that the sinkhole option would be deployed, as 
malicious clusters were typically given a risk score of above 0.75. This also means that the option of 







9 Conclusions and Future Works 
This chapter shall discuss whether the overall aims of the project succeeded, and what potential future 
work could consist of. To do this the aims will be discussed, and how they were accomplished, along 
with any improvements that can be made, and then turn to future work. 
9.1 An initial risk assessment mechanism  
As discussed in Chapter 8, the initial risk assessment was largely successful. Malicious flows were 
largely clustered together, giving a good indication as to the level of risk an individual flow within a 
cluster might possess (Table 7.3-1). Likewise, benign flows are largely clustered together, giving a good 
indication of low risk. In fact, with the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset there were 11 clusters that contained no 
malicious flows (making a risk score of 0 (Figure 6.3-2)). Assuming that a system’s resources would be 
stretched to the point of only being able to analyse moderately high risk or greater flows, this would 
mean that 60.2% of flows would be ignored with the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, while still analysing over 
85% of malicious activity. The method could use improvement for the UNSW-NB15 dataset however, 
with only 13% of flows being ignored. However, this does come with the caveat that 97.7% of malicious 
activity is considered moderately high risk or greater, and so would be analysed.  
If the criteria were changed to be only high-risk flows were analysed, then 59.5% of data is ignored, 
while still analysing 57.1% of all malicious activity for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. While still not quite as 
good as the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, this does indicate there is room for setting what risk level an 
administrator is happy to live with, verses  how much of the data traversing the network they want to 
analyse.  
It should be remembered that the system proposed would probably not be used in isolation, but as the 
initial part of a holistic defence that seeks to stop as much malicious activity as possible without 
disruption to services or users. Unfortunately, for each model the “unclustered” cluster -1 was the largest 
cluster. In of itself this might not be considered an issue. The fact that the data points were unclustered 
indicates they were anomalous. The risk score for the -1 cluster was also the closest to being 50% in 
both datasets, however, even so it did have a risk score of 56.9% for the UNSW-NB15 dataset and 
40.7% for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset, which still indicates a preference for malicious and benign flows 
respectively. In particular it is believed the result for the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset is particularly good 
considering the noise inherent in such datasets. The -1 cluster is an intended effect of using HDBScan. 
Every flow does not need to be clustered, since again the fact that they are a part of the unclustered 
cluster is significant. Other clustering methods were considered, such as k-means, which will ensure 
every point is within a cluster. However, instead of producing 1 cluster that had an ambiguous risk 
score, it produced many smaller clusters with ambiguous risk scores as the -1 grouping was split into 
smaller groups without any significant change in risk scores. 
9.2 An alternative to network packet data 
It can be seen that adding the logging data increased accuracy and F-score overall, with increases of 
almost 10% (Section 7.2 and Table 7.2-3 and Table 7.2-4 in particular). This log data is readily available 
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and allowed the system to compare favourably against other state-of-the-art systems (Section 7.1) that 
are using much more computationally expensive methods to gather data. While log processing speed 
has not specifically analysed, it is felt that this is a fast and efficient way to integrate data into future 
IDSs given that much of the log analysis may be being done, as a separate part of business security 
processes, and one that should allow real time analysis of network flows in a useful manner. From the 
results in Section 7.1, this work compares favourably with the results from the most relevant and current 
state-of the-art works. An important point is that this work uses only 28% of the data other researchers 
use with the same dataset, moving from 43 features to only 12 in the case of the UNSW-NB15 dataset, 
and only 11 features being used in the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset. Usually, deep models are trained on 
images consisting of at least hundreds (in the case of datasets such as MNIST) and more commonly 
thousands of features. Much of the reason for the comparable results comes from the addition of the 
few extra features that were added in the form of log analysis, as well as data pre-processing from 
ADASYN or SMOTE, however shown is that small but deep models can still be successful in analysing 
these smaller datasets. It is believed that this is the first time that such a small but deep model has been 
used in this manner to achieve these kinds of results. This is important, as smaller models take less 
time to train and run (Section 3.1.2, [87], [115]). This is a very time sensitive environment, and for any 
mitigations to take place, the analysis needs to be completed before the flow has finished. A smaller 
model helps with this. Often pooling layers are used to aid in reducing computational complexity, with 
a minimum of effect on accuracy [88], [89]. While not shown, these layers were also tested, and it was 
found that the reduction in the feature space adversely affected accuracy, precision and recall as the 
model could not be made as deep, even with the addition of 1*1 sized kernel layers to help. This again 
shows the limitations of the datasets with so few features.  
Having said that the model is not perfect. Recall is lower than would be preferred, which would lead to 
malicious activity not being flagged. Higher values can be achieved, but this comes at the cost of 
precision, making accuracy and F-Score typically stay around the same level. Additionally, 
unsupervised methods could be considered. Unsupervised machine learning is making great strides in 
the network anomaly research area, as it is seen as being more practical than supervised learning, not 
required labelled datasets. However, the use of the HDBScan risk assessment is considered cause 
enough to continue with a supervised approach. Any kind of machine learning is more computationally 
complex than the signature approach in use now, and even signature approaches struggle with network 
load, and more efficient sampling or prioritisation techniques are required. 
9.3 Mitigation system capable of bespoke responses to different threats 
Most works attempt to classify flows according to the grouping they are placed in within the dataset 
(DoS, Fuzzer, etc). However, this does not help in mitigating an attack. It is true that in order to mitigate 
an attack you must be able to tell what the attack is, however, the classifications given within datasets 
do not necessarily help. For instance, DoS attacks can come in many forms. DDoS attacks are typically 
flood based attacks which attempt to overwhelm a networks capacity (Network Plane, Network Target, 
System Limitation Vector and DoS Impact). A buffer overflow DoS on the other hand, will attempt to 
exploit vulnerabilities in the OS or Application which cause it to error and crash (Application Plane, OS 
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or Application Target, Vulnerabilities Vector and DoS Impact). It is fair to say that the datasets in use 
only offer what the Impact of the attack will be, and not the information required to mitigate it. Within 
this work inspiration was taken from [68] in building a deep learning system designed to identify what 
Plane, Target and Vector are being used, and designed a mitigation system that would build a response 
based upon these. If a DoS impact had been identified, then the system should never completely block 
a system, since this would achieve the attacker’s goals. Likewise, redirecting to legitimate sources 
should never be used in situations where a malicious actor is attempting to gain access to restricted 
information, since this would have no real effect. The implementation of the system is largely successful, 
with good accuracy rates considering the reduced dataset being used. Additionally, it has been shown 
that feeding the results from one CNN to the next was particularly helpful, increasing accuracy by up to 
10%. 
It is believed this is the first time a taxonomy has been used in this way. Typically, once an attack has 
been identified by name, an appropriate response would be looked up (either in a database or by hand) 
and the measures implemented (e.g. installing a patch). The method proposed should be more 
generalisable since it does not rely on previous attacks being analysed and a defence process being 
formed. Any attack that that the same attributes will have the same mitigation measures put in place, 
even if they are otherwise unrelated. However, it does suffer in terms of total number of attacks being 
mitigated, with only 65% of all malicious activity having a mitigation automatically undertaken. This 
could have been configured to be higher, however you start to get benign activity having mitigations 
measures automatically undertaken which could have unpredictable consequences.   
9.4 Limitations 
This work does of course have a number of limitations. The datasets being used are one significant 
limitation. While the UNSW-NB15 dataset is the state of the art for research in this area, it does not 
perfectly encapsulate the desired features (such as the sentiment analysis from the logs from the 
NetFlow/IPFIX dataset). Likewise, the NetFlow/IPFIX dataset is far from perfect. As has been stated, 
since it consists of raw data, the training, testing, and evaluation datasets had to be generated. This 
makes comparisons to other works more difficult, even assuming there would be many other works to 
make comparisons to. Unfortunately, there is no “one size fits all” in this respect. Datasets offering the 
raw data needed generally do not have prepared datasets to make easy comparisons. One area where 
this is slightly different is in the area of log analysis itself, where there are some datasets with the raw 
data separated up to make comparisons easier. However, these do not contain network flow data since 
the emphasis is on HIDS. Even within the HIDS arena, datasets are somewhat limited by the wide 
variety of possible hardware implementations. A dataset looking at SSH compromise is inherently 
different to an Android malware system call dataset for instance. 
Moving away from datasets, the choice of OpenFlow as the base for deciding what data is available is 
not perfect either. OpenFlow is only one SDN implementation, and while many high profile networking 
companies are using OpenFlow as the base in their solutions [4], they may choose to offer different 
features than those that have been listed. OpenFlow is the most universally available SDN solution, 
however it rarely exists as a product in of itself, rather as a product that service providers can offer 
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support for in cross platform network environments. This work takes the same approach, attempting to 
ensure that any features that are used will always be available, but it is possible that other features are 
available that were missed as they are not “guaranteed” available. Likewise, not every SDN solution is 
built on OpenFlow, and for those solutions it is possible features may have been used that do not exist 
in those implementations.  
This moves into a broader limitation, that being those made in Section 4.1 about the network structure. 
As has been stated, networks are changing, and the conventional view of a network being comprised 
of servers and clients is changing. On top of that, even superficially similar networks will have different 
structures and services. A variety of possible log data types have been incorporated, that show what 
may be possible, however exactly what log features are used will change from network to network. 
There is no way to fully account for all network types, or even all log types.  
The work also makes extensive use of scikit-learn [100], which is a scientific library designed for 
research in shallow machine learning techniques. It may not be the best tool to use in production 
environments, and compile times, hyperparameter options and tuning may be different for production 
tools. These could change even the accuracy of the results. TensorFlow [116] and Keras were also 
used, however these are much more used to being used in production environments. 
9.5 Future Work 
The work presented could be applied to different domains and continued in different areas. Some areas 
for future research involve: 
1. Cloud Computing 
As has been stated in Section 9.4, not all network environments have been considered, and 
cloud computing is an example of one area where this is true. Cloud computing has become 
more popular over recent years, as individuals and businesses attempt to leverage the scales 
of economy server farms such as Microsoft’s Azure or Amazon’s AWS provide. This work 
assumes a traditional network infrastructure with all servers being monitored in house. 
However, this is not necessarily true. Microsoft and Amazon are responsible for the security of 
servers placed with them, but do not necessarily have full access to logs, and likewise the 
administrators of the servers do not have full access to the network flows that interact with their 
servers. However, this work does pose some possible advantages for cloud environments. 
Established is that log data can supplement network flow data to aid in detection of anomalies, 
however the reverse should also be true, i.e. network flow data should be able to aid in the 
detection of anomalies for HIDS, perhaps supplementing the data for any HIDS Microsoft and 
Amazon have to increase accuracy and keep customers secure. Additional data could also 
potentially come from network devices such as routers or switches. These devices do keep 
their own logs, though usually for a short period of time due to memory concerns. These logs 
could potentially be used to increase accuracy on HIDS through monitoring anomalous network 




The work could be extended to IoT and sensor networks, potentially as a fog network extension. 
The sensors in sensor networks are coming under more scrutiny, and methods for securing 
these networks are still evolving. One of the challenging aspects is how to run IDS systems on 
such low power devices. However, SDN is being investigated as a potential aid to help manage 
these low power networks, using fog systems to run the SDN controller. The same process 
could happen with this system. Instead of attempting to run security systems on these low 
powered devices, move the processing to the fog, with the SDN flows serving as an indicator 
of malicious activity. Additionally, the sensor information itself could potentially serve as an 
invaluable source of data in the security process, taking the place of log data in the proposed 
solution. While sensor data monitoring temperature (for example) is clearly not a detailed log, 
combining the temperature reading with flow data at the time of malicious activity may give a 
better indication of that malicious activity (i.e. does the temperature fluctuate at the time of the 
malicious activity, or is the temperature reading missing entirely). 
3. Traffic Shaping 
A change of focus could lead this research to being used as a way to balance legitimate traffic. 
Generally, SDN helps administrators balance network traffic through dynamically changing the 
flow rules based up measures such as traffic volume or packet size. However, using the NHFs 
provided in this work, along with logs consisting of server resource usage, it could be envisioned 
that rather than responding to malicious activity the system could predict loads that are going 
to be computationally expensive, and dynamically redirect them to servers that have a low load. 
Essentially the models would be predicting traffic that is going to be computationally expensive 
and directing it dynamically to ensure QoS requirements are maintained. 
4. Semi-supervised or Unsupervised deep learning IDS 
The initial risk assessment could be expanded up on to create its own IDS. While the HDBScans 
results were not sufficient to rely upon as an IDS itself, it has been shown how adding additional 
small amounts of data can aid with results. It is possible that adding other small amounts of 
data could allow the risk assessment to perform well as an unsupervised IDS. This is something 
that was briefly looked into, however timing restrictions prevented a full analysis.  
5. Other Network Types 
This work has been carried out on an assumption of it being placed into a midsized corporate 
network, large enough to realise the benefits of SDN, but also have access to traditional server 
logs. However, it could be expanded to other network types with different logs types. Backbone 
internet companies are frequently transitioning to using SDN, and though not looked at in this 
work, router logs could be a source of valuable information for this kind of tool (packets dropped 
due to age, or invalid destinations etc). The limitations however would still be the load required 
to run the service. As traffic increases, so will the load of the IMS and SDN controller, and so 
the viability of moving to backbone internet structure would need to be assessed. Digital Twins 
are an evolving area of research, and some of the work regarding logs could be transferred to 
there, potentially to detect attacks on physical assets by monitoring associated meta data and 
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